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A presentation of Feliks Koneczny's
modified method of the study of civilizations
in order to capture
the inner civilization of man

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Introduction

As our premise, we shall adopt the fact that every person is in some way internally structured. This statement does not tell us much, if anything, about the causes of this structuring, nor the relationships between specific kinds (or types) of internal structure—despite the fact that this is the subject of a very old reflection that goes back before the beginnings of philosophy. If we think of pre-philosophical, let alone pre-scientific examples of this kind of observation or reflection, then what immediately comes to mind are zodiac signs, characterology, personality types (choleric, sanguine, etc.), matchmaking based on character traits, tempering or bending hard types, etc.

We have, therefore, many examples (from basically all parts of the world spanning all eras) of a certain intuition that man is "somehow" internally structured and that this "somehow" does not necessarily align with all other "somehows." This intuition is rooted in our experience, both internal and external. While relying on experience, it has been observed that certain inner constitutions do not cooperate harmoniously and fruitfully with other inner constitutions, while perfectly agreeing with others. This wisdom of innumerable generations of matchmakers leads

us, though perhaps somewhat indirectly, to the issue that will be at the center of our reflection (and around which we shall outline preliminarily our research method): "the inner civilization" that appears in the title of the book. We could also call it "the inner structure" and we shall use the two terms interchangeably. What this "inner civilization" actually is will become clearer in *Chapter III*.

From the very beginning, let us clarify that our objective is not to trace the history of thought regarding types or personalities of humans.[1] In our research, we shall draw on various data, but primarily on the thought of Feliks Koneczny at times complemented with the ideas of José Ortega y Gasset, Gustave Le Bon, Bogusław Wolniewicz and Étienne Gilson's principle of impersonal necessity. With these "aids," we shall present a model of studying a human being that may help us develop the question of their inner "structure" that we have also called "civilization."[2] Here, we need to emphasize that our analyses only prepare the foundations for further

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1   Such works are already available in libraries and we have used them extensively while working on our topic. We have found the following literature to be especially relevant to us: Hall, Lindzey, Campbell, *Teorie osobowości*; Stanik, *Skala ustosunkowań interpersonalnych*; Dąbrowski, *Osobowość i jej kształtowanie*; Costa, McCrae, *Osobowość dorosłego człowieka*; Berne, *Games People Play*.

2   From the psychological perspective, our solutions overlap in certain (sometimes considerable) areas with the research results of Kazimierz Dąbrowski, Lawrence Kohlberg, and their followers. However, generally, our conclusions go beyond the scope of strictly psychological (or psychiatric) research. Also, their starting point is different from the premises adopted in psychology and psychiatry.
Cf. Dąbrowski, *Dezintegracja pozytywna*; Dąbrowski, *Positive desintegration*; Dąbrowski, *Osobowość i jej kształtowanie*; Kohlberg, *The Philosophy of Moral Development*.

studies and solutions. We only propose an outline of a method that must be critiqued. Therefore, we do not claim to provide final assertions or solutions.

It is only after discussing the concepts of the above thinkers and introducing certain changes to their thoughts, that it will be possible to comprehend the outcome of our studies. Should we present it straight away, it would surely be misunderstood, which would inevitably impact the reception of the whole book. The basic premise of this work boils down to the question whether it is possible to use Koneczny's method of studying civilizations in order to find, in man, elements that influence his behavior, and thereby determine what we call the inner civilization. We put forward the thesis that such an implementation of Koneczny's thought is possible. In subsequent parts of this book, we present a proposal of a method based on the concept of civilizations (along with the appropriate modifications), and the outcome of implementing this method in the shape of a civilization not described by Koneczny. While presenting the method proposed, we shall ask certain questions, which will help us, at least partially, to show how this method works and how we define "the inner civilization." It is hard to decide which question we should begin with. We may surely pose a number of them and ultimately, we shall end up with those that are of most interest to us in the light of our reflection.

Let us start with the following: **why do I do this and not something else?** Why, for example, do I choose a vegetarian diet as opposed to a paleo diet? Why do I vote for liberals or conservatives, why do I even vote at all? The issue may seem to have been philosophically exhausted. For we know the discussions between determinists and indeterminists (in our work we adopt indeterminism due to the reasons that Karl Popper and Roman Ingarden

alluded to).[3] Our libraries are full of anthropological texts that explain human behavior, the influence of society, so-called culture, and whatnot on our behavior and choices. Are we not preaching to the converted and trying hard to revive a topic which is already a thing of the past? These various proposals and solutions, however, do not ultimately resolve the issue that we shall discuss. In light of this, our study, therefore, is not a waste of time. Should we rely on some concept e.g. of social influence lying behind our actions, we might close ourselves off to the problem that we want to elucidate, or even resolve.[4]

The question we have asked above: **why do I do this and not something else?** may be treated collectively, as one that comprises many other, more detailed questions. Let us present a few of those that are essential to our further analyses:

- what is the efficient cause of my action?
- what is the final cause of my action?
- are the efficient cause and the final cause not the same cause?
- what is my action consistent with?

In the realm of philosophy, diverse answers have been given to the first three questions.[5] Of course, the fourth question has also been answered,[6] but we shall focus on it because it will lead us further on. The question regarding the consistency of my

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3   Popper, *The Open Universe*, especially ch. 3; Ingarden, "Człowiek i czas," 41–74; Ingarden, "O odpowiedzialności j jej podstawach ontycznych," 75–184.
4   We have set ourselves a smaller goal while striving for a larger one.
5   See for example Spaemann, Löw, *Cele naturalne*.
6   Among Polish works, the book by Leon Petrażycki is worth noticing: Petrażycki, *O pobudkach postępowania*, chapters 1 and 6 in particular (available online at: http://dir.icm.edu.pl/O_pobudkach_postepowania/info—access 15th August 2024). From a slightly different perspective, these issues have been addressed in Christianity from the very beginning (Cf. Rom 7:14–24

action with something external and internal forces us to adopt a few assumptions (for example: my actions are not thoughtless or nonsensical; there is the subject of actions that acts consciously; apart from a subject that acts, there exists something). Moreover, it allows us to lead our thoughts and questions in two directions: external and internal. Thus, the question of consistency may refer to something external to me (e.g. the nature of the things I use) or something internal. The second case, however, should not be interpreted as "being consistent with oneself" or "being in harmony with oneself." Let us note that we adopt the following assumption (later it will be explained in detail)[7]: man cannot act inconsistently with oneself. This does not, of course, mean that while doing certain things, one cannot feel some discomfort. We shall elaborate on this issue further.[8] The question regarding consistency with something internal entails what a given person knows, feels, understands, believes, etc. We cannot, however, treat this "set" as a certain "self" of a person, as something that constitutes them, or, on the other hand, merely as their worldview. For now, let us treat the elements of this set as ideas understood as intentional beings with certain significance.

What does this consistency of one's actions with something internal consist of? It is the consistency of one's actions (not all of them, but we shall elaborate on this in *Chapters III and IV*) with the above ideas. Therefore, one of the main theses of our reflection is: **a man never acts contrary to his ideas.**

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or problems raised by the Desert Fathers, especially Evagrius of Pontus and his reflections on acedia) (Ewagriusz z Pontu, *Pisma ascetyczne*, Vol. I–II).

7   See p. 122ff, 155ff.
8   See p. 122ff, 155ff.

We realize this is a controversial thesis, and one may find many examples to refute it. A significant part of our argument will be devoted to proving that this assertion is true, or at least highly probable.[9] Therefore, we ask the reader to look for examples that could undermine this thesis, and to try to falsify it at the appropriate moment.

Ideas that we discuss are wide-ranging and not all of them interest us. We search for "fundamental ideas."[10] Consistency with these ideas determines whether a given action may take place. Also, it will determine the so-called convictions. Here, we must explain that by action(s) we mean not only a given act that takes place, but also one's motivations. As an example, let us consider giving alms to poor person A who is begging. People X, Y, and Z give this person the same amount of money. We can *prima facie* say that we deal with the same three actions. If we take into account their motivations, however, we can conclude that in the case of X, it was a simple act of charity, in the case of Y Pharisaism as understood by Max Scheler,[11] whereas Z did it because of social pressure. We would be glad if the reader now felt some resistance to my statement based either on Immanuel Kant's theses or the anti-psychological stance (in its narrow understanding) in philosophy. Kant believed that one may never know for sure what really motivated the act of a given person or even one's own act.[12] A proponent of the anti-psychological stance in philosophy could legitimately inquire what the difference between our study

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9   In accordance with the presuppositions of the critical hypothetical realism cf. Oko, *W poszukiwaniu pewności*, ch. 3.3, especially p. 273.
10 Cf. Ortega y Gasset, "Idee i przeświadczenia."
11 Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik*, 115, 120.
12 Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*.

and psychology is.[13] We shall argue that both of these objections are wrong.

Having briefly delineated the direction of our study, we should add that discerning these fundamental ideas (and convictions) leads us to subsequent issues regarding e.g. the connections between them. Thus, we shall have questions related to the possibilities and combinations between these ideas. We shall call the whole set of these ideas and convictions, for now discussed only generally, "the inner civilization of man" or "inner structuring of man."

However, we cannot leave a man on the operating table of our philosophical surgery and claim that we have done away with the problem. We have to go to a deeper level and inquire about the reasons for adopting certain fundamental ideas and convictions. We must admit that these issues will be the least elucidated for we know the least about them. However, the thoughts of outstanding intellectuals that we take as our guides will, at least to some extent, shed some light on the issue.

Ultimately, and this is the goal of our reflection, we shall try to give answers to (or illuminate) the following questions:

• what is in fact "the inner civilization"?
• what are the kinds of inner civilization?
• what are sets of fundamental ideas and the question of conviction?
• what is the method of studying fundamental ideas and convictions?

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13 See for example Ingarden, *Z badań nad filozofią współczesną*, 271–290. From the psychological perspective see, for example, Peterson, *Maps of Meaning*; Hall, Lindzey, Campbell, *Teorie osobowości*.

- how do we recognize the so-called fundamental "choice"?
- what is the influence of the fundamental "choice" on the further development of one's inner civilization?
- what are the difficulties related to one's change of civilization (e.g. the problem of disintegration)?
- what is the influence of one's civilization on one's actions?
- additionally, we shall emphasize that various ideas and civilizations tend to bear the same names. For example, one cannot be a Catholic and a pro-choicer. And yet, we know so many people who are pro-choicers and consider themselves Catholics. We shall discuss such difficulties separately so as not to fall into traps that language sets for us. We shall see that due to the concept of inner civilization, such terms, or "labels" that pigeonhole people and create chaos can become less problematic, and often redundant.

In the *Introduction*, we should explain the choice of thinkers on which we will rely. Their common trait is conservative views (though in his time, Ortega y Gasset was considered a liberal), and yet they are thinkers who worked in different times and socio-intellectual milieus. Moreover, their analyses refer to such varied planes of organization of human life, that the reader may doubt whether this selection is justified.

Should we take each of these thinkers separately and adopt their thoughts as they are, then this doubt would indeed be grounded. For even though each of them had something interesting to say about the human condition, it would be difficult to combine their arguments or at least intuitions in a meaningful way. Fortunately, we may reflect on each of their thoughts, modify them in terms of levels of reference (individual, social, etc.), and yet remain faithful to the basic ideas of their thinking. Starting from the thinkers

that complement the main argumentation, let us note that Ortega y Gasset discusses man in the context of specific changes of the 19th and early 20th centuries. These changes took place in the general outlook of man on reality and himself.[14] On the other hand, Le Bon tries to capture the phenomenon of "following," i.e., what does it take for a man to follow something or someone thoughtlessly, emotionally, affectively?[15] Subsequently, Wolniewicz tries to develop one of Koneczny's essential thoughts: a person cannot be civilized in two different ways at the same time. However, he goes beyond the idea of civilizations understood as the broadest types of association, and creates the concept of belonging (and, what follows, also of the identity of an individual) on the basis of belonging to a group. One of the main elements of Wolniewicz's contribution, apart from the concept of belonging to parallel structures, is the thesis that one's actual belonging (and one's identity) may be empirically examined (this can be done, as we shall see, in an extremely simple way).[16]

Feliks Koneczny's thought is the most important point of reference for our studies. Despite the fact that in his writings he expresses many interesting ideas on the tendencies of human behavior, it is his concept of civilization that is his contribution. Civilization as a way of communal life (to be more precise: a method of organizing communal life[17]) refers to "human associations," as Koneczny puts it, and only then can we transpose (or extrapolate) it to the actions of an individual.

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14   Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*.
15   Le Bon, *The Crowd*.
16   Musiał, Wolniewicz, *Ksenofobia i wspólnota*, 28–30, 35–39.
17   Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, 112.

We can now see that it is possible to combine—at least thematically—the above-mentioned thinkers. But how can we include Gilson? As a response and justification let us quote this French Thomist. The quotations below originally refer strictly to philosophy, but since we understand that philosophy is an element of understanding oneself and reality that significantly impacts us and reality, we shall elaborate his ideas also onto the field of fundamental ideas and convictions that are of interest to us.

Let us quote 3 excerpts that will help us understand why Gilson's principle of impersonal necessity will be so useful to us.

> What a philosopher has not seen in his own principles, even though it may flow from them with absolute necessity, does not belong to *his* philosophy. The possible consequences which the philosopher has seen, but which he has tried to evade, and has finally disavowed, should not be ascribed to him, even though he should have held them on the strength of his own principles; they are no part of *his* philosophy.[18]

In this excerpt, we are interested in two issues: possible unawareness and the principle of consistency. The history of philosophy has shown that even philosophers who, as a matter of profession and vocation, spend their lives thinking, are not aware of every "idea" in their "principles."[19] Our statement is far from revealing. Our aim, however, is to stress that since experts on thinking are

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18   Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*, 300–301.
19   Instead of the term "principles," we shall use "convictions" as it better renders the solutions that we are going to sketch in further parts of this work. Thus, we remain faithful to the spirit of Gilson's proposal though not to his expressions.

not aware of all the ideas that are concealed within their thinking, then we should not expect that people, who on a daily basis rarely engage in the same type of activity as philosophers, be fully aware of the latent ideas in their perception of reality.

The second issue, the principle of consistency, says that each idea—regardless of whether it is conscious or not—necessarily results in certain consequences, and it cannot result in others. This statement is important as it allows us to put forward a thesis that having adopted certain ideas as my own (whether consciously or not), it is not possible for me to think or act "freely." Gilson does not speak about actions, for it is unimportant to him from the perspective of the history of philosophy. Our statement is an extrapolation of his thesis. Gilson writes:

> In each instance of philosophical thinking, both the philosopher and his particular doctrine are ruled from above by an impersonal necessity. In the first place, philosophers are free to lay down their own sets of principles, but once this is done, they no longer think as they wish—they think as they can. In the second place, it seems to result from the facts under discussion, that any attempt on the part of a philosopher to shun the consequences of his own position is doomed to failure.[20]

In the above quotation, let us focus on the very name of the principle ("impersonal necessity") as well as two stressed statements. We can agree with the first one on a theoretical plane, but on a practical one, even within the history of philosophy,

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20 Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*, 301–302.

we would not be as optimistic as Gilson. For he says that "philosophers are free to lay down their own sets of principles." This suggests that when a philosopher is to choose some ideas, he sensibly picks elements that he finds appropriate. However, the history of philosophy reveals that such latitude does not take place. For example, if Roman Ingarden had not studied under Edmund Husserl, would he have been a phenomenologist? Or if Karol Wojtyła had not taken up the philosophy of Max Scheler (for reasons still unknown), would his anthropology have looked the way it does? We may assume negative answers to both questions. Before one puts forward such a strong thesis as Gilson's, one should first settle the impact of available possibilities, affinities and pressure on our intellectual choices. This minor criticism notwithstanding, the second part of Gilsons's first thesis ("once this is done, they no longer think as they wish—they think as they can") is extremely important to us. Our choice of what we call "ideas" makes us think (and act) not the way we wish, but the way we can. This is crucial to understand the force with which our inner civilization impacts our actions. The second part of the quoted excerpt complements this important thesis for it shows (and the history of philosophy broadly confirms it) that attempts at thinking (and acting) outside the possibilities delineated by the adopted ideas (and, in our case, by one's inner civilization) are doomed to failure.

> Proceeding, as they do, from the same illusion, the untiring efforts of historians, sociologists and economists to account for the rise of philosophical ideas by historical, sociological and economic factors seem ultimately headed for complete failure. True enough, philosophical doctrines that have been conceived in the same society,

or in social groups whose structure is comparable, will be themselves comparable, insofar at least as they bear the mark of their origin. There is such a thing as a "spirit of the time," and all the elements of a given culture, taken at a certain moment of its history, have a share in its composition. But the "spirit of the time" accounts for the contingent and transitory elements of philosophical doctrines, not for what they have of permanent necessity.[21]

This longer excerpt, apart from criticizing historicist explanations that confine the growth of philosophy to socio-economic factors (which Gilson exposes in a fragment not quoted here), points to the atemporal character of explanations related to impersonal necessity. This is important to us because it protects us from falling into historicist explanations concerning inner civilizations. Gilson says that it is not "the spirit of the time" that is responsible for the necessity of certain ideas going together. Translating this thesis from the history of philosophy to the issue of inner civilization, we can say that it is not "the spirit of the time" that is accountable for the structure of a given civilization (though, to some extent, it may be responsible for what fills in this structure).

From the above argument, it follows why, apart from Koneczny and other thinkers, we take Gilson as an ally in our examination of inner civilizations. A broader discussion of his method, in the subsequent part of this book, will better justify our choice of this philosopher as well as grounds for extrapolating his theses onto matters of interest to us.

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21   Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*, 303.

As for the excerpts from Gilson, we can see their fundamental relevance as regards our assertion that it is impossible to act inconsistently to one's ideas, or to put it in terms closer to Gilson, that certain ideas necessarily result from others and (which is an extrapolation of his idea) that certain actions (what people do and how they do it) necessarily result from certain ideas. This kind of necessity, though not determination, can be found in the other thinkers we mentioned above. Gilson's proposals that we have sketched will accompany us throughout the book, and we shall refer to them in more detail (in *Chapter II* in particular).

Having presented preliminary information regarding the subject and goal of our study, let us show the order of the subsequent parts of the book before we move on to discussing detailed issues.

In *Chapter I*, we shall discuss Koneczny's concept of civilizations. *Chapter II* will be devoted to Gilson's principle of impersonal necessity and its extrapolation onto the field of study that interests us. In *Chapter III* we shall describe more broadly the subject of our reflection and propose a method of studying it. In *Chapter IV* we shall focus on presenting preliminary research results and, while broadening Koneczny's division of civilizations, distinguish yet another one. We believe that singling out this civilization confirms that it is, fortunately, possible to use our research method, and it shows that despite the vast literature on the inner structure of man, there is still a lot to discover. In the *Conclusion*, we shall discuss our inferences and further research perspectives.

Before we proceed to *Chapter I*, we should indicate two problems that will help the reader understand the Author's perspective.

Firstly, let us stress yet again that the book is only a preliminary sketch of a much broader research and theoretical program which is too broad to be conveyed here. It is only an initial proposal that

we shall develop in our future works. However, even at this stage our work is sufficient for presentation and requires constructive criticism for further development.

Second, our approach is substantive and not antiquarian.[22] Our goal, therefore, is not to recall and combine the viewpoints of the thinkers mentioned above, but rather to assess whether they are true and useful in the context of our aim and, if so, to use them as our research tools. Since we do not want to elaborate excessively on historico-philosophical threads, we shall only indicate that these elements we have extracted from our studies on these thinkers (useful elements that describe reality) are noncontradictory and allow us to examine reality as it is.

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22 Wolniewicz, *Melioryzm Leibniza*, a lecture at the conference "Poza czasem i przestrzenią" 7/8th June 2016 at University of Warsaw—https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tp_q_oLW66o—access 3th August 2024.

Feliks Koneczny's concept of civilizations

Feliks Koneczny (1862–1949) is underestimated by scholars and thinkers. This is due to at least three reasons. First, his works are extremely critical of socialism/communism and Russia (he was an expert on Russia and "Eastern" affairs). No wonder they were censored during the communist era and published again only half a century after Koneczny's death. Even if someone referred to his works, these references were marginal and remained on the outskirts of science, away from its main, ideologized trend. The communist ideologization of Poland was, obviously, different from the ideologization in the West. However, when Koneczny's thought became present in the West (for example after 1962[1]), it rarely met fertile ground either.

The second reason for his modest presence in contemporary science is post-communist censorship—often taking the shape of political correctness. It is not as strong and tight as the communist version, but it is still quite effective.

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1   Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*.

The third reason is the character of Koneczny's output. Apart from a historical apparatus constantly at work, his oeuvre on civilizations is extremely interdisciplinary—both in terms of his method and subject matter. Beside history, his works draw from political science, sociology, psychology, anthropology, philosophy, broadly understood cultural sciences, religious studies (but never theology), legal and administrative sciences, and archaeology. Considering the times in which he lived, his background in these disciplines was outstanding. Thus, to appreciate his oeuvre, one should approach it very comprehensively, while at the same time not losing sight of the specifics of which there are so many in his works. With plenty of his remarks from various disciplines and a complete research method (that interests us most), few people decide to adapt Koneczny to their own field. It is historians that have drawn from Koneczny most, because they appreciate his contribution to studies of the histories of Poland and Russia, and more broadly, Eastern parts of Europe.[2]

As for the third reason of his minor presence in science, it is also the thematic scope of Koneczny's works as well as their length which successfully discourage many readers. This, however, does not suffice to justify the absence of Koneczny's thought in discussions of civilizations or so-called culture. Fortunately, in the

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2   Biliński*, Feliks Koneczny (1862–1949): życie i działalność*; Biliński, *Feliks Koneczny, studioso della storia della Russia e dell'Europa orientale*; Kuriański, *Cywilizacja bizantyjska w dziejach nowożytnej Europy (XVII–XX)*; Skoczyński, *Idee historiozoficzne Feliksa Konecznego*; Kuriański, *Cywilizacja bizantyjska w ujęciu Feliksa Konecznego (1862–1949).*

field of Polish science (not its main currents though), the situation is slowly changing.[3]

Let us briefly discuss Koneczny's research characteristics, before we elaborate on his theory of civilizations.

Based on historical data, Koneczny put forward a fundamental question: why are certain groups of people unable to function with others in the long run? It is difficult to determine when exactly he realized that the organizational foundations of collective life could be an insurmountable obstacle here. Perhaps it was a mere observation that prompted him to proceed with his research in this direction. As he himself pointed out, at that time in Poland there were four civilizations (Latin, Turanian, Byzantine and Jewish). Also, his historical studies of Eastern Europe may have prompted him to formulate his theory of civilization. Whatever the case, let us pay attention to several elements of his general method of studying civilizations. Koneczny scorns at—and this is not an exaggeration—and abhors any *a priori* method. He calls it "a meditative method" or "musing," which we find very apt.

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3   It should be noted that some of these works are not of academic character. See Skrzydlewski (ed.), *Feliks Koneczny*; Skoczyński, *Huntington i Koneczny*; Skoczyński, *Koneczny: teoria cywilizacji*; Skoczyński (ed.), *Feliks Koneczny dzisiaj: praca zbiorowa*; Frątczak, *Feliks Koneczny o państwie i wartościach*; Sztorc, *Bizantynizm i Orient*; Bezat, *Teoria cywilizacji Feliksa Konecznego*; Bezat, *Poglądy polityczno-prawne Feliksa Konecznego*; Serafińska, *Filozofia kultury Feliksa Konecznego*; Skrzydlewski, *Polityka w cywilizacji łacińskiej*; Bukowska, *Filozofia polska wobec problemu cywilizacji*; Gawor, *O wielości cywilizacji: filozofia społeczna Feliksa Konecznego*; Polak, *Cywilizacje a moralność w myśli Feliksa Konecznego*; Pucek, *Pluralizm cywilizacyjny jako perspektywa myśli socjologicznej*; Bokiej, *Cywilizacja łacińska. Studium na podstawie dorobku historiozoficznego Feliksa Konecznego*; Kwiecień, *O przyczynach upadku cywilizacji*; Szczepanowski, *Paradygmat cywilizacyjny*; Kmieć, *Multikulturalizm w ujęciu Feliksa Konecznego*.

To apply such a method, Koneczny remarks, one does not need any special preparation: whatever you come up with, there it is. Of course, he does not mean formal sciences that must apply *apriorisms*—he means the humanities.[4] Consequently, he uses the *a posteriori* method which comprises several complementary elements.

First of all, he finds historical sources interpreted critically to be testimonies on which one may rely as one relies on experience (albeit someone else's experience). Criticism of sources developed by strictly historical methods almost guarantees ("almost" for a mistake may occur) the truthfulness of the message conveyed therein. There are many sources related to the issues that we are interested in, so analysis of various sources will contribute to a more reliable picture. Obviously, Koneczny does not analyze all the sources himself (this would be unfeasible) but instead relies on both his works and other historians who specialize in a given issue or period.

Subsequently, Koneczny draws on the experience of the present. In the Second Polish Republic, one could, as if through a lens, see the difficulties related to civilizational differences. Thus, on a daily basis, Koneczny could observe the same things he wrote about as regards e.g. the state of Alexander the Great.

The next element, which Koneczny does not name directly, is so-called common sense. We understand it as the principle of the economics of thinking and Ockham's razor applied to the multiplication of causes of a given state of affairs.[5] Koneczny

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4   Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, ch. I; see also: Koneczny, *Cywilizacja łacińska*, 25ff.

5   Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, ch. I; see also: Koneczny, *Rozwój moralności*, 136.

looks for the causes of certain behavior in simplicity, pragmatism and necessity.

All these elements work closely together as if one guards the other. Their combination is the foundation of Koneczny's way of reasoning.

There is also Koneczny's incredible ability to understand the passage of time and social changes. The older a period, the weaker our comprehension of it. For example, when we speak of Moses leading the Jews out of Egypt, we cannot stop at that point. We should specify: from which Egypt? What were Egypt's relations with other states, tribes, etc.? The significance of such questions comes from the mere fact that the period from Cleopatra—the last queen of Egypt—to our times is shorter than from Cleopatra to the building of the pyramids in Giza. Therefore, while discussing certain events that have largely influenced the development of civilizations, Koneczny considers a particular day, week and year of the ongoing transformations. The empire of Alexander the Great lasted a few years only, but it was long enough to create the foundations of the Byzantine civilization.[6] Jewish civilization, on the other hand, needed centuries for its foundations to take shape.[7] Koneczny is perspicacious about such issues: if a given day matters, he focuses on this day, and if centuries matter, he has no difficulty noticing long-term changes that are hard to discern—even from the perspective of a given generation.

To grasp his method, thanks to which he is capable of discerning, presenting and juxtaposing various civilizations, we must refer to the following works of Koneczny: *O wielości cywilizacji* [*On the*

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6   Cf. Koneczny, *Cywilizacja bizantyńska*, Vol. I, ch. III.
7   Cf. Koneczny, *Cywilizacja żydowska*, Vol. I, especially ch. II, V–VI.

Plurality of Civilizations], *Prawa dziejowe* [*The Laws of History*] and marginally *Rozwój moralności* [*The Development of Morality*].

Let us start with an issue that Koneczny himself begins with: was man a gregarious being by nature? Koneczny claims that we cannot speak of any primordial gregariousness of human beings. Of course, people lived in pairs and groupings. Still, gregariousness implies numerosity, living in groups of some size.[8] Koneczny does not claim that man was a solitary but emphasizes that gregariousness is not in man's nature, and we cannot explain men's gathering into groupings by simply saying this is what they wished to do.[9] Among various factors (on which scholars are still racking their brains) that "radically transform conditions of life" Koneczny distinguishes fire.[10] Today there are miscellaneous concepts about the origin of man's gregariousness. However, we will not elaborate on them. It is sufficient to repeat Koneczny's thought that even though gregariousness is not in man's nature, for reasons that we may never be able to discover, it has become omnipresent. Along with gregariousness, the issue of civilization emerged as each community needed a method of organizing its communal (or gregarious) life.[11] Here, the following crucial questions arise: How was this method organized? What was its foundation? What did it depend on? What immediately comes to mind is the issue of language and communication, the stages of economic development, ingenuity, subjugation of space and time, religion as well as race (the latter appeared in the old concepts

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8   The original Polish "gromadność" clearly implies numerosity: https://sjp.pwn. pl/doroszewski/gromada;5431625.html—access 15th August 2024.

9   Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations,* ch. II.

10   Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, 66.

11   Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, 168ff.

of civilization).[12] However, this does not lead us closer to Koneczny's idea of "differentiation of civilizations," i.e. the fact that human communities applied their methods of organizing communal life in a variety of ways despite their similarity as regards language, climate, natural resources, common past, religion, etc. According to Koneczny, the investigation of the problem of civilizations must start by examining certain relationships between people in their associations. This is the starting point of reflecting upon civilizations (as conceived by Koneczny) as well as the inner civilization.

By way of digression, we should note that many humanistic concepts, generally speaking, refer to differences that are not crucial, and classify human groups accordingly. A typical notion taught at school or university is Neolithic evolution (or revolution) described as the transition from gathering via hunting-gathering to flock tending and then to farming. There are various exceptions to this theory.[13] Besides, the way of obtaining food does not have to impact the fundamental interpersonal relationships that Koneczny speaks about.[14]

It is these interpersonal relationships that differentiate the foundations of human communities. But what specifically do we mean by "interpersonal relationships"? Do these relationships have a hierarchy? Koneczny does not leave us in the dark here. In fact, the foundations of his concept of civilizations are of special interest to us as well.

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12 Cf. for example Barkan, *The Retreat of Scientific Racism*; Ehrenreich, *The Nazi Ancestral Proof*; Isaac, *The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity*; Lévi-Strauss, *Race and History*; Poliakov, *The Aryan Myth*.
13 Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, 100ff.
14 Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, 100ff.

Koneczny finds the so-called triple law to be the foundation: "Differentiation between civilizations begins with the diversity of triple law."[15] The three laws he discusses are family law (including matrimonial law), property law, and the law of inheritance.[16] Koneczny emphasizes—not without reason—that each of these three laws must be considered together, as changes in one of them automatically entail alterations in the other two.[17] Also, they are basic laws for there is no human group (cluster or community) which is devoid of them and does not build its social system around them.[18]

Let us then discuss the triple law, the relations inside family, property, and inheritance laws as well as those between them.

The basic trait of family law is that it determines the relationship between relatives and in-laws as well as the rules of marrying or simply mating.[19] Let us focus on the issue of matrimony. We have three basic options here: monogamy, polygyny, and polyandry. Of course, each of these has multiple branches, e.g. monogamy which allows relationships with prostitutes or ephebophilic relationships; or polygamy where there is one major wife, etc. Though so-called civil partnerships or polyamory are not mentioned, they fit into the three basic ways of organizing how people marry and pair. However, we are not interested in the details regarding the customs of particular peoples or combinations

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15 Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, 111.
16 Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, 111.
17 We mean actual relations between these elements, and not the law in the sense of provisions within modern, extensive legal codes of statutory law.
18 This applies even to communities with simple norms of family and property laws, for example, Pirahã (Everett, *Język narzędzie kultury*, 335–337).
19 Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, 131–132.

that result from specific conditions. We want to point out that the principle of marrying determines, to a large extent, all of family law, including attitudes toward children, authority over the home, equality or inequality of rights and obligations, determination of blood ties, etc.[20] Furthermore, property law and inheritance law also depend on the given principle of marrying.

It should be noted that in polygamy or in such family arrangements where one can easily terminate one's marriage (which is often a privilege solely of a man), the status of a woman is most often truly deplorable. Monogamy, when the marriage is indissoluble or hard to dissolve, gives a woman social subjectivity.[21] Thus the principle of marrying determines to a large extent the subjectivity of a woman.[22] When devoid of this subjectivity, a society loses an important part of its various strengths.

One should also point out that polygamous societies did not overcome the clan system.[23] There was no question of family emancipation. Moreover, as a rule, associations based on polygamy did not translate into a strong and lasting state (there are exceptions, such as China. However, polygamy was partial there; it was a strong state stuck in the clan system[24]).

Let us pay attention to two issues. Firstly, the emancipation of the family and the woman takes place only in the case

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20 Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, 124–134.
21 Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, 132–133. The issue (together with bibliography) is discussed in Kamprowski, "Miejsce i rola kobiety w rodzinie na przestrzeni wieków."
22 Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, 127–128, 132–133.
23 For more information on the clan system and the relations mentioned above see: Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, 93ff, 113ff.
24 Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, 129–131. We mean China during the imperial period.

of monogamy.[25] Secondly, only when the family is emancipated, do we have a truly private property. Thus, we can see how interconnected all kinds of interpersonal relationships are (and, what follows, also the elements of triple law) and how important the relationship of a man and woman is within them.

Inheritance law results, of course, from property law.[26] There is no need to convince anyone that in clan despotism where the family is not emancipated, inheritance law will be different than in a situation when the family is emancipated, the woman is equal to the man and has—or can have—private property.

The case is similar as regards having children. In clan systems, one of the crucial obligations toward the family and ancestors is to enlarge the wealth of the family. It is done for various reasons and includes expanding the family with, preferably, male offspring. The pressure to bring many children into the world and, as it were, "punishing" others (especially women) for their childlessness, loses its impact or even fades away in an emancipated family system where childless parents are responsible solely for themselves and have no obligations toward a clan.

There is yet another issue that accompanies the question of matrimony and property. We shall discuss it only to show the essential differences in understanding the same occurrences depending on the triple law adopted in various civilizations. We have mentioned the question of children as property within the clan system. Similarly, we may bring up the question of the wife as property. Significantly, in many places around the world, the purchasing of a wife still takes place, though it is more symbolic. And yet,

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25   Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, 128–133.
26   Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, 140.

thinking about the wife as the husband's property holds true. Consequently, her adultery is above all (possible emotional factors notwithstanding) "interference with another's property."[27] It is, as it were, stealing or unacceptable usage. The wife can be equal to the husband and be his partner, which is actually and commonly possible only when the family is emancipated, though the emancipation of the family does not automatically establish this equality. Here, adultery is primarily a serious breach of the relationship with the husband. We hope that this example helps elucidate what Koneczny means when he claims that every element of social life depends on the provisions of triple law. Let us go a step further. If adultery is an infringement of property, then it may be compensated materially, just as one would compensate for destroying somebody's car.[28] If it is an infringement of a relationship, then this relationship should be rebuilt.

Let us consider widowhood in this context of property. It was not uncommon that after the death of a husband, the wife was "transferred" as part of the inheritance (e.g. in certain variants of the law of levirate), though this "transfer" may have been referred to in a way that did not bring inheritance or property law to one's mind. Such a rule is unthinkable in a society with an emancipated family in which partners have equal status.

To sum up the issue of triple law in the context of communal life, let us quote Koneczny: "we may assert that differentiation in their communal life began with differentiation in the clan

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27 Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, 143.
28 It should be noted that not all damage to property can be compensated for materially. We intend to point out a particular way of reasoning and acting, not the casuistry of compensation.

system and triple law. These are the two fundamental things in any kind of historical development; on these bases in fact everything which is human rests."[29]

Let us now proceed to discuss the second pillar of the theory of civilizations i.e. Koneczny's **quincunx**. Here the basic statement that he makes is that man consists of a body and soul (in the sense of substance monism). We can understand the soul either in the Christian tradition, as a spiritual element, or simply as the sphere of a human being that people from all ages and places have distinguished within themselves. The body is understood as external, the soul as internal—a typical division into immanence and transcendence.

Koneczny claims that this division refers not only to human beings but to everything that is related to them. Let us explain what constitutes a soul and a body. In the context of civilization, i.e. the method of organizing communal life, two basic concepts apply to the soul: good and truth, where good is understood as a moral order. The notions of health and well-being refer to the body. Thus, we have four notions: morality/good, truth, health, and well-being. The quincunx, however, implies five elements. The last one belongs to the two spheres—spiritual and corporeal; it is the concept of beauty that is the manifestation or result of the other categories.

As regards these five notions, Koneczny writes: "There is no manifestation of life which does not bear some relation to one of these categories, often to two or more. Here every fact and every opinion belongs."[30]

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29   Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, 149.
30   Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, 149.

Koneczny posits that these five categories of human existence are constantly interrelated and interdependent, and thus we may speak of a certain organization of these categories. And where there is organization, there is hierarchy.

Hierarchy is a component of every civilization. Within these five categories and the hierarchy between them, there is no opposition or contradiction between what is spiritual and what is corporeal (this would be the aftermath of modern anthropological dualism that neither Koneczny nor we support). On the contrary, spiritual and corporeal elements are complementary. The scarcity of any one of them impairs the others.

Koneczny writes sententiously: "Some unyielding law requires that man, composed of body and soul, must perfect himself in both parts of his being [spiritual and material—KP] or decline in both."[31]

Therefore, the author of *On the Plurality…* concludes that communal life may be more organizationally advanced the more categories of the quincunx it develops and the more harmony between them. It is yet another essential element that differentiates various civilizations. The incoherence of any element of triple law or a fundamental incoherence of elements of the quincunx points to civilizational differences that cannot be reconciled. No wonder. Let us imagine a group of people living together—half of them consider a woman a commodity to be purchased in the act of marriage, whereas the other half thinks a woman to be a man's life

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31   Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, 151. It should be mentioned that this notion is neither new nor solely European. Cf. the ancient Greek ideal of *kalokagatia* or the Japanese ideal of samurai. (Cf. Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*; Totman, *Historia Japonii*, 288).

partner who is equal to him. This entails property and inheritance issues that we have discussed. Such a variety of attitudes cannot be reconciled within one social organism if it is to function in the long run. Let us imagine that representatives of both views marry each other. We cannot reasonably argue (which would be in line with a Hegel and post-Hegel view) that a synthesis eliminating contradictions will arise here. One or the other civilization will prevail. In the end, both civilizations may collapse, one or more new ones may arise, but it will not happen as a result of dialectic elimination of differences. It is similar to the elements of the quincunx. For example, let us consider the homage that the West pays to the god of the body, or rather, how the body and its well-being have been deified (which G. K. Chesterton accurately commented on).[32] How could one reconcile this stance (that is characteristic of many communities) with one that emphasizes the superiority (and at the same time complementarity) of spiritual elements of the quincunx? It is impossible, for one of the two outlooks would give up at least part of its foundations. Unfortunately, when we speak of a true community, social life cannot be based on contradictory foundations, or it will fall.[33]

Koneczny is right to point out that the first associations of men could not have been based on power and coercion, but must have been voluntary.[34] Thus, their fundamental principle was natural ethics understood as the voluntary fulfillment of certain obligations that are not externally imposed. There is, of course, a huge

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32   Chesterton, *Obrona wiary*, 137–141.

33   Koneczny calls it civilizational *circular madness* (see for example: Koneczny, *Prawa dziejowe*, 485; Koneczny, *The Laws of History*, 542).

34   See: Koneczny, *Rozwój moralności*, 200; Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, 154.

variety of such ethics. However, in a given association, at some point, its natural ethics transform into a law that begins to be imposed. In other words, each member of a given community has to choose: either they follow the rules of the community or leave and set up their own association. In a given association, until there were no people resistant to the tradition arising from ethics, there was no need for law. When such people appeared, which is quite a natural process, a law was formed.[35] Thus we have the first of the two distinctions that are important to Koneczny: ethics and law. The second distinction is between legal aposteriorism and apriorism. Ethics[36] is more ancient than law and it is its indispensable condition. However, a law that arose in the beginning was *a posteriori* law, i.e. it sanctioned those methods of communal life that had worked in a given community, and demanded that those methods be respected by its members. In other words, *a posteriori* law sanctioned tradition. Such a law is nothing more than a guardian and the extension of natural ethics.[37] The law cannot, therefore, be contradictory to the ethics of a given human association. It is worth noting that natural ethics and the resultant *a posteriori* law are dual.[38] This means that different rules

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35 Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, 154.
36 "Ethics" is understood here not as a branch of philosophy, but as a set of moral norms, as well as a view on what is good and what is bad. Should we adhere to contemporary terminology, we would use the term "ethos." This, however, would change Koneczny's concept to such an extent that we choose to use "ethics" in its philosophically imprecise usage. The question of updating Koneczny's language, as well as that of other authors we reference, to the most current terminological standards, will be addressed in our future works.
37 Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, 154ff.
38 Koneczny, *Rozwój moralności*, 136; Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, 301ff.

apply to "our people" and "strangers." There is no universal ethics yet that does not distinguish between our people and strangers. Currently, there is only one civilization, the Latin one (according to Koneczny's nomenclature), that managed to fully transcend the duality of ethics.[39]

In addition to *a posteriori* law, we have *a priori* law. Let us quote Koneczny's precise characteristics of the latter:

> But in history there already existed the *fas et nefas* law formulated not merely without but in direct opposition to ethics. This was, therefore, an artificial law not resulting from actual normal conditions but designed to change them and to order the association in line with ideas not so far known to it or at least not recognized by it. In this case, the idea came first and then the law derived from it to create artificially binding conditions. Thus *a priori* law comes into existence to give sanction to projected conditions, not to those already existing.[40]

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39 Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, 301ff. Previously, Roman civilization was such a type of civilization. Latin civilization derived its idea of law and its main precepts from it. Cf. Koneczny, *Cywilizacja łacińska*, 349.

40 Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, 154. In the original, the quote is as follows: "Ale już w prehistorii bywało prawo i „prawem i lewem", wytwarzając się nie tylko bez etyki, ale wręcz przeciwko niej. Zachodzi w takim razie wypadek prawa sztucznego, niewyłaniającego się z samych stosunków normalnych, lecz pragnącego je zmienić i urządzić zrzeszenie według pojęć, jakich tam dotychczas nie znano, a przynajmniej nie uznawano. A zatem w tym wypadku najpierw pojęcie, a potem prawo z nich wysnute celem sztucznego wytworzenia stosunków przymusowych. Tak powstaje prawo aprioryczne udzielające sankcji pomysłowi do stosunków, a nie stosunkom już istniejącym." (Koneczny, *O wielości cywilizacji*, 187.)

Koneczny is an opponent of *a priori* law which he also calls meditative or speculative law.[41] However, this does not mean that he thinks natural ethics (in the shape we have just delineated) to be the highest in the moral growth of a society or an individual. He considers it to be a necessary element of all rudiments of human associations. Nonetheless, crucial phenomena that emerged from such natural ethics include ancestral revenge, male violence resulting in the humiliation of a woman, and strict xenophobia.[42] In Koneczny's times, there were many communities at this level of social organization where such phenomena held sway. Even today there are such communities. Still, it is possible to break away from natural ethics without falling into *a priori* law.

Hence, we can see that ethics is strictly connected with law, but in the ontic and genetic order it is prior to law. As history proves, it is usually more durable (let us have in mind the case of Poland when it was partitioned, later under Nazi occupation and then the communist regime). Additionally, it is more essential for it is possible for a human association to exist without law (as understood by Koneczny), but no association or even a person (formed internally at least partially) may exist without any ethics.

However, law plays an important role in the creation and existence of societies. A law of some kind is the indispensable condition for the existence of every community (though not an association).[43]

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41 See for example Koneczny, *Cywilizacja łacińska*, 42–43.

42 Wolniewicz and Musiał understand it as harmful xenophobia (Musiał, Wolniewicz, *Ksenofobia i wspólnota*, 44ff).

43 An association may be based on natural ethics that, as we have already said, is discretionary and as such does not need to be legally sanctioned. As a rule, communities or societies, being significantly more complex and larger entities, require ethics and law in order to function effectively.

And each law has a triple law as its foundation. If in one society we have many triple laws, then this society is certain to fall, or it has never been one society. Here Koneczny puts forward a rule that he calls "the condition of commensurability" which states that it is not possible for a society or an association (that is efficient, developing, and capable of surviving) to exist when one of its elements is incoherent with the others. One cannot reasonably imagine that a wife is a property of her husband and at the same time she can leave a testament in which she freely bequeaths her belongings. There is an obvious contradiction here, one that can be introduced under the law. However, it is not about what we can introduce (for in fact every provision can be considered binding) but whether—in the absence of commensurability of a given triple law—it is possible to obey such a law and, ultimately, for a given community to grow. In other words, will the method of organizing the communal life of a given community endure in the long run?

We would like to immediately address the following objection: we know from history multiple examples of various triple laws within one community which grew despite this "drawback."[44] There are several issues we should distinguish in this objection. Above all, do we always deal with solely one community or are there smaller communities that have been incorporated, for some reason, (not necessarily in line with the will of these communities) into a larger administrative or political organism? One ruler and one nationality (to use a somewhat ahistorical expression) do not determine the unity of communities. Let us once again refer to the

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44 This is exemplified by the history of Poland and Germany.

history of Poland. Within one state and under one ruler, we had at least several systems of triple law (and speaking more broadly, general legal systems). Of course, specific laws changed with time, but there were different laws for the Jews, for citizens of Lesser Poland, for those of Greater Poland, for the Rusyns, and others still for the Lithuanians and the Polish Tatars. After the activities of religious reformers (in the Commonwealth almost complete freedom of religion was preserved), there was a different triple law for the Catholics, a different one for Protestant denominations, yet another for the Eastern Orthodox Christians, and, after the Union of Brest of 1596, also one for the so-called Ruthenian Uniate Church. Quite a miscellany of laws and ethical systems within one state, under one monarch, and often in one local territory! This should be seen as one of the reasons for the collapse of the Commonwealth.

Another issue worth considering in the context of the possible objection is the following: did this differentiation indeed hinder the growth of civilized communities? If we consider particular civilizations, i.e. we think of a community as one that uses the same triple law and consentaneously recognizes the issues from Koneczny's quincunx, then we see that certain civilizations cooperated while others fought with each other. However, in line with one of Koneczny's historical laws,[45] if within one territory there are two equal and viable civilizations, they are bound to clash. Usually, the one that is less demanding, i.e. "inferior" to use Koneczny's wording, wins.[46] Of course, if one of them loses and the other prevails, the latter will develop at the expense of the first.

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45 Koneczny, *The Laws of History*, ch. XIII.
46 Koneczny, *The Laws of History*, ch. XIII.

In the case of the Commonwealth, one cannot claim that its society flourished or waned for it was not one society based on the same fundamental principles (i.e. triple law and the quincunx). Certainly, two civilizations may conjoin but then they "collapse" and unite based on agreeing on one triple law and the quincunx. There may also be the case of one civilization absorbing the other, but this is a special case of a clash of civilizations that we have just described.

Of course, triple law is, as we have seen, one of the foundations. The condition of commensurability is in fact relevant in every manifestation of communal life. If there is no commensurability in ethics, a society splits or collapses. If a society breaks apart, for example as far as material aspects of the quincunx are concerned, then how can this diversity be reasonably managed? In other words, if a civilization is to be consistent and lasting, there must be several fundamental principles (in the context of an individual, we will call them ideas or convictions) according to which everything else is organized.

Koneczny gives yet another condition regarding commensurability, and it seems especially relevant for our further reflection on the inner civilization. This condition states that commensurability must be accepted voluntarily. This means that triple law and a given attitude toward the quincunx must be adopted of one's own volition. We have already seen that triple law and any other law fundamentally results from ethics. Consequently, ethics must also be adopted out of one's free will. Koneczny does not say it explicitly but let us reflect on the issue of discretion which will make us aware that civilization cannot be imposed on man. Koneczny has in mind external civilization, but we do not contradict his thinking when we extrapolate it onto inner civilization.

Let us, for example, focus on a man's attitude toward a woman. Theoretically, in Polish statutory law, a woman and a man are equal. A woman is not a man's property, but rather an independent individual. However, this does not mean that all men—and worse still, all women—share this viewpoint. Thus, one may obey statutory law, but at the same time remain civilizationally outside the area recognized by the majority of society. Would it be possible to coerce somebody who thinks a woman is a man's property into thinking that women are equal to men; that they are men's life partners, not their property? Koneczny says it is impossible. It may happen that for some reason a person changes their way of thinking, but surely they cannot be forced to think in a certain way because fundamentally they are free. Certainly, this does not mean that upbringing, society, environment, etc. have no impact on the views of a given person. Of course they do. That is why an adequately formed (i.e. in line with the quincunx of his civilization) individual grows into a representative of a given civilization. What we mean is solely a transformation of views on the above issues. If such a transformation occurs, then, as we see, one ought to remodel the remaining foundations of one's outlook on reality, or otherwise there is incommensurability not only on social grounds but also on an individual plane (or to be more precise, within the individual, i.e. on the immanent plane). In other words, when a person starts to treat women as equal to men and truly independent but does not change his/her views regarding property and inheritance laws, this will surely lead to an obvious contradiction: in practice, a free and independent woman, an equal partner to a man, still cannot manage her possessions (or significant assets) without the consent of a man. Unfortunately, this is still an extremely common situation. Ultimately, if a given

change in one sphere of triple law does not entail changes in the other spheres, we end up with incommensurability.

To show incommensurability, Koneczny draws on the example of ancient Greece. The average educated person thinks that so-called Greek culture is one of the foundations of so-called European culture. Philosophy and art (that is primarily spiritual and not material elements) originated there; it is in Greece that Christianity developed etc. There is nothing wrong with this thinking if one is not deeply interested in the historical development of civilizations. However, let us see how false this picture is. To treat Greece as an organism in terms of "culture" is a gross misunderstanding, especially if one means the entire history of ancient Greece or at least from the Greek Dark Ages until Alexander the Great or the Roman conquest. In reality, there were as many methods of communal life as there were *poleis*, as many views on the quincunx and relations within it. Let us bear in mind that only a free man of a proper age could be a full citizen. One may think that there was some agreement between various *poleis*. By no means. There was a significant difference between a citizen of Sparta which was based on a specific kind of monarchy and, for example, a citizen of Athens at the time of Pericles. In one *polis* you could fall into debt slavery, you could sell (or pledge) your children for your debts. In another, this was unacceptable. The fact that there were similar "decorations," i.e. similar aesthetic currents, did not determine the civilizational cohesion of Greece. Shall we look at philosophy then? There were many philosophical currents in Greece at the same time and they varied in their foundations. Greek "unity" was attributed to their language and their common belief that they were Hellenes as opposed to Barbarians (perhaps also their religion and mythology). However, this

is not enough to speak about one common civilization. If we were to follow this line of reasoning, then we would have to admit that the Golus Jews who adopted the Greek language and superficial habits are Greeks, for the Jews considered themselves (even if not the Hellenes) different from the Barbarians.[47]

The condition of commensurability seems, therefore, fundamentally important for the survival and growth of a given civilization.

Let us now turn to the question of civilization itself and related issues. We already know that civilization is the system upon which communal life is organized. Communal life requires a certain multitude of human individuals, which we divide into private (family) individuals and public individuals. Therefore, it can be said that civilization concerns everyone, except for someone living as a hermit in the wilderness. What differentiates human associations is precisely the methods of organizing communal life.

Let us note that if all human associations in the world adhered to only one method, it is evident that we could speak solely of differences in degree when it comes to how the method was developed. This reminds us of certain propositions of anthropological evolutionism, but here we focus on the degree of complexity or intricacy, not an evaluative degree of unidirectional development. Moreover, unity within a civilization allows for local diversities, which Koneczny labels as "cultures." Thus, gradation can only occur within the same civilization.

Koneczny's incredible philosophical or, in fact, metaphysical insight deserves a separate comment. While considering a civilization,

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47   See: Koneczny, *Cywilizacja żydowska*, Vol. I, 149ff.

Koneczny states: "Civilisation is the system on which communal life is organized: civilisation is simply a system."[48] One may ask what is so brilliant about this statement. If we consider almost all previous anthropological thought that attempted to define "culture" (or civilization), and if we focus on the achievements of the philosophy of culture which strives to grasp e.g. the essence of culture, then it quickly turns out that their propositions, from a metaphysical standpoint, do not hold water. Moreover, apart from a few exceptions, they claim that culture or civilization are subjects of certain attributes and that they can act, impact, etc. Koneczny rejects such approaches (he alludes to this at the beginning of *On the Plurality…*) as they can neither be maintained nor sensibly applied in any way.[49] If we, for example, put to use any definition of culture or civilization (enumerative, functional, or otherwise), it turns out that we cannot say what they actually are.[50]

Koneczny was aware of these difficulties. Let us consider a more recent example: a concept by Daniel Everett. In his works, Everett puts forward his view that language is a tool of culture, a "cultural tool." At the same time, culture depends in some way upon language.[51] While he delves quite well into linguistic issues, after reading all his works on this subject, not only do we not know how Everett defines culture—despite the numerous definitions appearing in his works—but Everett himself has no idea what culture is. Moreover, he submits a concept according to which culture and language are the *dark matter of the mind*: they are

48   Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, 168.
49   Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, 169–174.
50   More on this issue in Petryszak, *Ontologia kultury*, § 8.2.12.
51   See: Everett, *Język narzędzie kultury*, part IV; Everett, *Jak powstał język*, ch. 13.

intertwined elements or (he is not clear here) the *dark matter of the mind* is some kind of foundation for them.[52] In other words, language and culture fundamentally influence the way we act and perceive the world. This would mean that triple law and elements of the quincunx depend on language and culture (whatever it is) or on language alone. Here, it turns out that Everett's method of inquiry is essentially "meditative" (or also "meditative," a term also used by Koneczny) for Koneczny recalls dozens of historical examples to show clearly that language does not create the foundations of our behavior, convictions, ideas, etc.[53] However, this does not mean it is unimportant—quite the contrary. What it means is that it is not language that conditions civilization and the process of civilizing (which Everett claims), not to mention murky connections and mutual conditioning between language and so-called culture. Thus, we can see that while employing a strictly *a posteriori* method and drawing on historical examples, Koneczny presents a different outlook on the metaphysics of civilization. This view does not fall under the criticism faced by concepts according to which civilization or culture are subjects of attributes. To Koneczny, civilization is, let us emphasize once again, the method of organizing communal life.

Let us analyze Koneczny's definition from a philosophical perspective. Above all, civilization stems from freedom. Therefore, in their freedom, individuals hold various views or beliefs. For our convenience, let us call these views "ideas," and treat them as intentional beings. Thus, individuals are endowed with sets of "intentional beings" regarding various matters (sometimes

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52 Everett, *Dark Matter of the Mind*, part 2.
53 Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, ch. VI.

it will simply be an intuitive approach). In each individual, certain issues result from adopting other, more fundamental ideas—according to Gilson's principle of impersonal necessity which will be discussed in *Chapter II*.

If fundamental ideas align among many individuals residing in one territory (a community), a civilization emerges. Based on these ideas, a consensus emerges on how to proceed regarding the relationship between human beings. Further issues naturally stem from this attitude because representatives of a given civilization do not need to be aware of the principles of impersonal necessity. This consensus on conduct is precisely the method of conduct, and this is what we call civilization. It is evident how far this idea deviates—also in its depth—from perceiving culture or civilization as a collection of all elements created by humans (the whole world uses plastic bowls and rubber-soled shoes today, but that has nothing to do with forming a common civilization.). Therefore, since civilization is a collection of intentional elements, it is an intentional being as well.

Koneczny does not give up on using the term "culture." He finds it useful, which we have just alluded to. He points out the following issue. Undoubtedly, medieval Europe was influenced by Latin civilization (for example, in the 14th century). However, there were many detailed differences in the implementation of one method of communal life in places like Poland, Hanseatic cities, and southern Italy. Koneczny labels these diverse implementations of the same method of communal life as cultures. Therefore, culture would still be a method of organizing communal life but in a specific case and in a specific context. Thus, we have Latin civilization with cultures like Małopolska, Neapolitan, or Saxon. Essentially, cultures can—though need not—develop within each civilization.

Why does Koneczny use the term "culture" here? He does it with irony and thus justifies his choice of the word: "I have taken an expression which is free because [it is—KP] not required for the use hitherto made of it—an improper one, as I have pointed out."[54]

In traditional and popular approaches, civilizations are divided, for example, on the grounds of religious affiliation. In response to such approaches, let us briefly discuss what according to Koneczny, civilization does not depend on (race, language, or religion).

Today, race is somewhat of a taboo topic, at least if one wants to discuss it in terms of the actual existence of races. One immediately exposes oneself to the accusation of racism, which effectively hinders any sensible development of research in this matter.[55] We do not want to delve into this subject, we shall merely address the following reflection by Koneczny: assuming that biological races exist within the human species, we cannot conclude that racial biological affiliation in any way contributes to the existence of civilization or internal civilization. Otherwise, this would imply that there are as many civilizations as there are races, which is absurd. Therefore, regardless of the fact whether races exist and can be examined, civilizations do not depend on them. These conclusions are important for at the time when Koneczny developed his study of civilization, there was a widespread belief in Europe that races do exist and that some are superior to others, which translates into the (im)possibility of achieving certain stages of cultural or civilizational growth. Koneczny shows that this approach is absurd, which makes him one of the pioneers in detaching

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54 Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, 173.
55 Łukasz Lamża pointed out this issue in an interesting way in his *Trudno powiedzieć*, 193–195.

anthropology and later the so-called cultural sciences/studies from racial issues.

Another issue is language. At present, we are aware of the existence of over 7000 natural languages. If civilization was dependent on a language, then we would have over 7000 civilizations. Moreover, communities that use two different languages could not belong to the same civilization. However, if we narrow down the diversity of languages to language families, then communities speaking a language derived from the Proto-Indo-European language branch and those using a language from the Mura language family cannot be equally civilized. This is clearly untrue, which everyday experience and historical data convincingly prove.

The case is similar with religion. If there were any dependency or even equating of religion with civilization, there would be as many civilizations as there are religions. However, this is not the case. Koneczny clearly points out the role of religion in the life of civilizations which he thinks to be significant. And yet he does not observe any dependency or direct identification between religion and civilization, even though he distinguishes sacral civilizations. On the other hand, some civilizations are entirely indifferent to religion, such as the Byzantine or Turanian civilizations.[56]

Ultimately, none of these manifestations of human life impact the existence or even emergence of civilization (or culture), although numerous authors consistently find them to be their constitutive conditions.

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56 It should be noted that even though one cannot equate religion with civilization, it seems that Koneczny underestimated the broadly understood influence of religion on the formation and development of civilization.

To clarify the above theoretical reflections regarding the theory of civilizations, we shall in short discuss an approach to these three civilizational elements using the example of the two civilizations that Koneczny elaborates on.

The three civilizations that Koneczny best describes and studies are: Latin,[57] Byzantine,[58] and Jewish.[59] As an expert in the history of Eastern Europe, Koneczny also had a vast knowledge of the civilization that he called "Turanian" that dominated the regions of Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, he never wrote any systematic or comprehensive study of this civilization.[60] Moreover, he distinguished many other civilizations and emphasized that specialists in the themes of a given region or population should employ his method and produce appropriate civilizational characteristics. Below we briefly discuss two civilizations that he delved into. Our aim is to illustrate the interdependencies between specific elements of the quincunx and triple law.

However, before we characterize them, we should point out that the Author of *Prawa dziejowe* [The Laws of History] distinguished, among various civilizations, those that he called "sacral civilizations." Among those, he included the Jewish and Brahmin civilizations.[61] Having made some preliminary remarks about Brahmin civilizations, Koneczny refers to Le Bon's observations regarding India and the Hindus. Why do we find his distinction of sacral

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57   Koneczny, *Cywilizacja łacińska*.

58   Koneczny, *Cywilizacja bizantyńska*, Vol. I–II.

59   Koneczny, *Cywilizacja żydowska*, Vol. I–III.

60   There is, however, a compilation of materials that Koneczny gathered to describe the Turanian character of Russia. Cf. Koneczny, *Cywilizacja turańska Rosji*.

61   Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, 313.

civilizations important? While characterizing Latin civilization, one may be tempted to include it among sacral civilizations. However, this would be a misunderstanding. According to Koneczny, for a civilization to be sacral, its prevailing law, and in practice the only one, should be religious law which applies to every sphere of life. In other words, in the course of the development of this civilization, there was no separation between secular and religious laws. If, in a given civilization, all its laws are regulated by sacred texts and their commentaries, then it is definitely a sacral civilization.[62] As we shall see, in Latin civilization, this fundamental condition is not fulfilled. We shall not elaborate on the genetic sources of Byzantine and Latin civilizations, as Koneczny did it quite comprehensively.[63] Suffice to say that the Byzantine civilization is Oriental in its spirit and origin. Because the Greeks mingled with the inhabitants of Asia, and the Orient influenced Rome, Byzantine civilization settled along the Bosphorus and takes its name from there.

In the Middle Ages, Byzantine civilization flourished not only in Byzantium but also (at least in places where Latin civilization did not establish itself) the Holy Roman Empire and, to a lesser extent, Balkan countries.[64] In the modern era, after the fall of Constantinople, the weight of the development of this civilization permanently shifted to Germany (including Austria as part of the German sphere) and the Balkan countries. The highest development of this civilization was after the unification of Germany

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62 Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, 248ff.
63 Koneczny, *Cywilizacja łacińska*; Koneczny, *Cywilizacja bizantyńska*, Vol. I, ch. I–VII.
64 Koneczny, *Cywilizacja bizantyńska*, Vol. II, ch. XV–XVI.

under Prussian doctrine and subsequently under Nazi doctrine. Koneczny did not live to witness the further development of Byzantinism as he passed away in 1949.

As for the origin of Latin civilization, it grew alongside the Church in the Roman Empire and expanded worldwide with Her. However, one should not jump to the conclusion that wherever the Church reached or even established its presence, so did Latin civilization. Incidentally, this is yet more proof that religion and civilization are not identical.

Let us now discuss the main civilizational categories in Byzantinism and determine its two fundamental priorities (law or ethics? aposteriorism or apriorism?). In Byzantinism, we have the precedence of law over ethics and of apriorism over aposteriorism. Where do law and apriorism derive their legitimacy from? One could say that they derive it from themselves. The case, however, is more complex for here we must introduce the category of power which is not clearly defined and, as a rule, semi-mystical. In Byzantinism, if someone proved to be strong enough to have seized power (whatever form it took), it meant they were worthy of it, they deserved it and they were, no doubt, superior/more deserving than an average subject.[65] The mere sanction of power already legitimizes the law and makes it almost divine. The latter is deeply rooted both in the political and religious systems of the ancient East and in Germanic mythology and beliefs.[66]

Consequently, law sanctioned in this manner cannot be erroneous, and a person in power cannot err (besides, who would dare point out the erring?). Thus, any law that is established is the

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65 Koneczny, *Cywilizacja bizantyńska*, Vol. I, 9–11, 108–109.
66 For example, the god Vodan.

rightful law. If it turns out not to work, it is certainly not the fault of those in power but some external factors. What is characteristic—and what significantly distinguishes Byzantinism, for instance, from Turanism—is that power is depersonalized, whereas in Turanian civilization, power and law are identified with the person of the leader, chief, etc. In Byzantinism, it is, therefore, not important who grasps power for power will glorify them. Normative apriorism is more appropriate here, as those in power cannot be restrained by the whims or traditions of the folk. And since those in power cannot err, the laws they establish are always right.

How do the above assumptions influence triple law and the quincunx? Within **family law**, any kind of family relationship can be established. They are often adjusted to tradition, but if they are changed, it is not a problem for those in power or the people whose internal civilization is Byzantine. If the authorities almost overnight reject the traditional model of a family in favor of LGBT agendas, then a man with such internal civilization will diligently follow the directives of authority.[67] If the authorities decide to return to the traditional model, then such a man will fervently support even the most traditional among such models. Such changes took place in Germany which is dominated by Byzantine civilization. After the fall of communism, when the political tendencies shifted in East Germany, sympathy for the communist authorities almost overnight transformed into liberal

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67 Hannah Arendt's note that the Nazis were the utmost example of the Byzantine civilization is telling. Let us understand this properly: the Nazis were of Byzantine civilization, but, obviously, not every person with this civilization is a Nazi. Cf. Arendt, *Eichmann w Jerozolimie. Rzecz o banalności zła*, 173, 177.

thinking (into supporting liberal democracy, to be more precise).[68] The provisions of the Peace of Augsburg and the principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* bespeak the historical roots of such shifts associated with apriorism and the superiority of law over ethics. The dominant religion was established by law, and Byzantine-like subjects readily complied (other civilizations handled this differently). When it comes to family law itself: whatever decree the authority issues, becomes family law. Here, the concept of the family and family relations is not based on the nature of things, but on statutory law which may be contrary to the nature of things (or natural law).

In the case of **property law** and inheritance law, the situation is the same. If those in power decide that it is permissible to seize the possessions of people of this or that ethnic or national origin, then proponents of Byzantinism turn from friendly neighbors into plunderers overnight. When the authorities issue a decree, which states a given group of people is a state or private property and, therefore, must work as if they were slaves, then the Byzantine-like people will diligently follow such a law. However, when the authorities command that one ought to be "a shock worker" in the fight for human rights, these very same people become leaders of humanitarian progress. To prove Koneczny's study, we may refer to the infamous defense line of German war criminals who claimed they were not guilty as they had acted within the confines of the prevailing law.[69] In their eyes, the Nuremberg trials

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68 This can be easily traced based on election results after 1990. However, the reader should bear in mind that our reflections are very general, which is proven by the phenomenon of *Republikflucht*.

69 Arendt, *Eichmann w Jerozolimie. Rzecz o banalności zła*, ch. VIII.

must have been unjust. Such a stance has been prevalent among Byzantinists. To sum up, both property law and inheritance law depend solely on current statutory law.

Let us now discuss the categories of the quincunx.

The good, by Koneczny always associated with ethics, is subordinate to law. Thus, all principles of conduct are dictated by the scope of law. Anything that is not prohibited, is allowed. Accordingly, for a man whose formation is Byzantine, any fixed points on the map of ethical norms can be changed. There is only one superior principle (that resonates with Kant's attempts to establish ethics): respect for the law. This principle, however, applies to "every law" that comes from the authorities (which cannot be directly reconciled with the line of thought of the philosopher from Königsberg).[70]

Truth is not understood as conformity between intellect and reality. Rather, the Byzantinists hold to an interesting variant of reduced correspondence and coherence of truth. Truth is the alignment of judgment with the law (broadly understood as something the authority establishes). Due to the arrangement of mental constructs, i.e. judgments and law, we can speak of coherence here.

Well-being is important in Byzantine civilization insofar as it serves the purposes of authority. Should the authorities find it negligible, they will allow its growth as long as it does not interfere with their interests or as long as they can use it for their own purposes.

Welfare. Byzantinism recognized only one kind of welfare which, in this civilization, is an end in itself. It is the prosperity

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70   Let us clarify to avoid any ambiguity: for Byzantinists, deontological autonomy is unattainable. They remain within the realm of legislative heteronomy.

of those in power.[71] Welfare of this kind is nothing but the wealth and hegemony of the authorities. If the latter decide that the welfare of the citizens/servants is in line with their own prosperity, then individuals' lives will be affluent. If, however, to achieve their goals, the authorities allow their people to die of hunger, they will not hesitate to sacrifice them. Koneczny gives various historical examples to prove this thesis,[72] so we will not give additional ones to justify this characteristic.

Beauty is also subordinate to (those in) power. This is quite obvious since it is a pivotal category that expresses the other four categories. Without further elaboration, let us only point out that there are very few examples of art in Byzantine cultures that express criticism of authority. Such criticism was usually related to other civilizations—Latin in particular. No wonder, since art subordinate to those in power is capable only of producing esthetic *apologiae* of the authorities as well as brutal critiques of their adversaries. Thus, it loses its autotelic and axiological character.

Based on the above characteristics, one can see that Byzantine civilization is exceptionally simple as it means subordination to those in power. Therefore, all categories that are fundamental for civilization are outside the reflection of individuals. The following question comes to mind: what then are the power and authority guided by? Koneczny gives preliminary answers. However, they are neither exhaustive nor particularly interesting to us in light of our further reflection. We shall, therefore, answer the

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71 Koneczny, *Cywilizacja bizantyńska*, Vol. II, 186ff.
72 Koneczny, *Cywilizacja bizantyńska*, Vol. I–II.

question in a somewhat grotesque and sinister way: it is guided by its whims.[73]

Let us now briefly discuss Latin civilization. We shall start by determining its fundamental principles: law or ethics? aposteriorism or apriorism? Latin civilization takes Catholic ethics as the main determinant of behavior and organizing communal life. Here, everyone always perceives this ethics as superior to legislated law.[74] However, Catholic ethics does not turn this civilization into a sacral one as it refers only to moral actions. There is a vast sphere of secular legislated law that should be obeyed as long as it does not contradict ethics.[75] Catholic ethics is rooted in two sources: natural law and Revelation.[76] However, to some extent, it is possible to separate the supernatural sphere from ethics, while remaining within the realm of Latin civilization. Whether it is possible in its entirety would require further examination.[77]

So, apriorism or aposteriorism? Latin civilization chooses aposteriorism. However, it stipulates that any inconsistency with the accepted ethics must be overcome and adjusted to ethics. This said, it leaves a broad field for non-moral actions and does not interfere with them.

What are the requirements regarding triple law and the quincunx here?

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73 Hannah Arendt also pointed to this sinister character in Arendt, *Eichmann w Jerozolimie. Rzecz o banalności zła*, 324.
74 Surely, we could discuss the principle of double effect, etc., but it is not important to us now.
75 Cf. STh, I–II, q. 91, a. 3.
76 STh, I–II, q. 91, a. 2.
77 See for example Wojtyła, "Elementarz etyczny," 178–182; Kotarbiński, *Pisma etyczne*, 91–208.

In Latin civilization, **family law** is based on the family that is emancipated from dependency on the clan. The family consists of a woman, a man, and their offspring. They are emancipated which means that they decide for themselves—there is no superior authority over them. Interestingly, only Latin civilization promotes and even demands this kind of emancipation. As a rule, the emancipation of the family is indispensable for the emancipation of a woman from male authority i.e. allowing women to be socially and legally equal to men. Experience shows that this approach to family matters is highly challenging; when one tries to adhere to it, it comes at a price.

Property law is based on family law and grants private ownership to each individual. This cannot be abolished with a decree or a law. The case is similar with inheritance law. Without an emancipated family, it would not be possible to establish a separate property law for a man. Moreover, it would not be possible to emancipate a woman—she would still be barred from owning property. In fact, she would be considered part of someone's property. Similar solutions and consequences apply in inheritance law.

Let us now discuss the quincunx.

The good is tantamount to the ethical scope outlined by Catholic ethics and is a category that is superior to all others.

Truth, in Latin civilization, is understood primarily classically. That is why it is all the easier to understand why this civilization pursues aposteriorism. However, the category of truth is perceived more broadly as it is thanks to truth that one may cognize being, especially one that is independent of human beings. According to the old expression that Latin civilization adopts: *ens et bonum conventuntur* [being and good are convertible], it is possible to establish fixed reference points for all actions that

people thus civilized undertake. The truth thus perceived seems simple. However, if we think of the bulk of our experience, it becomes obvious that acknowledging that this truth is binding and should co-determine at least some part of our actions turns out to be very difficult for many. It would mean that we have to face the truth about ourselves. In the following chapters, we shall see that for some people it is virtually impossible unless their internal civilization changes.

Well-being and welfare. These are material categories in which Latin civilization is less interested at every possible level (whether individual or communal, or at the level of power as is the case with Byzantine civilization). As long as they do not interfere with ethical principles, well-being and welfare are indifferent. Catholic ethics, however, is demanding, which results in abuses and internal conflicts within individuals. This leads to a false conviction that the Church focuses primarily on these spheres in Her teaching. Unfortunately, this is an example of **confusing** spiritual and material spheres.

Were we pure spirits, then, obviously, only the spiritual part of the quincunx would apply to us. We act, however, through our bodies. With its impulses, needs, etc., our bodies play a significant role in our moral actions. Thus, the spiritual and material spheres are closely interconnected, and yet in the ontic hierarchy, the material sphere is always subject to the spiritual one.

Beauty, in Latin civilization, is understood as closely related to the good and truth (in line with the traditional triad). The material sphere of the quincunx is merely the basis for the manifestation of beauty, good, and truth. Here, beauty is not an esthetic factor or one that manifests something (in the sense of, e.g., avant-garde or postmodern trends) or as an end in itself (e.g. the estheticization of one's appearance as an end in itself). It is

especially in Latin civilization that we can see a close connection between the elements of the quincunx which are commensurate. Beauty is especially sensitive to disruptions in commensurability. When one of the elements begins to excessively dominate others, this automatically becomes apparent in beauty.

This short excerpt of Koneczny's description suffices to elucidate that in Latin civilization, it is spiritual elements that determine the direction of actions and growth. This is entirely different from Byzantine civilization. With such diverse approaches to fundamental matters, is it possible to claim that based on, for example, a single legal, tax, or administrative system, we could build an organism that we can call a society? This, Koneczny argues, is out of the question.

The above presentation aims to show adumbratively (theoretically and practically) Koneczny's theory of civilization. We shall translate its categories into the level of an individual, i.e. the level of internal civilization. Were we to render the descriptions of the two civilizations in a more detailed manner or to develop Koneczny's method regarding communal life, we would have to write a separate work that is unnecessary. Koneczny himself wrote about his method and its application so clearly that striving for summarization appears superfluous. Furthermore, his fundamental theoretical work has been available in translation into the contemporary *lingua franca* for several decades now.[78]

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78   In recent years other important works by Koneczny have also been translated into English, e.g., *The Latin Civilization*; *The Development of Morality*; *The Byzantine Civilization*; *The Jewish Civilization*.

Étienne Gilson's principle of impersonal necessity

Scholars and commentators of Gilson's philosophical oeuvre agree that the historical-philosophical method was most explicitly and comprehensively presented in *The Unity of Philosophical Experience* in 1937.[1] Twelve years later, Gilson's address at the annual convention of the Medieval Academy of America was published under the title *Doctrinal History and its Interpretation*[2] as a supplement to *The Unity…* The model of examination presented in the two texts has been commented on, though the issue of impersonal necessity has not received the attention it deserves.[3]

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1 Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*. I also use the Polish edition: Gilson, *Jedność doświadczenia filozoficznego*.

2 Gilson, "Doctrinal History and its Interpretation," 483–492.

3 See: Czerkawski, "Gilsonowska koncepcja historii filozofii"; Gogacz, "W sprawie koncepcji historii filozofii"; Swieżawski, *Zagadnienie historii filozofii*; Gogacz, "O pojęciu i metodzie historii filozofii"; Gogacz, "Rola historii filozofii w filozofii Boga"; Janeczek, "Między filozoficzną historią filozofii a historią kultury"; Milcarek, "Rozumienie filozofii chrześcijańskiej przez Étienne Gilsona"; Andrzejuk, "Koncepcja filozofii średniowiecznej jako filozofii chrześcijańskiej i niektóre jej konsekwencje w ujęciu Étienne Gilsona"; Andrzejuk, "Gilsonian metohd of the history of philosophy"; Garcia,

It should be emphasized that when compared to multiple other research methods, Gilson's model is quite demanding.[4] However, when applied, its contribution may be incomparably greater than in the case of other methods. In order to understand our extrapolation of one of the elements of Gilson's method, let us consider its three levels (or steps). Gilson speaks about three areas of research:

a) the history of philosophical writings;[5]
b) the history of philosophical doctrines;
c) the history of philosophy itself.

The history of philosophical writings is part of the method closest to strictly historical and philosophical study for it uses those elements of historical studies (originally derived from medieval studies) that make it possible to determine the authenticity of a given document, the time it was created, the author, etc. The purpose is to critically analyze and present a given text,[6] which may serve as a variant of the critical edition.

Having edited a given text in this way one may proceed to 2, that is the analysis of the content. Although a given text may contain various threads and issues, ultimately one needs to focus on reaching philosophical questions which are specific for

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"Philosophy and Its History: An Analysis of Gilson's Historical Method and Treatment of Neoplatonism".

4   It requires, for example, time and effort.
5   It is standard to talk about the "history of philosophical literature." However, because it is difficult to qualify what belongs to philosophical literature, I should like to broaden this notion and speak about "philosophical writing." Consequently, we may include in this set a philosopher's handwritten notes that were neither published nor even intended to be published as "literature."
6   Cf. Czerkawski, "Gilsonowska koncepcja historii filozofii," 61–62; Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*, 299–301.

a given material or doctrine.[7] Here, the title of Gilson's monography becomes clearer: the unity of philosophical experience is an assumption that Gilson holds on the basis of, for example, Henri Bergson's intuition.[8] Gilson shows it as a point (or a set of fundamental intuitions, axioms, etc.) that unifies the whole doctrine.[9] This assumption enables us to understand subsequent levels of the study which is an "inside analysis" of a given doctrine. If one does not know what doctrine this is, then, according to Gilson, the research material itself contains sufficient clues to reveal the doctrine.

Here Gilson speaks of three necessary steps: the analysis of the sources, the contextual analysis, and the scholarly analysis (which is an extension of the contextual analysis).[10]

The analysis of the sources—originally described in the context of studying medieval philosophy—takes as its starting point the original text. Thus, the return to the sources implies that we do not make use of "intermediaries" who, with their interpretations, could "contaminate" the thought conveyed in the source material.

A contextual analysis means that we read fragments of a given text in the light of the whole text or doctrine, following the assumption that if a doctrine consists of elements, then it is only in the context of the entire doctrine (i.e. ultimately all other elements) that we can correctly understand a given element.[11] That

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7   Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*, 299–304.
8   See for example: Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*, 313–314.
9   Cf. Any chapter from parts I–III in: Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*.
10 Czerkawski, "Gilsonowska koncepcja historii filozofii," 62ff; See also: Judycka, "Koncepcja historii filozofii Étienne`a Gilsona."
11 This is, of course, a postulate known from the hermeneutical analysis of a text.

is why one should not learn a given doctrine only perfunctorily (not to mention the so-called "taking something out of context") because perfunctory knowledge does not bring us closer to understanding a given thought.

A scholarly analysis is the last "substep" of analyzing the content of written material. Here, a given doctrine is put in the broader historical, social, linguistic, etc. context. This means that while analyzing e.g. Aristotle's writings, one should know the ancient Greek of his period. Also, particular historical conditions (his connections with the Macedonian court), social (to understand why in *The Nicomachean Ethics* he doubts whether an ugly man can be happy)[12] and philosophical (some of his works e.g., parts of *Metaphysics*, are incomprehensible if one does not know, for example, Plato's philosophy).[13]

This second step should be the culmination of the research closely related to the history of philosophy, and its fruit should be rendering a given thought as faithfully as possible. Here, Gilson does not allow for philosophical interpretations and recommends extreme caution when identifying alleged influences or sources of the elements in a doctrine under scrutiny. When put forward as a fact, an overinterpretation may forfeit the efforts of other researchers for many years, leading them astray with supposed intellectual impacts and connections. This also refers to presenting the further impact of a given doctrine.

However, in this method, the two steps described above are not the history of philosophy itself. They are, however, indispensable to proceed to step 3. The history of philosophy itself means the

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12   See: Aristotle, *NE* I 8 (1099b).
13   Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*, 299–304.

transition from historical, personal, social, etc. conditions of philosophical concepts and notions and considering them as they are as well as their "interactions." Over time, these concepts and notions have been related and mutually dependent. Also, their "content" has changed. It is exactly the scrutiny of this content and the connections between the notions that should be the purpose of the actual study that Gilson advances. If we follow the first two steps, we become capable of dissociating these concepts and notions from their authors, studying their actual philosophical interdependencies and transformations without the impediment of their "author." Gilson calls this approach "impersonal necessity."[14] It manifests itself in notions and their transformations and grows (or results) from the laws of reason. It is only by revealing the foundations of a given doctrine that one can understand the doctrine itself. Gilson notes that each philosophical doctrine is based on a finite number of preliminary assumptions that a philosopher adopts at the beginning of his philosophical path. It is around these assumptions that a given doctrine is built.[15] Changing or complementing these assumptions means that the whole doctrine is changed or complemented. Thus, these assumptions determine the entire doctrine. For scholars, a given doctrine must be always finite from a hermeneutical perspective. This means that a philosopher is capable of deriving only some of the necessary conclusions that result from the adopted assumptions. At some point, however, he cannot go further. It is up to the subsequent philosophers and scholars to further develop (or criticize) the doctrine.

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14   Cf. for example Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*, 318–320.
15   We have already mentioned this in the *Introduction*. See p. 16ff.

The application of the method (or rather its last step) that we have just briefly discussed is presented in Gilson's *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*.

Now we can see how it is possible to move from thought entangled in the context of its author, time, etc. to the thought *per se*. This is, of course, meant "metaphorically" because it would be difficult to justify metaphysically a thought devoid of the subject who thinks it. Therefore, we speak about a thought *per se* in outline while avoiding discussing its ontic status.[16]

Let us now explain how we want to apply this typically historical-philosophical research method in our reflection on internal civilization. Subsequently, we shall refute two main and very strong objections (the risk of idealization and determinism) to Gilson's method which could be extrapolated to our area of reflection. Even though impersonal necessity is most important to us, the extrapolation will cover all three research steps of Gilson's method. What we have indicated as the history of philosophical writing consisted in gathering research material and its appropriate editing.

In our study, human actions are our research materials for it is those actions that are available to us. It is usually impossible, however, to have access to all, or at least the majority, of the actions of a given individual. The access may be direct or indirect. This condition notwithstanding, we must alter Gilson's approach—were we to apply it in its entirety, we would have to know all the actions of a given individual. This, however, is neither necessary nor possible. It suffices to know what kinds of actions

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16   The above description of Gilson's historico-philosophical method is an excerpt from my paper: Petryszak, "The Perspective of Archival Discoveries in the Study of Karol Wojtyła's Philosophy."

are important to us: those regarding triple law or the quincunx. Moreover, we are not interested in all actions in this category or, to be more precise, those in which one's attitude to these categories manifests itself. We want to reach sample saturation. Since a human being changes with time, the data we obtain may represent only a certain period in the life of a given individual. Research material thus collected and presented will be the basis for subsequent analysis.

Our second step will be the analysis of the content of our research material. Due to the subject matter and the specificity of the research material, it is already in the first step that we have to extrapolate the method; moving to the second step allows us to be able to realistically engage in the research. Gilson explained that it is in the second step that we separate philosophical issues from the rest. In our case, this must happen earlier, as it would be impossible to collect data regarding all actions of an individual.

Also, similarly to Gilson, we assume that there is a "point" (or a set of fundamental ideas or convictions) that unites the entire person and their actions, constituting the core that determines a person's ability to act. However, we should not project any kind of internal civilization known to us. Gilson assumed that it is in the very research material that we may find information about what philosophical doctrine hides within it. We also assume that in the research material we specify, there is data about the core that determines a given kind of civilization.

In our substeps, it is stated that while studying a text we should deal with the text itself, without intermediaries, elaborations, etc., in the language in which it was written. In our case, the extrapolation of this substep points to two issues: the indirectness/directness of the research and knowledge of the "language."

Ideally, it would mean being with an individual whose internal civilization we want to explore. However, this situation is rarely possible. Moreover, an individual under scrutiny cannot know that he is being observed to gather data (this could influence their behavior and distort the data). We assume that ultimately, they would not be able to behave contrary to their internal civilization but they could mask their actions in various ways or refrain from some of them. For example, a person who knows that they are being observed in terms of their internal civilization may refrain from beating their spouse or breaking the law. They will try to fit into a certain accepted idealized vision of a citizen or man—a fact well-known from the theory and practice of field research.

We can monitor an individual directly, without them knowing why we are observing them (or that we are observing them), or indirectly, with the help of materials appropriately gathered by a third party. Obviously, such materials must be as free as possible from interpretation and depict a person objectively. However, they do not need to relate only to the aspects of triple law and the quincunx; the investigator can isolate the materials he needs accordingly.

Here, however, we face the problem of the "narrative" of any individual under scrutiny. In our method, we distinguish between actions and declarations. The question to what extent declarative statements may be useful will be resolved with the help of e.g. psychologists. We only want to point out that this issue needs to be addressed.

Another question in this substep is "the knowledge of the language." In our case, this simply implies the knowledge of the social and "cultural" norms and conventions. However, it is not about theoretical knowledge, but practical understanding that makes

us capable of picking up motivational nuances of this or that action of the person under examination. Nonetheless, we must bear in mind that there are no individuals who are fully competent as far as social and cultural matters are concerned. This means that nobody always knows how to behave in a given community, what the model norm is etc. Such issues are constantly subject to modifications, and our learned normativity (should one want to know everything) does not keep up with these changes. Our postulate to "know the language" is not sharp as the boundaries of the language are hard to determine (similarly to attempts to determine the limits of language understanding by, for example, native speakers of natural languages). Nobody knows a given language in its entirety,[17] we can, however, recognize who speaks it fluently. Also, intuitively we have to define the limits of minimum competencies in the context of our method. A general determination is the following: if you function well in a given society, it proves that you know its "language."

In Gilson's method, the second substep was a contextual analysis, i.e. interpreting a part in light of the entire text and vice versa. While extrapolating this substep, we shall focus merely on the set of data that are of interest to us (thus, we shall not examine the whole set of actions of a given individual). We assume, however, that people cannot be internally contradictory in their actions.[18]

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17 See an interesting analysis of this issue from a philosophical perspective in: Putnam, "The meaning of 'meaning'," 227–229.

18 A precise description of this principle was given in *Chapter III*. Here, we present it only briefly. Our intuitions and research that results from these intuitions are confirmed by many literary works considered to be classics. Let us take *Antigone* as an example. The conflict is about obedience to the divine law or statutory law that is identified with the ruler's will. As such, it is

This means that we must verify all data for possible contradictions—both between individual elements and the overall picture emerging from the data, as well as each element that makes up this picture. It is crucial (which we shall underscore with an example in *Chapter III*) not to make an analysis or mere judgment regarding internal civilization on the basis of data taken out of context or data that are very scarce.

In Gilson's analysis, a scholarly analysis is the last substep of the second step. Our extrapolation of this analysis means that we take into account deeper roots of given actions. We do not mean simple psychologizing of theses of cultural or social determinism but recognizing that elements of human reality are never unequivocal for all parties. These minor deviations and differences in understanding and responding to given elements of human reality should be taken into account. However, this substep is not indispensable. It may complete the picture, though the very structure of internal civilization is possible without it as well.

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nothing else than a civilizational conflict: on the one hand, we have a pagan version of what can be called Latin civilization (Antigone being faithful to the requirements of the divine law) vs. the local version of Turanian civilization in which the word of the ruler is the law, where one should be entirely obedient to the law. Antigone knows what will happen to her if she follows her inner civilization and stands against the civilization that happens to be dominant in a given place and a given ruler. However, she cannot act contrary to her inner civilization and this is what makes her a dramatic figure. Contrary to some popular interpretations taught at school, she is not a *tabula rasa* that waits to be written on, unable to decide whether the ink should be quasi-Latin or quasi-Turanian. Nor is she like Buridan's donkey whose drama consists in its inability to make a decision. We have a similar civilizational background of actions of various dramatic protagonists who cannot behave contrary to their civilization.

In the second step, Gilson does not yet permit an interpretation of philosophical content. In our case, such content is not so much absent as it is irrelevant from the point of view of determining internal civilization. However, should an obvious picture of internal civilization emerge at this stage, we should not peruse the data in light of a given civilization and philosophical issues related to it (e.g. moral judgments). In the second step, our task is to obtain the structure of internal civilization. The third step will either confirm or refute this structure and show (which will be again confirmation or refutation) the direction in which the actions of a given individual will go (obviously, only with a certain probability).

In our method, the third step is only the extrapolation of the principle of impersonal necessity. Thus, we assume that every internal civilization (just like every philosophical view) is based on a finite number of preliminary assumptions. However, we shall draw on an even more restrictive standpoint, namely, that every internal civilization is based only on one, main conviction that passing through fundamental and detailed ideas (see *Chapter III*) ultimately determines the scope of the possibility of an individual's actions. How does step 3 differ from determining contradictions or non-contradiction in step 2? Well, we can think of a data system that is consistent and will ultimately refer to two bases that we call "convictions." We shall discuss it (and give an example) in *Chapter III*.

The extrapolation of the principle of impersonal necessity allows us to go further and add an interpretation to the data obtained. In step 2 we can only say what data we have, what similarities, differences, etc. we find in them. Thus, we obtain a structure of civilization, though incomplete. In step 2, we can

go as far as the fundamental ideas. Step 3, due to accepting the assumptions of impersonal necessity, may lead us to discover the conviction that determines one's internal civilization.

Why do we adopt the principle of impersonal necessity instead of asking people what they think? As we have pointed out, relying on declarative statements, and even more so "automatic" interpretation of such statements, bears such a high risk of error that we firmly deny using it. We also rely on the arguments of Zbigniew Musiał and Bogusław Wolniewicz who have proven that we should not trust declarative components of statements regarding, for example, one's belonging to a given community.[19] Let us remind the readers that to us a community is based on common convictions regarding triple law and the quincunx. Thus, if it is empirical data and not one's declarations that convince us of one's affiliation, then the argument for rejecting an interview as a tool in our research is all the more potent.[20]

Even if the above description of our method may not be very convincing at this point, an example that we will present should dispel at least some doubts.

Finally, let us face the arguments raised against the principle of impersonal necessity: determinism and idealization. Let us start with determinism. We have already explained that our standpoint is indeterministic and we rely on arguments proposed by Karl Popper and Roman Ingarden.[21] However, is it not an example of deterministic thinking to claim that in a given moment

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19   Wolniewicz, Musiał, *Ksenofobia i wspólnota*, 28ff.
20   This, of course, does not mean that we find interviews to be inappropriate tools in other areas of science.
21   Cf. Footnote no. 3 (*Introduction*).

we cannot act differently to what our conviction tells us? In this charge there are two smaller issues that we can describe as the paradox of temporality and the absolutization of freedom.

As for the paradox of temporality, we obviously draw on the famous ancient paradox: If an arrow released from a bow is in a certain place at a given moment, it is not moving; if, however, it is moving, it cannot be in one place. This paradox was related to a given level of our knowledge; reality paid no heed to its "paradoxicality." While translating this ancient "riddle" into our subject, we may ask how it is possible to change one's internal civilization, if our actions are always determined by our conviction. This would mean (we assume it enthymematically) that we cannot go beyond the scope of actions determined by our conviction since it determines us at every point in time. This would mean that transitioning from our conviction to a change of our internal civilization (that would take place in time) is out of the question.

The above argument, however, suffers from a categorical fallacy. We do acknowledge that ultimately our conviction sets the boundaries of our possibility to act. And yet this conviction is not all-encompassing—it may not respond to every external factor while maintaining the *status quo*. The lack of such an adequate response leads to a kind of split or even breakdown of one's internal civilization, one that we can call "disintegration" as understood by Kazimierz Dąbrowski. When it is positive, disintegration helps one understand one's civilization more deeply or even move toward an internal civilization that is more demanding and allows one to face certain situations better and more comprehensively. On the other hand, negative disintegration leads us to a civilization that is less demanding or—if it is impossible

to find—auto-destructive behavior.[22] Moreover, as experts on dis-integration underline, a rather small part of the human population is capable of reaching a high (i.e. very challenging) level of internal civilization.[23]

Consequently, shaping the scope of our actions by our convic-tion is not determinism but behavioral facilitation—it becomes unnecessary to precede every action with a profound reflection.

The second charge is the absolutization of freedom. Of course, we can adopt such an outlook on freedom according to which I can do absolutely anything. This is, however, ridiculous. My cur-rent capabilities always boil down to the spectrum of activities available to me. For example, while I am writing these words, I cannot change the wheel in my car. And yet this limitation differs significantly from determinism, for it is not necessary to choose an option (from those available to me) that would in-evitably result from all my previous actions/states of the world; moreover, there would be no opportunity to do something else. Thus, limitation related to the spectrum of choices or conviction is not determinism. Additionally, while writing about the aristo-crats/nobility of spirit, Ortega y Gasset claims that it is possible to choose one's conviction continually, e.g. to serve that which is greater than I am.[24] This, he asserts, is a kind of freedom avail-able to few; we still know little about the reasons for this elitism.

Thus, the idea that fundamental and more detailed ideas nec-essarily result from one's conviction is consistent with Gilson's

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22 Or, to use Ingarden's term, animalistic behavior. See: Ingarden, *Książeczka o człowieku*, 18.

23 See for example: Dąbrowski, *Dezintegracja pozytywna*, 83–97.

24 Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, 63.

thinking. However, it is by no means determinism, though without disintegration it closes many options of acting.

Let us now consider the charge of idealization. One can accuse Gilson's concept of impersonal necessity of being hardly realistic as we cannot detach an idea from a given person, time, culture, or context. Similarly, one could raise this objection against our extrapolation. However, we find it utterly unfounded. Indeed, one cannot abstract one's reasons for adopting a given internal civilization from, among others, very "personal" variables. And yet abstracting detailed or fundamental ideas or convictions is quite possible. We do not claim that convictions exist ideally—we still think of them as intentional beings. Their content influences the content of other intentional beings that translate into certain actions of an individual.[25] Thus, as far as our usage and understanding of Gilson's principle is concerned, there can be no question of any idealization.

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25 More on this issue of dependency in: Ingarden, "O pytaniach esencjalnych," § 9–11; Petryszak, *Ontologia kultury*, § 8.2.

An in-depth presentation of the research subject including the proposed research method

Now we come to the heart of our considerations.

Let us recall the most important preliminary assumptions that we have outlined at the beginning. We have assumed that every person is somehow internally structured, and it is this structuring that we call—roughly speaking—an internal civilization. We have stressed that individual types of structuring do not always work together.

We have also asked ourselves a few questions aimed at facilitating an in-depth presentation of the research subject and the applied research method. The fundamental one is: **why do I do this and not something else?** Subsequently, we have divided this question into more detailed ones, the most important of which has turned out to be: **what is my action consistent with?**

This may be understood as compliance with something external to me or something internal. Also, we have assumed that

one cannot be inconsistent with oneself, i.e. one cannot act out of step with oneself even though one may feel (great) discomfort while doing certain things. Thus, the question of compliance with something internal refers to what a given person knows, feels, understands, believes in, etc. This is what constitutes ideas that people act in line with or rebel against. Here, we have put forward another thesis: **man never acts inconsistently with his ideas.**

We have said that there are various kinds of ideas, among others, fundamental ones. Compliance with these ideas determines the possibility of particular actions taking place or not (by action we mean an act and the motivation behind it). Therefore, we will be interested in relationships between ideas or entire groups of ideas. We have defined a person's internal civilization as the entire set of ideas that are characteristic of this person. Here, ideas regarding triple law and the quincunx, or those indicating one's attitude to the elements included in them, will be particularly important.

Establishing fundamental ideas themselves is already a significant step in our research. However, we also want to inquire into the reasons for adopting given fundamental ideas over others.

We have also decided that we want to shed some light on the following issues:

1. What "internal civilization" is.
2. Kinds of internal civilization.
3. Sets of fundamental ideas and the issue of conviction.
4. The method of studying fundamental ideas and convictions.
5. Recognizing so-called fundamental "choice".
6. The influence of fundamental "choice" on the subsequent development of one's internal civilization.
7. Difficulties related to the change of one's civilization (e.g. the problem of disintegration).

8. The impact of one's civilization on one's action.

9. We will also pay attention to the fact that various ideas or civilizations like to have the same names for multiple reasons.

Our subsequent reflections will take place in the following order:

1. Presenting our research method and discussing individual modifications supplementing the thought of given authors.

2. Studying internal civilization and presenting our research scheme.

3. Presenting individual internal civilizations based on the developed scheme.

4. An attempt to define a fundamental choice.

5. The consequences of a given internal civilization in specific actions.

6. Other issues.

1. THE METHOD OF STUDYING INNER CIVILIZATION

Let us repeat our claim that Koneczny's method of studying civilizations and Gilson's principle of impersonal necessity may be transferred to a different level of consideration. In other words, without losing any of their significant traits, they may be applied to the structure of man that we want to examine. Bearing this in mind, let us elaborate on it.

Having determined certain elements of the method, as regards the whole research procedure, we have to decide whether we want to draw from the *a priori* or *a posteriori* method (both of which could be used in this or any other case). However, to meet the methodological requirement (adapting a research method to the subject

of the research), the *a posteriori* method, which is based on experience, would be more appropriate. Should we adopt the *a priori* method, we would ultimately have to rely on a certain conceptual scheme that might be "indifferent" to whether it has any "sustenance" in reality. This is what we want to avoid. Consequently, we shall make use of the *a posteriori* method and, to be more precise, the experimental-inductive method; we shall examine actions and derive the structure of ideas from them as well as the principle of impersonal necessity to study the content and dependencies of ideas.

Let us start with Wolniewicz's thesis mentioned in *Chapter II*, which may be inferred from Koneczny's writings: one's belonging to a given association or community can be empirically verified.[1] This may be checked when there is peace between various communities or conflict. The same is true of compliance with ideas. However, before we discuss it, let us determine the change of research level. Both Wolniewicz and Koneczny wrote about communities or an individual in the context of a community. We would like to shift from the community level to a strictly individual one (and from the latter make references to the first). By no means should this be perceived as reductionism (which we could call individualism), for we do not deny that a man needs others to live, and it is only in a community that he may fulfill himself. However, we change this perspective because of the subject of our research. Similarly to Wolniewicz, who proposed the empirical study of one's belonging to a community, we propose examining the ideas of a given individual empirically,

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1   Musiał, Wolniewicz, *Ksenofobia i wspólnota*, 38–39.

or experimentally and inductively. What will our research consist of? Let us call it an experiential-necessity analysis. Since we are supposed to study experimentally, let us study an example. Let it be simple: creating an emergency corridor for the approaching ambulance. It is a typical situation: someone is stuck in a traffic jam, there are two lanes, the driver can hear the ambulance signal, he looks in the mirror and can see the ambulance approaching so he moves sufficiently to the right or left. If he does not give way or even blocks the ambulance, under new Polish regulations, he may be given a fine of up to 500 PLN. Regardless of whether a given driver knows about the amount of the fine, he knows that he is legally obliged to, if possible, give way to an emergency vehicle. If the driver does give way, then he has behaved in line with his conviction, the principle which ultimately prompts him to give way. We may consider the content of this idea(s) that forces the driver to let an emergency vehicle pass. There are four most probable answers here.[2] As regards our example, we have four possible ideas here:

1. Follow the traffic rules.
2. Follow what you have been taught at the driving course.
3. Follow what everyone else does.
4. Act to make it possible for someone's life or health to be saved.

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2   Obviously, we always rely only on probable evidence, but never conclusively certain. This is in line with the tenets of critical hypothetical realism which we adopt here as our epistemological stance. Moreover, since we are not dealing with an actual person whose other actions could confirm this or that hypothesis (i.e. we have no access to broader empirical material), our example is purely speculative. It is to illustrate the proposed research method being a form of speculation based on experiential models of internal civilization that we have most often encountered so far.

We can see that in a given case we can deal with each of these ideas separately or with all of them as they are not mutually exclusive. A driver may be guided by both observance of road rules and willingness to help the person in the ambulance (or for whom the ambulance is coming). There are no discrepancies between the ideas. Should we, however, assume that these ideas are all there is in a given man, this would mean that he chooses practical ideas to specific situations, and there is no consistency between the ideas (nor does there need to be). One can imagine such a situation; however, it seems extremely unlikely. For even though men may not be able to explain why they believe something, they generalize specific ideas to act more consistently. Let us note that we become annoyed when our actions are inconsistent, and we endeavor to make them consistent by establishing an idea that would explain them or explain them in such a way that they would look consistent. Thus, in our example, we have 4 ideas that are not *prima facie* contradictory. We must inquire as to what further, more general ideas, these particular ideas are based on.

Table 1.

Action	Giving way to an emergency vehicle			
Possible ideas that condition giving way to an emergency vehicle	1. Follow traffic rules	2. Follow what you have been taught on the driving course	3. Act like everyone else	4. Act to make it possible to save somebody's life or health

The first idea (follow the traffic rules) may fall under two general ideas. Of course, we can rack our brains to think of more

ideas each time but, to make things simpler, we shall present the most probable or typical ones. Our purpose is to show a certain way of analysis and a pattern of internal civilization—not this specific example. Thus, we have two general ideas (or more general ones): 1.1. comply with statutory law; 1.2. avoid fines or other kinds of punishments for not complying with the law. Here, we can already see that despite the same outcome, the two ideas differ and yield even more profound discrepancies i.e. in terms of more general ideas. For if we take idea 1.1. "comply with statutory law," we may include it in more general ideas:

1.1.1. Statutory law is the highest appellate jurisdiction for a given action.

1.1.2. Statutory law should be obeyed to the extent that our conscience allows us.

1.1.3. Statutory law should be obeyed to avoid unpleasant consequences associated with punishment for its violation.

We can clearly see that here we have three attitudes that ring a bell if we remember Koneczny's three kinds of civilizations. Solution no. 1: "statutory law is the highest appellate instance" is, obviously, the manifestation of what Koneczny called Byzantinism. Solution no. 2: "statutory law should be obeyed to the extent that our conscience permits" is a variation of Latin civilization. Solution no. 3: "statutory law should be obeyed to avoid the nuisance of being punished for non-compliance" is a variation of Jewish civilization but it is devoid of its sacral dimension.[3]

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3   In Jewish civilization, the foundation of one's actions is adherence to the Law. The Law comes from Jahveh, so it is sacral. If we strip the Law of its sacred character, then it becomes a law, though one's attitude toward it remains the same.

Thus, we have delineated more general principles/ideas of the principle/idea: "follow statutory law" shown in Table 2.

Table 2.

Action	Giving way to an emergency vehicle			
Possible ideas that conditioning giving way to an emergency vehicle	1. Follow traffic rules	2. Follow what you have been taught on the driving course	3. Follow what everyone else does	4. Act to make it possible to save somebody's life or health

More general ideas I	1.1. Follow statutory law		
More general ideas II	1.1.1. Statutory law is the highest appellate instance for one's actions	1.1.2. Statutory law should be obeyed to the extent that our conscience permits	1.1.3. Statutory law should be obeyed so as to avoid the nuisance of being punished for non-compliance

Here, the alternative idea was: to avoid fines or any other punishment for disobeying the law. At this point, we can also attempt to determine the general idea that is a possible foundation for this solution. Thus, we can present a few variants: 1.2.1. statutory law is a set of guidelines rather than rigid rules. This justifies the stance that nuisance should be avoided while statutory law should not—or need not—be shown regard; 1.2.2. statutory law is binding as long as it agrees with one's common sense—the justification: if it does not, I should at least try to avoid fines; 1.2.3. statutory

law is valid as long as it agrees with ethics X (e.g. Catholic ethics)—justification: if it does not, I disobey it as long as negative consequences do not exceed the benefits; 1.2.4. law does not matter as long as it does not entail punishment for me.

We can see that these solutions may be partially convergent or may overlap with general ideas that are the foundation of solution no.1: "follow statutory law." Can there be an even more general idea behind these solutions? Indeed, there can. In solution 1.2.1., statutory law is a set of guidelines rather than rigid rules, therefore, the justification says that nuisance should be avoided while statutory law should not—or need not—be shown regard. Here, the more general principle will be a kind of relativism or holding e.g. ethics higher than statutory law. However, this idea is formulated in such a vague way that one can hardly say what general idea lies at its root. To do so, we would need more data regarding a given person.

Solution 1.2.2., statutory law is binding as long as it agrees with one's common sense; the justification: if it does not, I should at least try to avoid fines. This solution falls under the following general idea: let your common sense guide you. Surely, we should clarify what a given person means by "common sense." However, we can see the superiority of X (here: common sense) over statutory law. Solution 1.2.3., i.e. statutory law is valid as long as it agrees with ethics X (e.g. Catholic ethics). The justification (if it does not, I can disobey it as long as the negative consequences do not exceed benefits) falls under the variant of the general idea from point 1.2.2., i.e. above all, be guided primarily by ethics X. Solution 1.2.4., i.e. law does not matter as long as it does not entail my punishment. Here, a more general idea would be: in your actions, avoid punishment (or nuisance).

Table 3 shows the above variants.

Table 3.

Action	Giving way to an emergency vehicle			
Possible ideas that conditioning giving way to an emergency vehicle	1. Follow traffic rules	2. Follow what you have been taught on the driving course	3. Follow what everybody else does	4. Act to make it possible to save somebody's life or health
More general ideas I	1.2. Avoid fines or other punishment for non-obeying the law			
More general ideas II	1.2.1. Statutory law is a set of guidelines rather than rigid rules	1.2.2. Statutory law is binding as long as it agrees with one's common sense	1.2.3. Statutory law is binding as long as it agrees with ethics X	1.2.4. Law does not matter as long as it does not entail my punishment
Fundamental ideas	?	The superiority of X (here: common sense) over statutory law	Be guided primarily by ethics X	Avoid punishment (or nuisance)

In this draft of variants, we can see that we are establishing fundamental ideas. It is easy to notice that they determine the

basic mode of action in a broad range of particular cases. There may be other ideas behind them, but they are of no interest to us now. We have reached a point at which we define one of the most fundamental attitudes of man toward reality. This is the core, or rather pivot, of one's internal civilization, and, as we have seen, the civilizational axis as perceived by Koneczny. We have, there-fore, the relationship between ethics and law. Individual ethics may be built either upon ethics that already exist (e.g. Catholic, Shiite, Jewish, independent ethics e.g. similar to Tadeusz Kotar-biński's idea[4]) or in a more individual manner i.e. without taking over the entire (or at least fundamental) ethical norms from exist-ing systems.[5] We may have a fundamental idea that tells us that the principle of our behavior is to be guided by common sense. For a given individual this would be "Kalism" (a term coined based on the novel by Henryk Sienkiewicz where the protagonist called Kali explains that "If someone steals cows from Kali […], then this is a bad deed. […] A good deed is when Kali takes someone else's cows."[6]). Here we would have the variant of the supremacy of individual ethics over law. Should following one's

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[4] Kotarbiński, *Pisma etyczne*.

[5] We mean less refined notions than, for example, Kantian autonomy.

[6] Sienkiewicz, *W pustyni i w puszczy*, 121. In the original, the quote is: *Jak ktoś Kalemu zabrać krowy* […] *to jest zły uczynek.* […] *Dobry, to jak Kali zabrać komuś krowy.*
In the context of our topic, it is worth mentioning the further part of the quote: *Staś był zbyt młody, by zmiarkować, że podobne poglądy* [do poglądów Kalego—KP] *na złe i dobre uczynki wygłaszają i w Europie—nie tylko politycy, ale i całe narody* [Staś was too young to grasp that similar viewpoint regarding bad and good deeds is shared also by European politicians and the entire nations in Europe]. *W pustyni i w puszczy* was first published in 1911 (in the years 1910–1911 it was published in installments in the newspaper *Kurier Warszawski*).

common sense mean acting in line with the nature of things, then such ethics, though individual, would fall under Catholic ethics and independent ethics (in a shortened version). We could then speak about the supremacy of ethics X that agrees with individual ethics over statutory law. Either way, ethics is superior to statutory law here.

Let us also elaborate on solutions that result from the variant "follow statutory law" and its subvariants. In subvariant 1.1.1. "statutory law is the highest appellant jurisdiction of one's actions," we have a more general (fundamental) idea: law superior to any other regulations (or norms). In variant 1.1.2., statutory law should be obeyed as long as our conscience permits, we have *prima facie* two possible solutions of more general/fundamental ideas. Either we have systemic ethics over statutory law or ethics in the form of Kalism, or similar. Since we cannot maintain this variant in the long run, we shall stick to one variant: systemic ethics over statutory law. The third variant, i.e. 1.1.3., "statutory law should be obeyed to avoid nuisance," falls under a general idea that we have already discussed, i.e. avoid nuisance (or punishment)—solution ascribed to variant 1.2.4.

Table 4 shows the above dependencies.

Table 4.

Action	Giving way to an emergency vehicle			
Possible ideas that conditioning giving way to an emergency vehicle	1. Follow traffic rules	2. Follow what you have been taught on the driving course	3. Follow what everybody else does	4. Act to make it possible to save somebody's life or health

More general ideas I	1.1. Obey statutory law		
More general ideas II	1.1.1. Statutory law is the highest appellant instance of one's actions	1.1.2. Statutory law should be obeyed as long as one's conscience permits	1.1.3. Statutory law should be obeyed to avoid the nuisance of being punished for non-obeying
Fundamental ideas	Law is superior to all other regulations (or norms)	Systemic ethics over statutory law	Avoid nuisance (or punishment)

We can see that, depending on the case, we have various relations of ethics toward law. To move forward, we shall adopt Koneczny's thesis that we can determine one's civilization only based on clarifying one's triple law and the quincunx.

Let us say a few more things about our extrapolation of Koneczny's theses to our research material. Based on historical and

anthropological studies, Koneczny acknowledges that each human community develops or adopts an attitude toward elements that make up triple law and the quincunx. This means that every individual who belongs to this or that community also has a stance toward these categories. Usually, this stance, its relations with other elements of triple law and the quincunx, and their content are not consciously problematized by an individual. Even when faced with other civilizational solutions, an individual rarely problematizes these issues, and their reaction boils down to the comment "What strange (unnatural) behavior," "What a different approach" or, more recently, "This is how cultural differences beautifully manifest themselves"[7] rather than paying attention to the solutions of one's own civilization and attitudes toward the discussed categories. Thus, in most cases, one's attitude toward triple law and the quincunx is not conscious (or problematized). This does not mean, however, that it is not there or that it does not point to more fundamental assumptions. Also, it entails certain practical solutions while doing away with others. An extrapolation thus outlined seems to concur with Koneczny's mode of thinking. He himself, however, did not discuss these issues from the perspective of the internal structure of an individual. Here, a definition of internal civilization becomes more precise: it is a way of internal structure and behavior of an individual based on their convictions and fundamental ideas. It is crucial to note that we speak of the way, and not separate elements, actions, or even views on given topics. It can be easily explained with an example. What we think of something may differ from the idea according to which we act. For example,

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7   Not to mention the fact that they do not problematize the issue of "culture," let alone demand from themselves any definition of this buzzword.

if someone says that family is the most important in life, but their behavior reveals that what matters is actually work or entertainment, then we cannot accept their declarations (in which, we assume, they believe) because they do not concur with empirical data.

Here, a doubt may arise in the reader's mind whether by introducing the term "internal civilization" we are not duplicating terminology or perhaps preaching to the converted. For we do have the term "worldview"[8] which seems suitable to describe what we call "internal civilization." Indeed, at first sight, the two terms mean the same thing. However, this similarity is only apparent. We do not want to elaborate on this, we shall only indicate the main points that make it impossible to identify worldview (or its synonyms) with internal civilization.[9]

First of all, the term "worldview" is not defined well—the term is vague and depending on the thinker or current, its understanding varies. For our purposes, we choose a rather broad definition by Włodzimierz Dłubacz.[10] According to him, "worldview" is "general knowledge (convictions, statements, assessments, norms) about the world and oneself that one holds to be true and based on which one orients oneself in the world and acts."[11] Here we can see the first difference: in the context of internal civilization, we do not assume that convictions and fundamental ideas are knowledge or beliefs, not to mention their conscious character. Indeed, they may be conscious but need not be so. In one's worldview, the case is different. All the more so, since

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8   Other synonymous words with "worldview" include: "viewpoint," "frame of mind," "standpoint," etc.
9   Cf. also: Naugle, *Worldview. The History of Concept*, ch. 11.
10 Dłubacz, "Światopogląd," 346–347.
11 Dłubacz, "Światopogląd," 346.

"[this knowledge] may have the character of wisdom."[12] We could never claim that as regards certain internal civilizations. Moreover, it is exactly this lack of wisdom-like nature that is necessary in certain civilizations (e.g. Byzantine or one that we shall call relativistic civilization).

Moreover, according to Dłubacz, "[a worldview] contains more or less explicit answers to questions that are vital to each of us: who am I? what do I live for? What is the world? What is good and what is bad? Is there God and life after death? What should I do?"[13] As regards this—open, we assume—set of issues, internal civilization may address at least two: what is good and what is bad? (this will be equivalent to one's stance toward good in the quincunx) and what should I do? (one's civilization is capable of yielding norms, though usually we are not aware of this). Thus, it becomes obvious that "worldview" when compared to internal civilization is much broader in terms of the scope of problems it deals with, and much narrower when we bear in mind that an individual must be aware of the elements that constitute a given worldview. Apart from a few similarities (e.g. one's worldview develops especially when one faces difficulties in life),[14] the differences are so crucial that one can hardly identify the two concepts.[15]

Let us return to the main course of our analyses. Let us develop detailed ideas that caused the driver to act in a given way.

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12 Dłubacz, "Światopogląd," 346.
13 Dłubacz, "Światopogląd," 346.
14 Dłubacz, "Światopogląd," 346.
15 Because the above differences refer to the foundations of the two concepts, we see no reason to delve into the issue in more detail and enumerate more discrepancies. The case is similar as regards inner civilization and words synonymous with "worldview."

We present them so that our analysis is clear and complete, though we will discuss only variant 1 in more detail.

Variant 2 says: "follow what you have been taught at the driving course" and it falls under one general idea: 2.1. "follow the recommendations of the authority."[16] However, "authority" is an ambiguous term here, for it may imply an expert at teaching driving, a society that respects the norms of driving a car on the road or a group of road traffic specialists represented by the instructor, etc. What is understood by "authority" becomes more precise on the next level of general ideas, of which, as the most common options, we distinguish seven: 2.1.1. orders of authorities are the highest instance of appeal—by authorities we mean the instructor as well as the abstract (for the driver) set of people who are experts in the field; 2.1.2. comply with a social organization understood as the relations of validation of norms, authorities (experts), etc. which determine the possible scope of possible actions of an individual; 2.1.3. orders of authorities (understood as in point 2.1.1.) are binding as long as they are not in conflict with one's conscience; 2.1.4. one ought to obey the orders of authorities (understood as in point 2.1.1.) to avoid the nuisance related to the punishment; 2.1.5. orders of authorities (understood as in point 2.1.1.) are a set of guidelines rather than rigid rules; 2.1.6. orders of authorities (understood as in point 2.1.1.) are binding as long as they agree with common sense; 2.1.7. orders of authorities (understood as in point 2.1.1.) are binding as long as they agree with ethics X.

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16 It would be possible to point to other general ideas but—let us emphasize it once again—this is a model example and we do not want to delve into excessive casuistry.

Let us pay attention to two issues. First of all, even though point 2.1.1. determines the semantic scope of the term "authority," in each of the above points it is understood somewhat differently due to the subject's attitude to the authority. What we mean is not only a person's attitude toward another person or a group of people (or abstractions) but also who determines the authority and how far it reaches. We shall not elaborate in detail on these issues. We only emphasize that for us in the elaborations of particular idea no. 2, a crucial issue (which will later be an important point of reference) is "being the holder of authority."

Before we present the whole variant 2 in a table, let us point to the fundamental ideas which lie behind the general ideas that we have discussed. These are: 2.1.1. follow the orders of authorities; 2.1.2. act like a conformist; 2.1.3. above all, be guided by ethics X; 2.1.4. avoid punishment (or nuisance); 2.1.5. unluckily, we do not have a reasonable solution at the moment; 2.1.6. the superiority of some X (here: common sense) over authority; 2.1.7. above all, be guided by ethics X. It should be noted that the fundamental idea of point 2.1.2. may be a fundamental idea or another general idea that falls under the fundamental idea "avoid punishment (or nuisance)." Based on an isolated case, we cannot determine which variant occurs.

Variants 3. and 4. that we are going to discuss, seem highly informative and surely much more interesting than variant 2. Ultimately, however, they lead to the same convictions despite their seeming intricacy.

The particular idea no. 3. "act as everybody else does" falls under 3 general ideas:

3.1. the majority cannot be wrong; 3.2. be a conformist; 3.3. be an opportunist.

Table 5.

Action	Giving way to an emergency vehicle						
Particular idea	2. Follow what you have been taught at the driving course						
General idea I	2.1. Follow the recommendations of an authority						
General idea II	2.1.1. Orders of authorities are the highest appellant instance	2.1.2. Comply with a social organization	2.1.3. Orders of authorities are binding as long as they are not in conflict with one's conscience	2.1.4. One ought to obey the orders of authorities to avoid the nuisance related to punishment for non--adherence	2.1.5. Orders of authorities are a set of guidelines rather than rigid rules	2.1.6. Orders of authorities are binding as long as they agree with common sense	2.1.7. Orders of authorities are binding as long as they agree with ethics X
Fundamental idea	Be guided by the orders of authorities	Act like a conformist	Above all, be guided by ethics X	Avoid punishment (or nuisance)	?	Superiority of some X (here common sense) over authorities	Be guided primarily by ethics X

In the case of 3.1., a more general idea is: 3.1.1. "be a conformist," a reference to variant 3.2., and it is exactly variant 3.2. that is here the continuation of variant 3.1.

Variant 3.2. falls under a general idea in 3.2.1. rules that are binding in a given society[17] are the highest appellant instance for my actions. Here, the fundamental idea would be the superiority of the communal over the individual.

Variant 3.3. may fall under 4 of the most common general ideas that are specific to it:

3.3.1. follow the rules of conduct of the majority as long as it agrees with common sense; 3.3.2. follow the rules of conduct of the majority as long as it benefits you (or you avoid nuisance or punishment); 3.3.3. follow the rules of conduct of the majority as long as it does not contradict conscience; 3.3.4. follow the rules of conduct of the majority as long as you are controlled in your actions by this majority.

Each of these variants of a general idea falls under a fundamental idea which is:

3.3.1. the superiority of some X (here, common sense) over the social norms/norms of the majority; 3.3.2. avoid nuisance (or punishment); 3.3.3. ethics X over social norms/norms of the majority; 3.3.4. Pharisaism.[18]

A schematic representation of the above dependencies is shown in Table 6.

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17   Here we can also speak about a community, an association, etc.
18   As understood by Max Scheler (Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik*, 115, 120).

Table 6.

Action	Giving way to an emergency vehicle					
Particular idea	3. Act as everyone else does					
General idea I	3.1. The majority cannot be wrong	3.2. Be a conformist	3.3. Be an opportunist			
General idea II	3.1.1. Be a conformist	3.2.1. Rules that are binding in a given society are the highest appellant instance for my actions	3.3.1. Follow the rules of conduct of the majority as long as it agrees with common sense	3.3.2. Follow the rules of conduct of the majority as long as it benefits you (or avoid nuisance)	3.3.3. Follow the rules of conduct of the majority as long as it does not contradict conscience	3.3.4. Follow the rules of conduct of the majority as long as you may be controlled in your actions by this majority
Fundamental idea	[Continued in variant 3.2.]	The superiority of the communal over an individual	The superiority of some X (here common sense) over the norms of the majority	Avoid nuisance (or punishment)[19]	Ethics over the norms of the majority	Pharisaism

19 Cf. Koneczny, *Prawa dziejowe*, 336.

4.1. follow solutions that save somebody's health or life; 4.2. follow ethics X; 4.3. follow your feeling (or empathy); 4.4. act as you would like others to act toward you.

Variant 4.1. falls under four more general ideas: 4.1.1. each rule that saves somebody's health or life is binding; 4.1.2. rules that save somebody's health or life are binding as long as they agree with common sense; 4.1.3. rules that save somebody's health or life are binding as long as they agree with one's conscience; 4.1.4. follow solutions that save somebody's health or life unless failure to comply will result in punishment or nuisance.

The above general ideas fall under fundamental ones: 4.1.1. law and rules that save somebody's health or life are superior to all other categories;[20] 4.1.2. the superiority of some X (here common sense) over law and rules; 4.1.3. above all, follow ethics X; 4.1.4. avoid nuisance (or punishment).

We perceive variant 4.2. (follow ethics X) only as falling under a general idea that results from rules that are binding in a given

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20 This idea in various forms is quite common in many discussions. It necessarily entangles its user in practical and theoretical difficulties, over which bioethicists rack their brains. As an example, let us consider a moral dilemma (i.e., a situation in which there is a choice between two equally valued options, but in practice, only one of them can be realized). For example, a medical rescuer has the time and means to save two people, but four people need help. However, he is unable to assess which of the individuals has the greatest chance of survival but is certain that without immediate assistance, each of them will die. In such a situation, how does one adhere to the principle that the rules prioritizing human health or life-saving are paramount if the norm of their conduct in practice would result in condemning two people to death? Without a properly grounded normative system, we inevitably fall into contradiction or relativism each time we attempt to resolve this practical problem. I owe this example to paramedics with whom I conducted classes in ethics.

ethics. Without clarifying them, we cannot say much more. Here, the fundamental idea will be in each case: above all, follow ethics X.

We consider variant 4.3. "be guided by compassion (or empathy)" also from the point of view of one general idea: 4.3.1. "help save the health or life of a person as long as you feel compassion for this person." This may seem a purely theoretical solution at first sight, for it seems difficult to find a person who behaves in this way. On the contrary, the history of mankind, as well as our everyday life, teaches us that this is certainly one of the reasons for (not) helping others (also when it comes to saving their health or life). Let us note that some people filled with compassion travel great distances to provide humanitarian aid. At the same time, they are not moved by the fate of the sick, or the homeless people at risk of freezing to death in their own neighborhood. We are not critical of compassion, we simply want to stress that this is a rather dubious compass of conduct.[21]

Variant 4.3.1. falls under the fundamental idea: "be guided by your emotions." The last variant, 4.4. "act as you would like others to act toward you" falls under two general ideas:

4.4.1. follow your emotions; 4.4.2. follow your common sense. Variant 4.4.1., obviously, falls under the fundamental idea "follow your emotions"; whereas point 4.4.2. falls under the idea "follow your common sense."

Examples 3. and 4. are important insomuch as they introduce the categories of emotions, conformism, opportunism and

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21 This is a variant of emotionalism (like in Max Scheler's philosophy) which was criticized by Karol Wojtyła. He found it impossible to base an ethical system on it. Cf. Wojtyła, "Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu Maxa Schelera," 119ff.

Pharisaism. However, we shall see that all these categories will fall under the convictions specific to the convictions analyzed in variant 1. As we have shown,

discussing all the variants in light of Koneczny's method would be too time-consuming and unnecessary for the purposes we have set. We shall, therefore, limit ourselves to variant 1, especially since we shall reach the very same convictions that we would have reached if developing variants 2.–4.

Let us try to indicate the main possibilities of linking the obtained solutions of fundamental ideas in our example with the driver so that there is no contradiction in the remaining fundamental categories. Subsequently, we shall justify our thesis that there can be no contradiction within one's internal civilization.

Thus, we have 9 possible fundamental ideas that determine the relationship between ethics and law or law and ethics, though some of these ideas are repeated. Hence, out of 9 fundamental ideas, there are 5 left.[22] These are:

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22 Let us limit ourselves to variant 1. and point out additional fundamental ideas that do not occur in variant 1 but can be reduced to the five mentioned in the main text. Thus we have the following fundamental ideas (going from variant 2 to 4): a) follow the orders of authorities; b) act in a conformist way; c) be guided primarily by ethics X; d) avoid punishment (or nuisance); e) [the unknown variant]; f) common sense is superior to authority; g) be guided primarily by ethics X; h) an individual is inferior to the collective; i) common sense is superior to social norms; j) avoid nuisance (or punishment); k) ethics are above social norms; l) Pharisaism; m) laws and principles saving human life take precedence over all other categories; n) superiority of common sense over law and principles; o) be guided primarily by ethics X; p) avoid nuisance (or punishment); q) be guided primarily by ethics X; r) be guided by emotions; s) be guided by emotions; t) be guided by common sense. We see that some categories are repeated both in relation to each other and in relation to the categories from variant 1. These will be (standardizing the notation): ethics

1. Relativism (here we include Kalism[23]).
2. Ethics over statutory law.
3. Following one's common sense.
4. Avoiding nuisance.
5. Law is superior to all other orders or norms.

Behind these 5 fundamental ideas there are ultimately 3 convictions:

1. "I" am the most important (with fundamental ideas of relativism, common sense and avoiding nuisance).
2. Subordinating "I" to ethics (with the fundamental idea of ethics being superior to statutory law).
3. Subordinating "I" to statutory law (with the fundamental idea of law being superior to all other orders and norms).

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is above enacted law (c, g, k, o, q), be guided by common sense (f, i, n, t), avoid nuisance (d, j, p), law takes precedence over all other commands or norms (a, b, h, m). This ordering should raise no doubts. However, what about relativism and the categories we have not classified yet?

Can they all be categorized as relativism? It seems so—except for the unknown variant (e)—for the following reasons. In the case of 1. Pharisaism, the most important norm of conduct based on fundamental ideas is being recognized as good and seeing oneself as good. Therefore, any legal or ethical norms are not important (within, for example, objective or religious ethics) because if breaking the law is considered good, the Pharisee will act in a way so as to be perceived as good in his own and others' eyes. In the case of r) and s.) be guided by emotions, we may admit that it is hard to find anything more variable than human emotions. Surrendering to them means going in one direction one moment and in another direction the next, according to the whims of this capricious guide. One's internal situation must be indeed relativized when one is torn by emotions, in the sense that some emotions are opposed to others. For this reason, we believe that this is an obvious case of relativism.

23 Kalism seems *prima facie* to fit ideas 2–4 as well. However, its deeper analysis reveals that we can sensibly talk about Kalism only as related to relativism.

We have, therefore, reached the core of defining internal civilization. For there is no human action in which "I" does not refer to some X (subject or object) in some way. This way, as we have seen earlier in the definition, is (or results from) internal civilization.

Let us now determine the noncontradictory main civilizational determinants of convictions. In this step, we shall not only deal with pure possibilities, for this would be a too *a priori*-directed approach straight from Ingarden's *Controversy over the Existence of the World*.[24] Instead, we shall draw on the necessary solutions thanks to which we have obtained fundamental ideas. This means that we shall rely on these fundamental ideas in the context of previously obtained more detailed ideas, for only in this way may we avoid straying from the study of a given person and falling into some general network or scheme of possibilities.

Similarly to what we have done above, let us begin with triple law (bearing in mind, however, our new data).

Family law fundamentally determines the relationship between spouses and their offspring, and then between our relatives and related persons. Let us have a look at the bond between a man and a woman.

With conviction 1. "I" am the most important, we have the following possible relationships between spouses:

a) first of all, it may be a partnership;

b) it may also be a relationship of subordination or even ownership;

c) it may also be a contract for an indefinite period.

It all depends on the shape of conviction: if it is typically relativistic, then as a rule, all the above options are possible—i.e.

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24   Ingarden, *Controversy over the Existence of the World*.

one never knows what to expect of such a person. Should we have broader research material, then a certain regularity could emerge. However, if we deal with actual relativism, then we do not know what to expect. That is why, all the above options may occur.

If we are guided by common sense, then all the above options seem to enter into the equation. However, only apparently, for the only option truly available is the contract for indefinite period. Why? If we are guided primarily by common sense and decide to solemnize marriage on the basis of partnership, what could be the obstacle? And yet common sense tends to be capricious while its precepts are not clearly defined. Thus, if I commonsensically come to the conclusion that I have not been getting on well recently with my wife, that we may be happier if we find someone else, that my secretary is in fact more attractive than my wife, then guided by common sense, I may bring my marriage to a close "overnight." This means that matrimony is important to me as long as it is consistent with my common sense. Therefore, ultimately, with the fundamental idea based on common sense, only a contract of an indefinite period comes into play. Here marriage is not valuable in itself, but is a means to achieve one's egoistic goals.

With the variant "avoiding nuisance," we would repeat the argumentation related to common sense.

With the conviction that "I" is subordinate to ethics, it all depends on what kind of ethics it is. Should it be Koranic ethics, it will be possible to divorce the wife; should it be Catholic ethics, it will not be possible, etc.

In the case when "I" is subordinated to statutory law, the situation is simple as well. If the law allows for divorce, then marriage cannot be treated as an indissoluble union. However, should the law not allow for divorce, then we can speak of the indissolubility

of the bond of matrimony as long as the law does not change in this regard.

Thus, we have sketched various attitudes toward matrimony. Analogically, we can clarify one's stance toward one's offspring, relatives, and related people. It suffices to consider these two issues so as not to fall into casuistry: the attitude towards one's offspring and one's parents-in-law.

One of the most lasting interpersonal bonds is between a child and a mother (or more broadly, parents). Surely, there are exceptions to this rule. Nevertheless, one cannot disagree that it is indeed a strong bond. However, for a person with Byzantine civilization, this bond will not prevail, should the law impose the duty to give up one's second child to the state to, for example, raise a future army of officials who will be blindly obedient to the state and free from any family ties. Another example: if the law allowed for abandoning a child, then among people with such internal civilization, there would probably be a high percentage of those who indeed abandon it.

As for the attitude toward one's relatives, in this case, one's in-laws, if the law says that people who become a burden (from an economic point of view) should be subjected to euthanasia, then a person with Byzantine civilization, filled with good intentions, would allow his parents-in-law to be killed.

When it comes to property law, having previously described solutions from family law, the case is clear. However, let us examine it for the sake of order.

If we adopt the conviction that "I" am the most important, then, obviously, I will try to accumulate as many goods as possible for myself. However, this is one option. Another says that "I" will like myself all the more when I give away money (obviously, money

is a symbol here, as we mean all material goods). This second way is typically Pharisaic.[25] Both are focused on emphasizing "I," though in various ways.

Looking at this issue from the indicated fundamental ideas we can say that in relativism, various stances on property law may be implemented. However, we cannot conduct further analysis without additional data for this would be pure speculation.

In the case of common sense, it is similar to relativism. Common sense advises one person that playing on the stock market is the best way to multiply one's money, and that separate "wallets" of spouses are all they need to manage their property. Another person guided by his common sense thinks that a man should earn money, but it is the wife, a thrifty person responsible for the household, who will manage their money, etc.

In the case of avoiding nuisance, the attitude toward property law can also be shaped in various ways. For some, not having money is a nuisance, while for others, it is being perceived as a miser. Thus, the situation is similar to the one with relativism.

If we have a close look at conviction 2 where "I" is subordinated to ethics, the question is what kind of ethics this is. If it is an ethical system that does not directly address property issues, then we shall act so as not to contradict other norms which are binding within this ethics.

With the conviction that "I" is subordinated to statutory law, it is obvious that it is statutory law that determines the possibilities of managing property issues. Thus, everything that law permits at a given time, may be implemented by a person with

25 As understood by Max Scheler.

such a conviction. But what if the law changes? History teaches us that people with such convictions have had no problem seizing the property of others as long as the law allowed it. When the law did not allow, they found such conduct improper.

Thus, we have a sketchy picture of property law. We shall not discuss inheritance law separately, for we would have to repeat ourselves: here inheritance law can be perceived as part of property law and, in certain cases, as part of family law.

Thus, we have adumbratively discussed triple law. We can see that the solutions we have shown result from the given convictions and fundamental ideas related to them. Ultimately, all our results are subject to the attitude toward ethics and law.[26]

Let us now discuss the **quincunx**.

We shall again begin with the conviction that "I" am the most important.

The issue of good (i.e. ethics) has been discussed above.

Let us consider the question of truth and its three main concepts: classic, coherent, and pragmatic.

With "I" being the most important, we can theoretically show that each of these three concepts of truth can be adopted and implemented. This is in theory. However, we should take into account additional issues that result from the adopted conviction. We can assume that emphasizing "I" could take a noble turn. Then

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26 Since we do not want to introduce additional distinctions into the main text, we shall not indicate that the distinction of the "self" subordinate to ethics is a general category, within which we can distinguish, for example, the subordination of the "self" to Catholic, Fatimid, independent, utilitarian, etc. ethics. The Catholic ethics, which forms the basis of Latin civilization, would deserve special distinction here. We will not discuss here why this particular ethics was thus distinguished, as Koneczny has sufficiently explained it.

one could recognize the virtuous good considered as fitting i.e. objectively appropriate for oneself. This would be related to personalistic thinking and perfectiorism.[27] Should one adopt one of these concepts, one cannot start by putting oneself on a pedestal for then it is not the norm nor order that determine the correctness of my actions, but I am a norm-creating subject for myself. Let us repeat once again—we do not mean deontonomic autonomism of the Kantian type. The latter was based on an unchanging apriorism, where everyone could, and ultimately must, reach the same norms which—according to Kant—proved that they are manifestations of objective principles, despite their autonomism.[28] In the case of the conviction discussed here, we deal with subjective or subjectivist autonomism. This means that in practice it is the subject who is the final norm-creating instance. But since they do not have (or there are no) objective premises on which they could rely e.g. to come twice to the same conclusion that is the basis of the norm of conduct, they may behave differently each time. Perhaps not entirely differently, but somewhat differently. Of course, we mean reflective behavior, not habitual. Thus, the subject will be equally subjective toward the truth as they are toward ethics. Ultimately, it is the truth that serves them, and not vice versa. What do we mean by that? Above all, the fact that many people become "authorities." This is typical of modern times. A subject decides, without any reasonable grounds, who is an authority for them. A person with such a conviction does not allow for the possibility that they might be wrong in matters

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27 Cf. Wojtyła, "In Search of the Foundation of Perfectiorism in Ethics."
28 I. Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.*

crucial to them. It is those who think differently who are wrong.[29] Thus, such an attitude cannot be the foundation of personalism or perfectiorism even theoretically.

Referring what we have said to the issue of truth, we can see that only the pragmatic conception of truth is in tune with this conviction. The classic and coherent concepts are acceptable in so far as they agree with the judgment of a given person in a given situation. Let us give a few examples. If this person were in a parking lot and saw that someone was scratching their car, then while making a statement to the insurance company, this person would strictly adhere to the classical concept of truth (and incidentally, to the coherent). However, if scientific research does not concur with the actions or views of this person, then the classic concept of truth no longer holds water.

Therefore, pragmatism remains. Could we say that there is no pattern of actions, and that every reflective action of such a person is always a great unknown—even to themselves? Not entirely. The conviction "'I' am the most important" provides one with a certain guideline for one's actions. Surely, one's own good, broadly speaking, will be understood differently by different individuals. For a practicing alcoholic, the most important thing will be to arrange their life situation in a way that provides as many opportunities, as much permission, and as much justification for actions related to their addiction. Therefore, the key will be to discern what is good for the "self." Considering the above-mentioned

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29   Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses,* 69–70.
It is worth mentioning here the concept of the "proud self" by Ditrich von Hildebrand as well as other personal centers that hinder a critical view of oneself. Cf. Hildebrand, *Christian Ethics*, 408–452.

difficulties in fitting into perfectiorism, we can say that here we talk about subjective good.

Having determined the attitude toward the truth, we can reflect on it in the context of fundamental ideas, i.e. relativism, common sense, and avoiding nuisance.

In relativism, apart from subjective good, we have nothing to draw upon. Here, everything depends upon something else. This is a very common stance toward reality, i.e. so-called "dependism." This kind of relativism is a kind of tool that is to satisfy the "I" of an individual. However, it is an empty tool, without content—its content must come from outside. Thus, we have relativism that waits to be filled with content. Of course, the more given content concurs with our conduct and outlook on reality, the easier it is to accept (the subject is the ultimate holder of authority).

If we take common sense as the fundamental idea, the situation is similar to relativism. However, the perspective changes here, for common sense is not such an empty tool as relativism, though it also needs to be complemented. Commonsensical people try to close everything within the boundaries of their mental abilities. If something goes beyond them, then it surely needs to be discarded. However, we do not mean mental limitations *per se* but also limitations that result from information available to them. Let us give an example. What is the best way to fight inflation? For many, the commonsensical answer is: let us print more money and give it to people. Devoid of knowledge (or information) on the subject, they cannot see the absurdity and counter-effectiveness of this solution. This does not mean that such people could not understand the rules governing economics. They simply have too little information. Why don't they want more information?

Or, if they cannot have more, why do they talk about subjects they know little about? This is an issue that refers us straight to the core of conviction about the priority of themselves, i.e. "'I' am the most important." Thus, common sense relies on reason, but there is no need to supply it with crucial information, or no need for the reason to reason accurately. Should we, for example, via common sense reach the conclusion that we should always be guided by emotions, then we could claim that we are guided by common sense though in reality we would be at the mercy of our whimsical emotions.

The last fundamental idea of the discussed conviction is "avoid nuisance." Here, the truth will deal with pleasure and nuisance, and this will define our actions. Therefore, there is no need to elaborate on this matter.

Thus, we can see that even though we have one conviction evolving around "I," we can go to various fundamental ideas that are in line with this conviction.

Let us, therefore, discuss the issues of **welfare and health (i.e. well-being)**. When we look at them from the perspective of the conviction, i.e. most generally, they will be similar to what we have said about property law, though there is a difference worth elaborating on. We have said that a whole set of arrangements within property and inheritance laws may be implemented in the conviction under discussion. It is so indeed. However, while discussing welfare, one should point out the following issues that Koneczny stressed while clarifying specific civilizations: whose welfare do we mean? Is welfare more important than the spiritual aspects of the quincunx? What do we mean by welfare and what are its boundaries?

Since we are discussing a conviction where one's "self" is the most important, then it is clear that one's welfare is meant here.

Is welfare more important than the spiritual aspects of the quincunx? We could examine this issue from the perspective of each of the three fundamental ideas. This, however, seems unnecessary because the conviction is superior to fundamental ideas, and the solution always indicates physical goods over spiritual goods. Why so? Above all, because within the spiritual elements of this civilization, there is nothing permanent to which one could refer. On the other hand, when welfare becomes scarce, it can get under our skin. Then all spiritual categories are suddenly at the service of a relativist, commonsensical, epicurean, or hedonist outlook of a person whose aim is to achieve welfare. Thus, it is the category of welfare that is superior here. It is not important whether they will have to "abuse" spiritual categories. What matters is the improvement of one's welfare.

Let us also consider whether there is a boundary beyond which we cannot speak of welfare. In this case, like in no other, relativism wins, for it is hard to determine where welfare begins and ends.

Thus, welfare takes precedence over all other elements of the quincunx. However, to get a better picture, we should complement this category, i.e. expand it a little bit. For welfare materially understood is strictly connected with mental well-being (we distinguish between the psyche and the spirit). Therefore, we do not mean only material welfare, but the whole psychophysical sphere of an individual (without the spiritual plane).

From this perspective, the question of health is intriguing. Obviously, as long as a healthy lifestyle is considered valuable by a person, health is important to them. When their conviction changes, which is easy, health is off the radar. Thus, the issue of health depends on one's current convictions which can be extremely changeable. This, however, does not mean that a given

person does not want to be healthy. Health ceases to be an objective category and becomes, like almost everything else here, subjective. In this paradigm, a person who is morbidly obese due to their lifestyle and not due to factors beyond them may think that they are healthy. It sounds absurd, however, let us note that if one's approach to the question of truth is purely pragmatic, and what matters is one's material and mental welfare, then it would be difficult to convince such a person that they are wrong.[30] Here, health is also a radically relative category.

The last element is **beauty**, which is a spiritual and material element that, as if, connects all the other elements of the quincunx. Here, however, beauty is not associated with anything that would ground it and distinguish it from ugliness. Traditional categories that link beauty, good, and truth do not matter here, primarily because good and truth are reduced to utilitarian categories. In classical terminology, they are called *bonum utile*. From this *bonum utile* that does not lead to a higher objective, *bonum honestum*, one cannot derive the category of beauty as something based on esthetic values. Thus, subjectivity is the ultimate criterion here as well.

Thus, we can see that all categories of the quincunx are subordinated to subjectivism: the aim, for various reasons, is the material and mental welfare of an individual. Thus, in the conviction under discussion ("'I' am the most important"), it is matter and will (possibly with emotions) that prevail over spirit and reason, to put it in more classical terms.

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30 An example that confirms this thesis is the promotion of obesity by some representatives of the *body positive* movement.

We have discussed the internal civilization whose conviction is "'I' am the most important" and which can adopt relativism, common sense, or the principle of avoiding nuisance as its fundamental ideas. These fundamental ideas may intersect, but this is not important to us at this preliminary stage of our elaborations. Other convictions are obvious as to their names (which we shall borrow from Koneczny). He, however, did not establish the above civilization while conducting his studies on the plane of associations.

In the conviction where "I" is subordinated to **ethics**, the latter, obviously, determines a whole set of an individual's actions. It is toward ethics that the remaining categories of the quincunx are oriented. If ethics does not regulate a given issue directly, then actions that are undertaken should at least not contradict ethical norms. It is worth noting that in such civilizations there is complete voluntariness for one cannot force anyone to accept given ethical norms as one's own. If there is coercion, then ethical norms change into law, and we move from subordinating "I" to ethics toward e.g. conformism or opportunism. Most importantly, as Koneczny emphasized, in this kind of civilization, one's submission to ethical norms must be completely voluntary.[31] The dominance of ethics over the other categories of the quincunx indicates the superiority of spirit over matter.

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31 Ortega y Gasset incisively describes this issue when he points out, using the example of the aristocrat of the spirit, that they voluntarily submit themselves to the service of something they know surpasses them. However, this submission is not a one-time act, but a choice made each time, as there is no compulsion to serve this greater "idea"—in our case, ethics. Cf. Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, 62ff.

As for the approach to **truth**, much depends on the ethics adopted. If we have dual ethics, i.e. one set of norms for the members of our own association, and another for aliens, the category of truth may also be subject to duality. Let us, however, consider the approach to truth in Latin civilization that is based on universal ethics. Apart from Revelation, Catholic ethics is also based on the greatest possible dose of reason (understood classically as a tool for recognizing the truth about the world). Here, truth is understood in terms of correspondence i.e. the content of our thought (or judgment) should concur with reality. If someone has access to data showing what things are and yet stubbornly sticks to his judgment which is inconsistent with reality, then it is considered inappropriate or even reprehensible. This approach to truth is a strong support for ethical issues—without knowledge of reality it would be difficult to implement or even reflect on various ethical postulates.

Well-being and welfare are important—it is within them that tensions between an individual and ethics arise. Still, these are material categories, and, when compared to spiritual categories, they have little relevance in this civilization. However, one should not conclude that they are entirely unimportant. Indeed, they play a vital role in terms of the possibility of survival or living at a level that assures financial independence. For, as Koneczny stresses, widespread destitution is the enemy of ethics—it is difficult for a constantly malnourished person who fears whether they will sleep with a roof over their head to reflect on ethical issues. Thus, the point is to ensure conditions where one can freely choose ethically appropriate actions.

The last category is **beauty** which, as the keystone of the remaining categories, expresses the spirit of a given civilization.

Let us note that, for example in Latin civilization, beauty serves ethics and truth. Often enormously expensive artistic materials have been used to present and glorify what is spiritual. Beauty is also one of the first indicators of civilizational changes, which Koneczny aptly notes: "And if society does not have an appropriate level of morality, pornography might expand under the pretense of literature and art."[32]

Therefore, we can see that it is primarily Latin civilization that subordinates "I" to ethics (if it is Catholic ethics) or civilizations similar to the Latin one.

Discussing all the points of the quincunx in Byzantine civilization would mean repeating what we have already said on pages 53–58. That is why we shall add only one piece of information. This civilization puts law first which it identifies with the will of the authorities. The latter are identified with the state (or with other forms of pre-state organization in earlier periods) which results in statolatry in various variants. "I" is subordinated to statutory law (or, more broadly, law that is superior to ethics) in the following civilizations: Byzantine, Jewish and Turanian (according to Koneczny's nomenclature), although there are significant differences between them. Byzantine civilization is the model of statolatry and is closest to Turanian civilization.

Let us summarize the method we have used. Firstly, let us note that we have drawn on very prosaic and scant research material. This was to show the method in practice. However, we should bear in mind a few questions if we are to use this method successfully.

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32 Koneczny, *The Laws of History*, 348.

1. We should collect as much research material as possible—to use the language of social sciences, we can say that we should gather material until the sample is saturated.

2. We cannot assume that the three types of convictions we have identified are a complete set. We could likely distinguish some other types. However, those that we have enumerated seem to be most typical and thus most crucial.

3. We should always strictly stick to the necessity analysis so as not to fall into speculation. Starting from empirical material, we analyze possible principles that have led to a given behavior. These principles are ideas i.e. intentional beings. From most specific ideas we move to more general ones and then to fundamental ideas whose basis is solely a conviction (a core of our behavior, or, to put it more broadly, life).

When we move from particular ideas to more general ones, the subordination of certain ideas to others is a much more precise matter. If our examination is careful, it will be difficult for us to make a mistake in the necessity analysis. If someone has an abortion because they do not want to lose their figure and comfortable life, then it is obvious that their fundamental idea cannot be e.g. Catholic ethics over statutory law. If we are to use the necessity analysis, then no element of any idea that in the analysis leads to, and in practice results from, the conviction can be inconsistent with other ideas in a given sequence, or with the conviction itself. What does "in a given sequence" mean? If we take relativism as a fundamental idea of a given person, then, in a given moment, they may do something completely different than what they have done throughout their life. Thus, it is not that ideas that justify all my actions must always be mutually non-contradictory. They need to be mutually non-contradictory with the fundamental idea and

the conviction. However, they are more particular ideas and they may be inconsistent with one another because the fundamental idea allows for it. Therefore, while speaking of "a given sequence" we mean a connection between a given behavior (action) and a fundamental idea or conviction. This sequence cannot be inherently contradictory for reasons we will elaborate on shortly.

Let us anticipate a possible objection. We were supposed to rely on *a posteriori* data and our necessity analysis seems like an *a priori* examination. One can perceive certain elements of our reasoning as *a priori.* However, this is an *a posteriori* method to its core, which will be clear when we discuss the basic principles of being in the context of internal civilization.

4. We all know situations when one's actions are inconsistent with one's declarations. Drawing from Wolniewicz's conclusion, we can say that just like we do not rely on somebody's declarations regarding their belonging to a given community (instead we empirically verify their actions), we act in a similar vein in the case of internal civilization. Consequently, if someone swears that family is the most important thing to them, but their actions show that it is e.g. money or career, then, obviously, we should rely on his actions, and not words. To understand this problem, we can draw on two well-known sociological phenomena: a role conflict and a conflict in a role. Such conflicts are usually difficult and unpleasant for an individual. For us they are the perfect research material. For example, if someone declares that their family is most important, this is easy to verify when there is a role conflict: it is his child's birthday and the child really counts on the parent to be at the party. However, on the very same day the parent has an opportunity to make a really good deal (let us imagine he is a businessman) from late afternoon

until late at night. Regardless of what the parent declared, his actual hierarchy of values will appear in the choice he makes.[33] Here, we can face the charge that it is not justified to draw such far-reaching conclusions from the behavior. However, if we have a closer look at the case, it will appear that indeed it is. Let us note that each of our actions is something unnecessary in the sense that it is a new quality introduced into being. As such it requires a certain engagement, devoting some energy. Moreover, it is also directed toward something—even if we think we act aimlessly (i.e. we discard the final cause or cannot see it), there can be no action without an efficient cause. Ultimately, the question regarding a given efficient cause (and final cause unless we discard it or reduce it to the efficient cause[34]) is the question of motivations and internal civilization. It shapes the direction and form of our actions. Thus, if we act, we do it based on something, i.e. our internal civilization. In this way, our actions are always consistent with it. We cannot, therefore, reasonably claim that family is the most important to us while our actions show that it is our job. At the level of declarations, we can say anything, whether it concurs with our civilization or not, whether it is internally contradictory or not. However, the level of our actions is always in line with our internal civilization.

Until now, we have shown that in actions men cannot contradict their internal civilization. However, putting things so broadly may lead to misunderstandings. For how could we explain the

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33 We do not mean a situation where the deal assures the family's survival and therefore seems necessary.

34 See the famous discussion between Averroes and Avicenna regarding this issue.

question of sin or even guilt (or the sense of guilt) or conscience (or remorse)? Should our actions always agree with our internal civilization, then our conscience would be useless, and there would be no sense of guilt (or guilt itself), let alone sin. However, our experience shows that a human being (particularly in the light of his actions) is an intricate being. Trying to know a human being by their actions[35] may raise justifiable doubts as to whether we can be so categorical (in terms of the principle proposed) or may lead to cognitive skepticism regarding any "pattern" of human behavior. Thus, the issue is relevant to our considerations and needs explanation.

Internal civilizations can be grouped into two sets depending on someone's dominant attitude toward reality.[36] They are very similar to those that Koneczny distinguished (and a long philosophical tradition before him). The first one is the *a posteriori* attitude: one's thought is adjusted to reality; having recognized rules that govern reality, a given person tries—if they have such will and possibility—to introduce certain changes or improvements into the surrounding reality in line with these rules. The second approach is of *a priori* character. Here, one tries to adapt reality and its rules to one's mode of thinking. Thus, in the first case, if one's mode of thinking is inconsistent with reality, one tries to change one's thinking. In the second case, it is the change

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35 See for example Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn*, 11–17; Ingarden, *Książeczka o człowieku*, 119–125.

36 It is difficult to say whether this attitude towards reality would be a separate (or fundamental) element of internal civilization. However, it seems that the categories presented in the main text are so extensive that framing them in this way would be an oversimplification. Nonetheless, they help explain the issue of the compatibility of action with internal civilization.

of reality that one aims at. This may seem rare, however, some analyses in this book prove that it is not.[37]

We could say that the above approaches are idealized extremes and all kinds of civilizations that we can think of (among them those that we will discuss below) fall between those two.

Let us start from the *a priori* civilizations. Their characteristic trait is that they rely on intentional beings, i.e. creations of one's mind. Here, obviously, we have a whole spectrum of approaches. For example, Byzantine civilization is, as we have said, typically *a priori*. Here, one should recognize what was created by others, for power and law as intentional beings are intersubjective. Law is a quasi-objective point of reference. In a dubious situation, we follow the law or at least we do not go against it. For a person thus civilized, the attitude of law toward reality, i.e. whether it respects what St Thomas called natural law,[38] remains indifferent. One could raise an objection that these are somewhat idealized characteristics, for there is no man who would be so law-abiding never to violate its provisions. This objection is quite justified; however, these idealized types are helpful while presenting this issue, and this is their sole purpose in our work. We agree that probably every adult has violated the provisions of the law by, for example, exceeding the speed limit by 2 or 3 kilometers. How should we understand the proposition that we cannot act inconsistently with our internal civilization? Before we answer this question, let us discuss a civilization based on strong relativism

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37 Stefan Swieżawski presented an apt analysis that showed how widespread *apriorism* is in Western thought, while *aposteriorism* is rare. See Swieżawski, "Zbieżność metafizyki realistycznej i historiografii."

38 STh I–II, q. 94.

and close to the extreme of apriorism. In such a civilization, the only point of reference is one's subjective belief,[39] conviction, or thought. In other words, one is a point of reference for oneself. According to Ortega y Gasset, such a man is never wrong in his opinion,[40] and all his actions are justified and, as a rule, good, for they are based on rightful intentions. This type is also some idealized creation, though our intuition tells us that, unfortunately, many people are just like that. Since they feel they cannot and are not wrong, their actions can never be inconsistent with their internal civilization. There is full compliance here.[41]

Let us go back to Byzantine civilization in which there is a point of reference external to us. Should its rules be limited to e.g. the following two: do not kill and do not rape, they could be fully respected or implemented. However, in more developed systems of law, their perfect fulfillment seems, and virtually is, unfeasible. Should I be a Byzantinist and break the law, would this mean that I abandon the principle of the superiority of statutory law over all other norms? By no means. I still adhere to my internal civilization, and that is why I may feel remorse or a sense of guilt as I have acted contrary to my internal constitution. Only I and my imperfection are to be blamed. If I were a perfect citizen, I would be able to fully abide by the law.[42] However, my imperfection does not

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39 Understood as the opposite of the intersubjective belief.

40 Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, 58–59, 62–64.

41 It is very symptomatic that achieving this full consistency is widely promoted as the aim of the so-called internal development. When it leads a person toward spiritual impoverishment, it is what Roman Ingarden accurately described as "death." (Ingarden, *Książeczka o człowieku*, 26).

42 The above-mentioned excerpt from Hannah Arendt shows the sinister nature of this attitude. Cf. Arendt, *Eichmann w Jerozolimie. Rzecz o banalności zła*, chapter "Obowiązki szanującego prawo obywatela."

exempt me from my guilt—for I and nobody else have broken the law of my own free will.[43] Thus I know that "what I want to do I do not do, but what I hate I do."[44] If my civilization was not oriented toward norms that are objective, i.e. independent from me and my will, I would not feel that my conduct is inconsistent with something beyond me. The fact that there is something beyond me is not an assumption but a conclusion—were it not beyond me (its particular character depending on the civilization), I would have no problems meeting its requirements. It is exactly this "surpassing" that draws me and pulls me to grow, to equal this something (though no one will probably ever reach it).

The gradation of the principle that one cannot contradict one's civilization is gradually coming to light. Let us also consider the *a posteriori* civilization exemplified by Latin civilization. Here, ethics is the superior appellate instance i.e., according to Koneczny, good. Good, as transcendental, appertains to what is. Thus, reality and (because of the strong bond of Latin civilization and the Catholic Church) Catholic ethics, i.e. God's law are a point of reference here. Since God's law cannot contradict reality (though man-made reality can contradict God's law), we shall, by way of reduction, speak about reality. The latter is the subject of our imperfect

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43 This broad issue of the relationship between will and reason has a rich history in the philosophical tradition. We shall not recapitulate it or take a stance on specific solutions. We only want to draw attention to the fact that in our research, we arrive at the same *aporia* that other thinkers and researchers have reached in different contexts and at different times. This only strengthens our conviction that we have chosen the right direction. However, it should be noted that we reject ethical intellectualism, which could justify our actions against the norms with the help of our ignorance. This solution cannot withstand even the criticism based on observations of everyday life.

44 Cf. The whole speech by St. Paul in Rom 7:14–25.

cognition. Therefore, we may be wrong in one way or another and this will influence our actions. However, being wrong in good faith does not entail guilt or remorse. It is especially in this civilization that one can see one's inferiority to something that one wants to serve of one's free will. In this perspective, reality surpasses man so distinctly that one cannot hope to become worthy of it. However, one ventures to become more and more worthy of it. Obviously, by "reality," we understand not only the physical world but, primarily, the heritage of history and ideas of centuries, values (with moral and esthetic above all), human knowledge, and experience thanks to which we have arrived where we are. In the case of believers, one should also include God's law. Could one claim that a man with Latin civilization who decides to serve his heritage, can go through life without a sense of guilt or ever failing to measure up to his convictions? Ultimately, without sin or remorse? It would be absurd to claim that this is within our capabilities. However, sensing the pertinence and greatness of what one serves, despite one's downfalls and stumbles, one tries to aim at the points of reference we have sketched. A man thus civilized adjusts his mode of thinking to reality, even if it is painful, for he knows that what is inferior should strive toward what is superior. Even though it is impossible that such a man fully obeys all the norms of this civilization, we cannot claim that he discards his convictions the moment he goes against them out of his free will. Full adherence to our convictions is simply beyond our human capabilities. The fact that our imperfect human nature renders our actions imperfect does not exempt us from blame for what is our free choice.[45] It is

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45 In the context of our further considerations, it seems that (bearing in mind religious issues, which is justified in the case of Latin civilization) it is exactly

especially in Latin civilization that remorse and a sense of guilt indicate that the foundations of one's internal civilization are continually binding. Without this continuity, it would be impossible for remorse or a sense of guilt to occur. We should place the actions of a given subject in such a perspective. Thus, we do not mean one's single act performed at a given moment, but one's motivations and effects. A different approach would mean that we break the unity and identity of the subject.

We have presented the above issue from the perspective of a subject. Can it be transferred to the realm of metaphysics in the same form? The answer is negative. For a subject, a point of reference may be something subjective. In the field of metaphysics, however, we deal with an objective state of affairs. If a representative of a radically relativist civilization does not feel remorse or a sense of guilt because of his actions which are inconsistent with e.g. natural law, this does not mean that he is not responsible for breaking this law or, consequently, does not incur guilt (which in his subjective feeling he may discard). Should this happen, he becomes—as Ingarden pointed out—doubly responsible and, in a moral perspective, doubly guilty.[46]

Having examined these 3 examples, we can say that the principle of compliance of one's action and internal civilization remains in force, but its full/perfect implementation depends on the point of reference characteristic of a given civilization. The more demanding the reference point, the more often this

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the imperfection of our nature that may save us (as a kind of mitigating factor) from categorical eternal condemnation. Lucifer, on the contrary, has a more perfect nature than ours. Thus, while making a choice, he consciously condemned himself to eternal damnation.

46 Cf. Ingarden, *Książeczka o człowieku*, 100–101.

principle is "adjourned" in the case of individual actions (but not action as a process or continuum), even though it is still binding both as a reference point and pattern of behavior. Thus, the least demanding civilizations will literally obey this principle to the highest degree because they are the least complex.

Our digression regarding the principle of compliance of one's action and internal civilization additionally reinforces arguments behind our thesis that it is possible to empirically verify one's internal civilization. For example, thanks to the categories of remorse or sense of guilt we can recognize the norms that a given individual treats as their fundamental ideas.[47]

Consequently, we can maintain our thesis that inner civilization can be empirically verified and that the empirical "data" exceeds declarations.

5. While using our method one cannot forget the verifiability or falsifiability of the results thus obtained.

6. Also, it should be noted that we have chosen Koneczny's method (and ultimately, the attitude towards triple law and the elements of the quincunx) because it is easiest to recognize one's inner civilization with it.

Having thus delineated additional points that complement our method of studying inner civilization, we may clarify certain preliminary statements that we have to confront. These are: man cannot have two inner civilizations; one's inner civilization cannot be internally contradictory; from this follows the next statement: one's inner civilization must be consistent with the

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47 Designing appropriate research tools (observation methods or tests) is a task for the future. It requires the involvement of an interdisciplinary group of researchers.

basic principles of being; the necessary interconnection between ideas is governed by Gilson's principle of impersonal necessity which is independent of our will.

Let us start with a more precise explanation of why a man cannot have two inner civilizations. Koneczny said a man cannot belong to two civilizations—understood as a method of organizing the collective life—because civilizations are mutually exclusive. The case is similar as regards one's inner civilization. Let us note that it is impossible to be guided in one's action by two convictions (or particular ideas based on two various convictions) at the same time. It is as if we were admitting that statutory law is superior to ethics and that ethics is superior to statutory law. It is not about theoretical, academic contradiction. The real difficulty lies in executing a doubly civilized action. While discussing the examples of giving alms and driving a car, we saw that the same external behavior may be based on very different reasons rooted in one's civilization. However, a given person cannot execute an action relying on contradictory ideas or convictions. As we have seen, a given action may be motivated by, for example, two ideas that do not contradict each other, but it is not possible as regards a conviction and (probably) fundamental ideas. To render the matter metaphysically (or ontologically), we may say that it is empirically impossible that an action is doubly civilized.[48]

We have adopted the following definition of inner civilization: **It is a mode of internal structure and behavior of an individual based on their convictions and fundamental ideas**. Thus, one

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48   Cf. Ingarden, *Controversy over the Existence of the World*, § 5.

cannot act relying on convictions or fundamental ideas that are contradictory to one's own.

The above raises the question of whether it is possible to change one's inner civilization. Obviously, we are not born civilized in any way. We become internally civilized through socialization and other experiences that trigger our development. But is it possible that one's inner civilization can change? In *Chapter II* we have said it is. Depending on its direction, this change is relatively rare and relatively frequent. There is a hierarchy of Koneczny's civilizations and related civilizational laws.[49] According to one of these laws, the equality of opportunity of two civilizations in a given area—provided both are viable—will ultimately result in the victory, or domination, of the inferior one.[50] We have already explained that civilizational inferiority and superiority refer to requirements that a given civilization imposes on its members as regards triple law, the quincunx, and so-called ethical generalities.[51] Koneczny found Latin civilization to be the most demanding. He claimed that in countries with this civilization, one should not give equal rights to other civilizations as this would result in the dwindling of society and the fall of the humanity of its members.[52] If we transfer this law to the field of inner civilization, then our phrase "the direction of change" becomes more lucid. As regards the frequency of changes, we can notice a certain regularity here. Inner civilization changes more often from the more to the less demanding rather than the other

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49 See Koneczny, *The Laws of History*, ch. VII, XI–XIII.
50 Koneczny, *The Laws of History*, ch. XIII.
51 Koneczny, *The Laws of History*, ch. XIII.
52 Koneczny, *The Laws of History*, ch. XIV; Koneczny, *Cywilizacja łacińska*, ch. II–III.

way around. The latter shift is relatively rare and, according to some scholars, requires appropriate internal predispositions.[53] The explanation behind this tendency is simple: inferior civilization is easier. The directionof change notwithstanding, there must be something that triggers it. We can call it a "disintegration of personality" as one's inner civilization is a vital element of one's identity. Jordan Peterson points to a similar mechanism.[54] Generally speaking, disintegration occurs when we realize that our actions, thoughts, identity, etc. do not correspond to the reality in which we find ourselves. Thus, we must go beyond what is known and internalized by us, and move toward what is new. Only then can the internalization of new elements take place, which may involve the growth of one's inner civilization or its alteration into a new one. Both Dąbrowski and Peterson discuss it in the fields of psychiatry and psychology. What matters to us most is the general direction and cause of this change.[55] Let us note that according to this concept (which seems to be well-grounded in reality), the formation of identity and inner civilization is a process. We cannot reasonably claim that because of the same conviction, a twelve-year-old and fifty-year-old

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53 See for example Dąbrowski, *Dezintegracja pozytywna*, 86–87.

54 Peterson, *Maps of Meaning*, 67–70.

55 It is important to quote Dąbrowski's relevant remark: "It is also *necessary* [emphasis mine—KP] to delve more deeply—from a philosophical perspective—into the issues related to the essential emotional elements, essential elements of valuation, which would constitute a starting point for further specification of the levels of values." (Dąbrowski, *Dezintegracja pozytywna*, 153–154). Even though Dąbrowski writes about valuation and values, this should be understood more broadly than only in light of axiological theories. This results from the entire message of his work and the set of reforms that he proposed to improve mental hygiene.

human being will be on the same level of identity development. We see, therefore, that a process takes place—it may be growth in line with one's current conviction or it may be a more dramatic disintegration that involves discarding this conviction. We are now interested in the latter case. Being somehow civilized and having faced a reality that one cannot cope with, one realizes one's identity is falling apart. Therefore, usually unconsciously, one begins looking for a new inner civilization. It may be simpler or more demanding, yet the transition is always a process. While examining a person in the liminal phase of their civilization, one can see certain contradictions. One behaves in a certain way as if suspended between two convictions or two sets of ideas: one that is habitual and one that is only taking shape. One's acts of will that strive for the new civilization will not always, in this liminal period, prevail over acts based on the "old" pattern. Interestingly, the change is faster (i.e. the liminal phase is shorter) when one passes from a superior civilization to an inferior one. Especially rapid transition occurs when moving from a positive civilization to a negative one, which we shall discuss later. Among the various civilizations we have enumerated, there is one with a decisively negative "program" that opposes positive "programs" of other civilizations. It is simply the denial of other civilizations, especially those that give priority to objective ethics.

Regardless of the direction and pace of change that occurs, once civilized, a man cannot become uncivilized. The question is only which civilization prevails in him.

A man, therefore, can change his inner civilization, but this change must be triggered by a lack of correspondence (or sufficiency) between his present civilization and external or internal factors. Here, the level of growth of a given community matters, as through

its creations and demands it may motivate its member to reach for a superior civilization or let him dwindle to animalism.[56]

The above reflection leads us toward issues of fundamental importance for our concept of civilization, its superiority or inferiority: the internal noncontradiction of civilization, the compliance of (each) civilization with the basic principles of being, and Gilson's principle of impersonal necessity that governs the relationship between ideas.

As for the internal noncontradiction of civilization, we may inquire as to why this noncontradiction is so crucial and whether there are any exceptions. We have already mentioned a liminal phase that may be a kind of exception. Still, ideas falling under a given conviction must be consistent with this conviction. Why then talk about noncontradiction? A human being who lives in the world is subject to the principles that govern reality and is capable of recognizing these principles with his mind. Despite the arduous efforts of philosophers, especially from the post-Cartesian family, who have undermined the basic principles of being, it turns out that these principles hold water. Moreover, our minds work in line with them. Surely, we can substitute the word "mind" with "reason" here. Acting in line with these three principles (noncontradiction, identity, and the excluded middle), we reason and cognize reality by them. However, they are not *a priori* principles, for they have been developed based on experiencing reality. Bearing this in mind, it would be nonsensical to claim that suddenly we have found, for example, an inner civilization that is not subject to the principles

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56   Ingarden, *Książeczka o człowieku*, 21–26.

of being. Thus, we conclude that it is indeed subject to these three principles.

We have already said that we reason under these principles because reality is shaped according to them. Why are there so many concepts, for example, relativistic ones, that seem to contradict these principles? Again, we must refer to the distinction between what is factual and empirically verifiable vs. what is declarative. Apart from certain strictly defined social situations, i.e. performative speech acts or performative acts described by John Austin,[57] there is no such power on earth that could change metaphysical reality with words. Obviously, the mere fact that we can utter internally contradictory expressions, e.g. "wooden iron" or "square circle" does not mean that their referents exist. The case is similar with various expressions that are more complex. Therefore, it is not possible for the inner civilization to be contradictory to the basic principles of being.

However, we have said that relativism is one of the fundamental ideas. Relativism rejects the three principles (in their various variants) that we have enumerated. To address this issue, we must distinguish two things. First of all, there is a difference between an idea (that is an intentional being) and the content of this idea that ultimately turns out to be noncontradictory.[58] The existence of ideas is subject to the above-mentioned principles of being. So does the content of an idea.[59] Let us examine what relativism

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57 Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*.

58 Ingarden, "O pytaniach esencjalnych," § 11; Petryszak, *Ontologia kultury*, § 8.2.

59 The problem of the so-called "third man" thanks to which one could try to show contradictions within ideas, has already been overcome. See Ingarden, "O pytaniach esencjalnych," § 11.

actually says. It proclaims that there are no permanent norms, or that it does not recognize them. Whether these are ethical norms, norms of academic conduct or other, the fundamental practical conviction within relativism is the opposition to norms. Thus, relativism creates a new quasi-norm. In this way, this opposition is not only against the principles of being but also against the consequences of accepting them and against the classic concept of truth that is essentially related to the principles discussed.

No matter how much a relativist would like to overturn language so that it does not presuppose fundamental laws of being in its structure, they will fail. Moreover, they are not capable of contemplating a contradiction, even though they can express it.[60] Thus, the internal contradiction of relativism in the context of civilization is only apparent (or declarative). Starting from the conviction that "I" am the most important and adopting the principle that I can satisfy this conviction by any means whatsoever, even if it turns out that my actions are mutually exclusive, they will not be inconsistent with my civilization.

Also, Gilson's principle of impersonal necessity says that contradiction between sequences of ideas is impossible. Here its impersonal character becomes particularly clear. Should the connections between ideas be dependent on my will (i.e. I could freely arrange or shape them), it would turn out that with our analyses we find ourselves in irrational chaos. Since ideas, in their being and content, are subject to the basic principles of being, we can examine regularities between them. The will of a given person notwithstanding, ideas are connected, and from a given idea one

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60   Expressing a contradiction in one's mind is not contemplating, or thinking, a contradiction.

can derive a limited number of more specific or more general ideas. Some ideas cannot be derived from others because they are mutually exclusive. Additionally, the principle of impersonal necessity leads us toward a broad field of consequences resulting from accepting certain ideas and discarding others. These consequences can be unclear, hidden, or simply unwanted by a given person. Still, they will appear in certain conditions.[61] As possibilities, they are necessarily inscribed in ideas.

We can see, therefore, that the principle of impersonal necessity is not only useful in the field of history of philosophy, but it is also inscribed in ideas and connections between them.

As we have stressed, the methodological proposal presented in this book is a sketch of the method—we are constantly working to clarify, specify, and verify it. However, already at this stage of our study, it is possible to indicate the strengths and weaknesses of this proposal.

The strengths include:

1. Approaching reality from a side that has not yet been examined so far.
2. Relying on methods and assumptions that have held good in the research practice on research material that is slightly different but related to ours.
3. Coherence of the method.
4. Avoiding vague definitions.
5. Using accurate and finite criteria.
6. Clearly defined research steps.
7. The possibility to verify and falsify the results obtained.

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61 Cf. Ingarden, *Controversy over the Existence of the World*, § 5.

The weaknesses that require refining, or supporting from other fields include:

1. The need for a significant amount of research material to start the analysis.
2. In some cases, doubts whether our understanding of human behavior is accurate.
3. Efforts to refrain from interpreting one's actions at the stage of gathering research material.
4. The risk of generalization, i.e. difficulties in applying the results to entire communities.
5. The influence of other structures with a human being on his inner civilization.

It seems that we may overcome, at least to a large extent, the above weak points. Obviously, overcoming the fifth weakness requires the engagement of other disciplines (e.g. psychology, psychiatry, neurology, theology, etc.). At this stage of refining the method, this is beyond us, hence the need to involve other specialists.

Despite the fragmentary character of our method, we can see it is applicable. This confirms our belief that it is worth developing, especially since it makes it possible to strictly explore (particularly in the field of philosophy and theology) what so far has been noticed or discussed with vague, metaphorical, or generally intuitive categories.

Preliminary research results and the differentiation of civilizations

We have already said that among the various methods of collective life, Koneczny did not find the one we discussed first—the one in which "I" is the most important. How shall we call this type of inner civilization to render its essence? Let us call it **Luciferian civilization**. We shall not treat the term "Luciferian" as necessarily referring to the actual or mythical evil spirit, for in our considerations we shall not include demonology or any other branch of theology. We simply mean Lucifer as *a figure*, *a symbol*.

Lucifer is the one who goes against God and utters the infamous: *non serviam*. He opposes God for several reasons. Above all, he does it out of pride—he should be the most important and, in his eyes, he is. He defies out of confidence in himself—he believes he knows better than anybody else what is best, right, etc. He opposes God because reality has not been adjusted to his expectations. Also, he trusts his own mind more than his Creator.

Of course, we could give a few more reasons for his rebellion, but the above four suffice in illustrating why the figure of Lucifer

perfectly renders the civilization we discussed first. The more detailed similarities include:

1. Lucifer cannot bear that someone is better than him, that is why he drags everybody down.[1]
2. He does not want to change but wants others to change according to his will.
3. He can change his mind and not obey any norms if he finds it beneficial.
4. Rage is his fundamental emotion.
5. He can subordinate himself insofar as he must, not because he wants to.
6. In the context of creation, one could say that he despises historicism.
7. He is not guided by the objective good in relation to others, but by the subjective one concerning himself.
8. Accountability and consequences apply to others, not himself.

The above similarities between a man with "Luciferian civilization" and the figure of Lucifer already show that borrowing the name of this figure is justified.

Discerning Luciferian civilization is one of the crucial findings that we have achieved as part of our research. This type of civilization is a negation of a positive civilization, in fact any civilization as understood by Koneczny. Internal Luciferian civilization can exist only in opposition to something positive as, in itself, it does not propose any positive program or norms. Should all

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1   This observation has been extrapolated onto the social plane by Ortega y Gasset (*The Revolt of the Masses*), Koneczny (*Prawa dziejowe* [*The Laws of History*]), and—among more contemporary thinkers—Wolniewicz, who said that "the mass will drag you down" (here, "the mass" has strong connotations with "the mass man" of Ortega y Gasset).

men living in a given area adopt Luciferian civilization, then, according to Koneczny, an "a-civilizational state" would arise that can be compared to "the capsheaf dance."[2] Surely, in a given association there is always someone who follows a positive program, but then this person would not be of the Luciferian type. We can, therefore, see that this type of inner civilization Koneczny "sensed" but because of the level of his analysis, he did not examine nor even postulate it.

What Koneczny did not describe, Ortega y Gasset and Le Bon did. However, we cannot claim that their descriptions refer to a civilization as understood by Koneczny, i.e. as a method of organizing collective life. Both these thinkers begin from a different level than Koneczny—what the latter saw on the level of associations, they detected on the level of individuals (though obviously, they did not know Koneczny's works). To better validate the conviction that our method is reasonable and applicable, and to show that "Luciferian civilization" has been, at least partly, detected (though without systematic examination or exposure of its inner structure), we shall discuss Luciferian civilization in the light of the thought of Ortega y Gasset and Le Bon.

In his works, Ortega y Gasset examined a mass man, while Le Bon characterized the crowd and the man of the crowd. We shall not recall these issues that we know well from the history of philosophy. We simply want to say that both these thinkers partly depicted a man whose inner civilization is Luciferian.

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2 Best known from the drama *Wesele* [The Wedding] (Wyspiański, *Wesele*) the motif represents malaise and the inability to take any positive action. In a spiritual perspective, the capsheaf dance may also be called a type of acedia (cf. Ewagriusz z Pontu, *Pisma ascetyczne*, Vol. I, 426–428).

To show how similar their intuitions are to the results we have obtained (which even more justifies adopting and developing our method), let us consider each point of the characteristics of Luciferian civilization. To better present the validity of our research method, we shall refer to two issues: family law (taking as a model a nuclear family without the context of offspring) and truth. We could refer to any other elements of triple law or the quincunx—the choice is not important.[3]

Pride. Ortega y Gasset points out that the main conviction of the mass man[4] is that he is better than others and, in fact, perfect the way he is.[5] One can hardly think of a better characteristic of a proud man. Anyone who objectively exceeds him is considered an enemy that must be destroyed.[6] A proud man finds no guilt or imperfection in himself.[7] If there is anything inappropriate or evil, it does not come from him. In short, he is extremely proud. Should anyone fail to recognize his greatness, his basic reaction will be a fury that drives his thoughts and actions.[8]

Bearing in mind the above characteristics, if we consider family law, we see that any partnership relationship between spouses

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3   We should note that our main point of reference is Ortega y Gasset, while from Le Bon we take the characteristics of emotions and theses regarding the inertia of the man of the crowd.

4   One should not consider the mass man identical to the one with Luciferian civilization. The designatum of the two terms may be the same. However, the description by Ortega y Gasset is not precise enough in places that are crucial to us. Consequently, we cannot equate the two notions, though we treat them as quite similar.

5   Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, 68–69.

6   Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, 61ff.

7   Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, 62ff.

8   Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, ch. VIII.

becomes impossible here. For partnership means that I acknowledge that the other person is my equal and I respect the principle of serving one another. This also means I admit that I can do something wrong as regards my spouse, which can incur my accountability and guilt. Should it turn out that my spouse is superior in certain aspects, then in a partnership relationship I should recognize this superiority (which is impossible in the case of a proud man). In the relationship of subordination, the other's superiority in some respect is not so painful, though it still causes rage (for a different reason though). Should I acknowledge the partnership between my spouse and I, then her superiority would be a challenge to me—I would have to face the following contradiction in my thinking: "I am better than others" vs. "I should be the equal of someone." In the situation of subordination, rage appears because the inferior one "raises their head," i.e. tries to claim a place "not intended" for them. Surely, the above contradiction does not occur in the mind of a proud person—they merely think it indispensable to "correct" the subtle structure of interpersonal relationships so that everyone knows their place. Should a slave appear to be better than his master, this will not be the cause of the frustration of the latter, rather, the fact that the slave violates the structure of interpersonal relationships and becomes capable of "climbing the ladder."

As for the question of truth, a proud man—as described by Ortega y Gasset—is not interested in it unless it says he is the best. Should an unpleasant collision with the truth (understood as objective reality) occur, a proud man feels a fury that drives his actions,[9] i.e. he discards the truth by adopting the position of an authority

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9   Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, 62–63; Le Bon, *The Crowd*, b. I, ch. II, § 1.

figure.[10] In practice, also in the academic milieu, such a person seeks arguments (even those taken out of context) or phrases that support his stance. Ultimately, this may lead to extreme skepticism: he thinks that without full cognitive objectivity, neither science nor any authority can offer him anything meaningful. That is why such people "are forced" to rely on themselves.

Confidence in oneself. We have already said that a person civilized in a Luciferian way "holds authority." This is also characteristic of the mass man who, in theory, knows everything.[11] Alas, his theories often contradict facts, and his "Very Little Brain"—to use a phrase from "Winnie-the-Pooh," may be incapable of overcoming his narrow thinking based on scant information resources. However, such a person thinks "I am in the right and it is *the rightiest of all rights*."[12] This stance is typical of the mass man.[13] Moreover, which is easy to notice, he has an *ad hoc* opinion on every possible topic.[14] Since such a person is the highest instance that distributes truth and authority, why should he not take the floor and speak on any subject? He loves slogans[15] beyond which emotions hide that are "clear" to him, though these slogans do not logically connect in any way or do not have to connect.[16] Again, should anyone oppose the "wisdom" of the mass man, he will usually respond with rage.[17]

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10   Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, ch. VII.
11   Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, 68–69.
12   A paraphrase of well-known words from *Dzień świra,* a tragicomedy by Marek Koterski.
13   Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, 68–69.
14   Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, ch. VIII.
15   Le Bon, *The Crowd*, b. II, ch. II, § 1–2.
16   Le Bon, *The Crowd*, b. II, ch. II, § 1–2.
17   Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, ch. VIII, XI.

How does it translate into family law? The marital relationship will depend on the stance of the spouse with the Luciferian civilization. We know plenty of examples from everyday life (and plenty from statistics[18]), where domestic violence used almost every day is thought to be the best solution. The cleverer representatives of this approach would theoretically agree that domestic violence is indeed bad, and swear they would never hit anyone, however, they use gaslighting for years—hard to detect both by people from the outside and by the victims themselves.[19] Thus we have a full spectrum of varied marital connections depending on the whim of the Luciferian spouse.

As for truth, we could repeat what we have already said.

Reality has not been adapted to the expectations of the mass man. He demands a lot from reality, but primarily he demands that it adapt to him.[20] The idea that he could adapt is beyond him. That is why his basic postulate is that reality must be changed. Sometimes this may involve his actions, then becoming "the crowd man." If there is no action on his part, he will be the crowd man or a mere nag. In the case of the crowd man, let us note that the actions of the crowd are directed against a given "state of affairs" (not necessarily existing) and head for one that is emotionally desired i.e. the opposite of the state that is existentially positive.[21]

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18 Cf. Sample statistics: https://www.parpa.pl/index.php/art/855-o-kampanii-powstrzymac-przemoc-domowa#sub02, especially point „Generalne wyniki sondażu"—access 15th August 2024; *Przemoc wobec kobiet. Badanie na poziomie Unii Europejskiej*, Luksemburg 2014, especially point 1.8.

19 Spear, "Epistemic dimensions of gaslighting: peer-disagreement, self-trust, and epistemic injustice."

20 Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, 62–64.

21 Le Bon, *The Crowd*, b. I, ch. II.

How does this translate into family law? If we have some expectations toward our spouse (e.g. it is not rare that we want him/her to read our minds), and he/she does not fulfill them, then as a Luciferian spouse, we do not revise our model of marriage but instead try hard or even force the spouse to meet our demands (even though it may be unfeasible). Still, if the other party does not adapt, we react with fury, and what follows is the destruction and severance (or tensions at the early stage) of the relationship instead of a critical reflection on oneself and one's expectations. Here, the destructive character of the Luciferian civilization comes to light very vividly.

As for the question of truth, we could quote the 11th thesis on Feuerbach by Karl Marx: "Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it."[22] One could add: "change according to one's will," which is enthymematically conveyed in Marx's thought. Thus, it is not reality or truth regarding it that attracts a person with Luciferian civilization but the implementation of their idea of reality.

The mass man has more confidence in his reason than in reality. Here we can quote words ascribed to G. W. Hegel: "If the facts do not agree with the theory, so much the worse for the facts." This point results from the previous ones. If reality turns out to be inconsistent with the vision that the mass men cherish, due to their pride, they will not conclude that they were wrong. They will not trust the reality with which they have "collided" but will speciously seek to rationalize why the reality should be consistent with their vision of it. This is also characteristic of the

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22   Marx, *Theses on Feuerbach*, thesis XI.

crowd man. As Le Bon emphasized, the crowd man does not use his reason, but emotions based on rage.[23] In our case, a man with Luciferian civilization feels rage because reality dares to be different than his wishes.

As for family law, we have already discussed this issue on pages 140–144. The question of truth was examined on pages 140–144.

Let us go to subsequent similarities between the figure of Lucifer and the reflections of Ortega y Gasset and Le Bon. Let us consider beauty as the category that unifies the elements of the quincunx.

1. An inability to bear that the other is better than me. One of the main traits of the mass man is resentment or hatred towards those who are better, better off, etc. The mass man allows human perfection and success on condition that they do not exceed his perfection or success.[24] We can refer it to the concept of the degrees of perfection: God is the paramount perfection and other beings are only partially perfect—they can realize their perfection as far as their nature allows it. If we substitute God with the mass man, we have a similar pattern. However, there is a reality check: it turns out that there are people who can be more perfect than he is, which makes him furious. Because of this, the mass man tries to drag everybody down so that no one turns out to be better.[25] He does not strive to improve others and himself but aims at "shrinking" in case anybody demands something of him.[26] Wolniewicz's words "The mass will drag you down"[27] hold true here.

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23 Le Bon, *The Crowd*, b. I, ch. II, § 1.
24 Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, ch. VII–VIII, XI.
25 Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, 70.
26 Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, ch. VII–VIII.
27 See Wolniewicz, *Wstręt do rozumienia*, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jPhlTu0xhg8—access 16th August 2024.

This feature vividly manifests itself in the case of beauty as the category that unifies the elements of the quincunx. Recognizing beauty relates to acknowledging its objectivity (that something is beautiful and not that I merely like it) and the fact that someone has made it (in the case of human creations). It also involves acknowledging that I have encountered something that exceeds me,[28] and what Roman Ingarden called "metaphysical qualities."[29] This means I recognize that there is something and someone better than me. If someone creates something that exceeds me with its value, or, unlike me, he is capable of discerning this value that exceeds us both, then there may be a difference between us: not only of quantitative character but of qualitative. This is what a man with Luciferian civilization cannot bear—this infuriates him and triggers destructive mechanisms directed both internally and externally.

2. He does not want to change but wants everybody to change according to his will. Ortega y Gasset points out that the last thing the mass man wants is to demand from himself and stop demanding from others.[30] Even though he is ignorant, he demands that others learn avidly. Although he is a slacker, he wants others to work flat out etc. If others do not meet his expectations, the mass man is frustrated and once again furious with reality. The wrath of such people grows when they are made to demand something of themselves or are shown that they themselves lack what they require of others.

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28   Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, 63–64.
29   See Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art*, § 48–50.
30   Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, 63–64.

Here beauty is also a good benchmark. Let us consider the beauty of our body. The mass man will demand that everybody accept his appearance uncritically. However, he will point out that the esthetics of others (or the esthetics of their bodies) are inappropriate. The body-positive movement, broadly present in the media, illustrates this issue quite well. The original assumptions of the movement that emphasized fighting discrimination and hatred toward e.g. obese people were unobjectionable. However, the trend has evolved to approve of all pathogenic states as positive and... beautiful. This means the complete relativization of beauty, which is to justify people's reluctance to change. Moreover, approving of (or having) a "healthy appearance" and treating it as a kind of canon of beauty meets with the fury of people with such civilization. They reject this canon because adopting such a canon would probably entail that they themselves should change.

3. He can change his mind and not obey any norms if he finds it beneficial. Ortega y Gasset does not say it explicitly and does not consider this aspect of the mass man's behavior. Rather, he points out that mass men are as changeable as a weathercock and follow slogans unthinkingly.[31] We extend our thesis to individual choices unrelated to mass movements. This issue is perfectly complemented by Le Bon's concept of the crowd man: He points out that the crowd is inert and so is the crowd man. He thinks he knows, understands, and reflects upon his actions, but in reality he is mindless and passive.[32] He goes with the flow of slogans. Should the slogans change, so will he. This can be observed in the

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31 Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, 73.
32 Le Bon, *The Crowd*, b. I, ch. I, II (§ 1–2).

everyday life of such a person, which is extremely helpful while gathering research material for studying inner civilization.

When we refer the above to the category of beauty, we can admit that any passive following a given trend (or fad) is an expression of this kind of civilization. This does not mean, however, that we cannot like what is currently "in fashion." The problem lies in following it regardless of its concept of beauty.

4. Rage as the fundamental emotion. We can already see why rage is the fundamental emotion of both the mass man and the man of the crowd.[33] If (almost) nothing goes as he wishes, and the blame for this state of affairs is beyond him, he would have to be a saint not to be livid. The problem is he cannot be a saint. If we want to manipulate the actions of the crowd man, then his fury must be continually fueled.[34] The crowd must have a leader who will "look after" the proper degree of passion. In the case of the mass man, there is a mechanism of self-reinforcing quick temper that results from the causes described above. Reality itself arouses his anger. When prolonged, it turns into hatred and disdain which contribute to the mass man's pride.

As for beauty, rage is expressed as contestation and iconoclasm. Thus, it is not about beauty and aesthetic categories themselves, but about questioning the values that this beauty expresses.

5. He can subordinate himself but insofar as he must, not because he wants to. A man with Luciferian civilization can subordinate himself to the extent that he knows (or feels) he has to or his well-being will be disturbed. This is how a mass man

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33   Le Bon, *The Crowd*, b. I, ch. II, § 1; Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, 97ff.

34   Le Bon, *The Crowd*, b. I, ch. II, § 1.

behaves.[35] He only does what is necessary to maintain his level of well-being.

As for beauty and point 4, we should say that a man with Luciferian civilization will refrain from (or limit) iconoclastic actions if he (usually intuitively) feels that this will benefit him. The most important thing to him is his good, therefore, he will refrain from giving vent to his rage if his good is at stake.

6. He despises historicism. Turning against what is positive, against norms, civilization, etc. results from one's ignorance. The mass man lives "in the now" without understanding its connection with the past.[36] Surely, he may declare that history is important and complain that people do not know it. Still, he will not even try to understand the present in the light of history. He does not (want to) admit that he is an inheritor of something that exceeds him a thousand times. He cannot even treat this idea seriously, for this would mean that he acknowledges that there is something greater than him. Pride, i.e. the core of the mass man and the one with Luciferian civilization, will not allow him to do this.

As for beauty, history can be used—and indeed is often used—to cut oneself off from historicism as understood by Ortega y Gasset.[37] History reveals various approaches to aesthetic issues. Since there have been so many of them, there is no use adhering to the current one—one can freely choose a canon of beauty that suits one best. Here, it is not relativization that is the problem, but a lack of understanding that beauty—as Koneczny aptly points out—cannot be understood without the historical context and the

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35 Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, ch. XI.
36 Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, 89–92.
37 Ortega y Gasset, "Historia jako system," 175ff.

other categories of the quincunx (or, to be more precise, without their understanding that is characteristic of a given civilization).[38] Without this, when we are faced with a beautiful painting, we see only void forms of colors, lines, etc. that are nothing more than what a shiny motley is to a magpie. It is, therefore, understandable that people with Luciferian civilization will wonder that parading in places of Christian worship with e.g. a pentagram or in museums that commemorate the victims of left-wing totalitarianism in a T-shirt with Ernesto Che Guevara causes objection in those who realize the significance of symbols.

7. He is not guided by the objective good in relation to others, but by the subjective one concerning himself. Recognizing the objective good entails two things: the effort to recognize it and submit to it, which involves the need to work on oneself. In the light of what we have said, we can see that here the objective good is impossible. Ortega y Gasset, however, says that one cannot accuse the mass man of having bad intentions.[39] On the contrary, his intentions are often crystal clear though conditioned by everything we have mentioned. He cannot go from what is best in his eyes to what is actually good/right, i.e. consistent with the nature of being. Here we can see a difference with the figure of Lucifer who has no good intentions and because of his supernatural knowledge he is aware of the nature of being. However, because of his traits, he cannot aim at it, i.e. strive for its realization. The rest of our analogy is correct. Thus, due to his good intentions, the mass man believes that he is morally impeccable because he always "means good."

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38   Koneczny, *On the Plurality of Civilisations*, 148ff.

39   Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, 67.

As for beauty, we have to refer to understanding the nature of being without which beauty understood classically does not hold water. As we have said, discarding historicism, choosing relativism, and neglecting the cognition of the nature of being means that beauty is separated from good and truth. Thus beauty not only loses its character but also, in the light of quincunx, is cleaved off of its foundations thus becoming an empty form.

8. Accountability and consequences are important in relation to others, not himself. Here the issue is simple. If we exact primarily or, in fact, only from others, then we demand others to be always accountable, bear the consequences, etc. The mass man cannot demand this from himself. Principally, because his intentions are good, and if something has gone wrong, he is not to be blamed.[40] Moreover, this would disturb his o, therefore, his accountability will surely be rejected.

In this context, beauty as the keystone of various values demands that we be responsible for it, i.e. in the sense that Ingarden speaks of "responsible life."[41] The point is to discern a positive value and to strive for its affirmation and implementation. Also, to discern a negative value (or the denial or destruction of a positive value) and to strive for its realization. However, how can one shoulder the responsibility if one does not believe that the nature of being can be recognized and that one should demand something from oneself? Thus, the concept of beauty in Luciferian civilization diminishes so much that apart from a plain aestheticization of everyday life (which resembles the behavior of a magpie), it ceases to play any role.

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40 Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses,* 97ff.
41 Ingarden, "O odpowiedzialności j jej podstawach ontycznych," 101–119.

Let us now finish our short review. The mass man of Ortega y Gasset complemented by Le Bon's emotional impulses of the crowd (or the crowd man himself) is what we have called a man with Luciferian civilization.[42] Let us stress that this civilization cannot be a civilization of an association. It can only draw from what is positive, for in itself it is a destructive (negative) civilization. Having gained the upper hand, it heads for an acivilizational state. Le Bon and Ortega y Gasset held a similar opinion. They believed such a civilization emerged in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries.[43] A separate work could be devoted to the reasons for this inner civilization's high reach. We have only touched upon this topic, which will hopefully be explained in the future.

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As the last issue of this chapter, we shall briefly discuss three problems mentioned in the beginning that have not yet appeared in our investigations. These are:
- recognizing "the fundamental choice";
- the influence of "the fundamental choice" on the subsequent development of one's inner civilization;
- various mutually exclusive civilizations falling under one name (or linguistic label).

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42 Cf. the reservation from footnote no. 4 (*Chapter IV*).
43 Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, ch. I–III; Le Bon, *The Crowd*, "Introduction."

WHAT IS
"THE FUNDAMENTAL CHOICE"?

Intuitively, we think we understand the content of this question. A problem arises when we have to articulate this intuition. We have already said that an inner civilization is a process (often a long one). We could coin our first civilization with the well-known term "socialization" or a similar one that to a large extent points to many crucial factors that impact one's inner civilization. But how can we explain the fact that e.g. twins raised in the same fashion can have different inner civilizations? How can a child brought up by, for example, Byzantine parents who take pains to pass on their best patterns of behavior, turn out to be civilized in e.g. the Latin manner? We could ask many such questions. However, common sociological explanations cannot address these issues, though they are very useful elsewhere. Could it be the case that certain primordial internal formations are more inclined to be civilized in this or that manner? Could the fundamental choice occur not as a process but during the course of one situation or event? Perhaps psychology could answer these questions to some degree, though as yet we have no highly probable data. Ultimately, addressing the issue from a philosophical perspective, could we say that a choice is actually made? Do we have "resources" to choose from and know what we can or want to choose? Could we speak of our will being involved here? Or is it the case of mere clinging to what suits us? But then why do some things suit us while others do not? Where do our preferences come from? The accounts scattered in various currents of anthropology, reduced to evolutionary explanations or multiple kinds of cultural determinisms are shallow or do not even reach the actual meaning of our questions.

Unfortunately, we know nothing about the issues related to the period of adopting the first civilization. We have begun studying the matter, but the results obtained so far are too preliminary and not satisfying enough to bring them to light. However, it is beyond doubt that this variety of "fundamental choices" calls for elucidation.

What about changing one's civilization? While changing one's inner civilization, why does a man choose this and not that direction? Among the multiple reasons, there are: access to information regarding various types of civilizations; one's own cognitive capabilities; the need to explain reality; one's emotional and spiritual structures, etc. Could we then speak of making a choice here? In the strict sense, rather rarely. The point is—which is not common to admit nowadays—that majority of people cannot rise intellectually and/or spiritually to the level of a conscious choice of e.g. a superior civilization.[44] Changes often occur over a longer period and are noticeable with hindsight. They take place intuitively, with the help of the factors mentioned above. But then what is responsible for this intuitiveness? We could point to various answers given by science that could boil down to three explanations: culture, society, and one's experience. Alas, none of these explanations address our issue, which does not mean that they are of little importance in other matters. In our case, they are useful but only secondarily. Thus, it seems that here we also have to admit we do not know. Moreover, the intuitions or preliminary results of our studies are not clear enough to be presented.

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44 Cf. footnote no. 23 (*Chapter II*).

As for making the fundamental choice, one thing is clear to us and we treat it as an axiom: our inner civilization is not the outcome of any determinism. However, it may not be a result of one's conscious, free, and individual decision. This choice lies somewhere between determinism and a conscious choice.

THE INFLUENCE OF "THE FUNDAMENTAL CHOICE" ON THE SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENT OF ONE'S INNER CIVILIZATION

If adopting a given civilization is a process, what does it mean to be civilized in a given way? We cannot treat it simply as being "in a condition" of civilization because it is exactly civilization, i.e. the structure of ideas based on a given conviction that allows us to act in a certain manner. This is in line with the thesis we have adopted that one cannot act inconsistently with one's civilization. Thus, being civilized can be compared to Aristotle's outlook on virtues. One cannot have a virtue as something "finite," for virtue is something that we practice.[45] The case is similar to one's inner civilization which, as we have said, can vary as to its degree within the same type of civilization. To be internally civilized in a given way means to act based on a conviction and a set of ideas that are consistent with this conviction. Therefore, as Koneczny's studies and observations prove, the more one practices the ways of a given civilization, the more one grows or "diminishes." That is why what we have intuitively labeled as "the fundamental choice" merely shows the way of growth of our inner civilization, and is not

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45 Aristotle, *NE*.

a ready set of actions and viewpoints. All the more so if we take into account the dynamic structure of the surrounding reality.

IN SOCIAL PRACTICE BUT ALSO ACADEMIC DISCUSSIONS, CONFUSION OF TERMS IS QUITE COMMON

It is not because those who use these terms do not know their definitions (at least in the academic milieu), but because they do not reflect on differences in inner civilizations. As an example, let us discuss Catholicism. In Poland, according to the data of 2020, Catholics (i.e. people who are baptized) constituted 84.8% of the population.[46] Does this mean that all the baptized are civilized in the Latin manner i.e. acknowledge that Catholic ethics is more important to them than any other normative regulation? Obviously, the answer is negative. Not every person who has been baptized is a practicing Catholic, and a non-practicing Catholic is merely a "nominal" Catholic. How about practicing Catholics? Are they all civilized in the Latin manner? The answer is yet again negative. Leaving formal and administrative issues aside, can one be a Catholic with e.g. Luciferian civilization? The contradiction is obvious. Should then all people who are not civilized in the Latin manner suddenly officially leave the Church? By no means. If it is possible to pass from any other civilization to the Latin one which is consistent with the teaching of the Church, then pastoral efforts consist of contributing to this very transition. If this transition does not occur, then the zeal of the so-called faithful is merely an empty form of Pharisaic piety. However,

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46 *Mały Rocznik Statystyczny Polski 2021*, 119.

if one stubbornly sticks to the civilization which is incongruent with the teaching of the Church, then one eliminates oneself from being a Catholic (though one may still be labeled as such).

In light of the above, one can see that using labels that describe someone's affiliation is convenient, but without taking into consideration the question of inner civilization, there is no real chance that they are used with precision. Coming back to the example with Catholicism, one can hear everywhere that there is such a thing as open, modern, etc. Catholicism. And yet every doctrinal departure from the teaching of the Church and conscious and persistent adherence to it places a given trend or person outside the spiritual or intellectual structures of the Church. The case is similar with the inner civilization. If a given person consciously clings to a civilization that is inconsistent with the teaching of the Church, it puts this person outside the structures of the Church, even though administratively or even as a participant of services he may be regarded as a full—and even pious—member of the Church. In Poland, there is a huge confusion of concepts, which is present also all over the world. For example, pro-abortion groups (known for their participation in "black marches") as the so-called representatives of the Church (because of their administrative affiliation and perhaps emotional or sentimental attachment to the faith of their fathers) have proclaimed that the Church should approve of abortion. The lack of understanding of civilizational differences and their impact on the actual and not only declarative affiliation[47] exacerbates this confusion. As a result, it seems as if

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47 See the arguments by Musiał, Wolniewicz and Gilson that we have referred to in the previous chapters.

one's approach to the issue of abortion, so vital in the teaching of the Church, is discretionary when it cannot be so.[48]

In a world as nuanced and divided as ours, the old academic distinctions that have proven useful for decades are now becoming insufficient to describe the reality that surrounds us and that we co-create. Our research method and Koneczny's method regarding associations and the terminology involved help us overcome—at least to some extent—this insufficiency. If we take inner civilization and one's belonging to a given civilization (or culture as the local variant of civilization), we do not encounter problems that we have sketched as regards Catholicism. The categories of a nation, society (Polish or Chinese), small homelands, cultural fields, religions (understood sociologically), ethnicity, etc. are not good enough to explain a situation where, for example, in a family of four there is more than one civilization (a common phenomenon now as anyone can see by using our method). By the historical laws discussed by Koneczny (that we extrapolate also onto the level of interpersonal relationships), if there are two viable civilizations with equal rights on one terrain, usually (Koneczny says "always") the inferior civilization prevails. Thus, the lack of understanding of clashes between ideas as well as the method of studying them means that we not only make mistakes while naming certain phenomena but cannot see changes that have been undetected by researchers till now. What they do detect are the aftereffects (most often outdated ones) of clashes between these invisible planes on which they occur.

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48   Cf. *Code of Canon Law*, 1983, canon 1398.

Conclusion

While setting out to write this book, we set ourselves a few goals. The primary goal was to determine whether we can use Koneczny's method of studying civilizations in order to find, in man, elements that influence his behavior, and thereby determine what we have termed "the inner civilization." Our analyses show that such a use of Koneczny's method is indeed possible. Applying this method in the modified way revealed a kind of inner civilization that does not stem directly from Koneczny's concept. The mere possibility of successfully using the proposed method seems to open a new chapter in the studies of civilizations as understood by Koneczny. Also, it suggests a new research paradigm within the framework of philosophical anthropology. While searching for a framework for our research subject, and a theoretical framework for the proposed method, we asked auxiliary questions to which our analyses gave preliminary answers. Our objective has been to explain or at least shed some light on the following issues:

1. What "inner civilization" in fact is?
2. The kinds of inner civilizations.
3. The issue of sets of fundamental ideas and convictions.
4. The method of studying fundamental ideas and convictions.
5. Recognizing so-called "fundamental choice".

6. The influence of one's "fundamental choice" on the subsequent development of one's inner civilization.

7. Difficulties related to one's change of civilization (e.g. the problem of disintegration).

8. The impact of one's inner civilization on one's behavior.

9. The problem that various ideas or civilizations tend to have the same names (for multiple reasons).

In the last part of our reflection, we may sum up and draw conclusions from our analyses and sketch further possibilities for developing issues discussed here.

What is in fact "inner civilization"? It seems that we have clearly explained how we understand inner civilization and why. We have defined it as "a mode of internal structure and behavior of an individual based on their convictions and fundamental ideas." We have distinguished this term from "worldview" and its synonyms. In light of our analyses, individual elements of definitions become clear and have specific referents. Thus our definitions are precise enough for the purposes we have set.

As for **the kinds of inner civilization**, we have pointed to those that Koneczny proposed, and (to demonstrate the effectiveness of our method) to the additional kind of inner civilization that results from our studies and is related to relativism. Here we must admit that this distinction is preliminary and still insufficient (even if we include Turanian and Jewish, or more broadly, sacral civilizations). Presenting a more complete distinction would require more comprehensive studies and, above all, developing our method whose basic version we have described.

Sets of fundamental ideas and the problem of conviction. With the help of charts or descriptions, we have shown quite comprehensively how—in line with the principle of impersonal

necessity—fundamental ideas and convictions are grouped in sets. We have also explained what they are. Significantly, a great variety of foundations for human actions, which result from the diversification of general ideas, ultimately boils down to a few convictions. We have not presented unduly elaborate variants of particular ideas but have shown a representative of results obtained regarding more complex variants. However, we do not determine how many convictions we could indicate, should the research material be wider (we believe no more than a few).

Method of studying fundamental ideas and convictions. We have shown a method of going from observations to fundamental ideas and convictions as well as preliminary methods of verifying and falsifying results thus obtained. We shall not repeat what the theoretical assumptions of this method are. And yet, we should stress that it requires further testing, development and specification. This, however, seems to be a task for an interdisciplinary team.

We have shed some light on **the issue of "fundamental choice."** Nevertheless, we have been unable to say more about its causes or one's possible tendencies to head for this or that conviction or fundamental idea. This requires further studies and we have only emphasized its significance.

As for revealing **the influence of one's fundamental "choice" on the subsequent development of one's inner civilization**, we have contributed only a little. We have emphasized the importance of this impact, and we hope to examine and describe it more comprehensively.

Based on e.g. works by Kazimierz Dąbrowski, we have shown the **difficulties related to one's change of civilization**. Also, by extrapolating Koneczny's idea of historical laws, we have

revealed the risk related to one's (or, perhaps, a communities') tendency to head for inferior, i.e. less demanding, civilizations. This seems to be crucial especially nowadays when one can hear more and more often about the dissolution of young people's identity or that their identity is not strong or fully formed. Further examination of these issues can contribute to recognizing both the theoretical and practical difficulties in studies and therapy of persons with identity disorders.

Moreover, in the last chapter, we have said that the lack of civilizational categories on the individual and social plane contributes (and will continue to contribute) to the incompatibility of research results with actual divisions, tensions, and conflicts between people. Let us again emphasize that we do not want to reject the existing sociological categories. We merely want to complement them.

The impact of one's inner civilization on one's behavior. Although our method leads from observations of somebody's actions to the core of their civilization, we have shown that it is exactly one's civilization that plays a fundamental role as regards all of one's actions. Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir and her followers were wrong when they claimed that existence precedes essence. One has always essence both in terms of one's identity and metaphysics, i.e. one's essence precedes existence as understood by Sartre.

As part of observation rather than a meticulous analysis, we have shown certain conceptual confusion related to labeling entire communities, associations, etc. When devoid of the context of inner civilization, this seems to escape notice. We do not claim that solving these problems would be impossible without taking into consideration the issue of inner civilization. However, our method and its clear categories help to conduct such studies and "establish order."

To sum up, it seems that we have managed to meet the tasks that we have set at the beginning. We have succeeded in presenting certain research problems—the most important to us at this stage of research—meticulously enough. We have only sketched others. Hopefully, we will work on them with researchers from various academic fields.

The research perspectives that our method reveals are the following:

1. **Specifying our method**. By investigating issues related to the "fundamental choice"; examining the possible impact of other structures in a human being on particular elements of one's inner civilization; studying the universal character of inner civilization.

2. **Using our method to complement data on inner civilizations** and elaborating on kinds of (model) civilizations that can be distinguished as well as their possible sub-variants.

3. **Examining the possibility of using our research results** in e.g. social studies or other disciplines.

4. **Further analyzing detailed issues**, e.g. the question of the significance of matrimony for the development of the inner civilization or the question of updating terminology that in many cases does not align with contemporary terminological standards. It was impossible, however, to discuss these issues in this work. Therefore, we defer them to further studies.

Let us once again repeat why we think these issues are important (leaving aside their purely academic appeal). The existing models, terminological frameworks, and research models are, in our opinion, not adapted to grasping even a partial truth about divisions among people who, in line with standard categories, constitute one nation, society, cultural field, etc. If we

cling to classic frameworks (that may be adequate in other areas), we will not be able to capture the dynamics, causes, and possible reasons for changes that are now happening faster than ever before.

We realize that there are no perfect research methods. However, if these analyses and conclusions contribute to a slightly better understanding of human beings and their dynamics (internally, in particular), then writing this book was worth it.

Abstract

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ON THE INNER CIVILIZATION OF MAN

This work investigates the concept of "inner civilization," a model for understanding the internal structuring of individuals based on deeply held ideas and convictions that influence behavior. Inspired by Feliks Koneczny's theory of civilization and enriched by insights from Étienne Gilson, José Ortega y Gasset, Gustave Le Bon, and Bogusław Wolniewicz, we propose a method for analyzing how these internal structures shape human actions. Central to our thesis is the principle that individuals never act contrary to their core ideas, a controversial yet foundational assertion we seek to substantiate. Our approach critiques historicist and psychological models, emphasizing the philosophical necessity that ideas inherently determine behavior. We aim to refine and expand Koneczny's classifications by identifying a new type of inner civilization, highlighting the intricate relationships between beliefs,

motivations, and actions. While this study serves as a preliminary outline of our research method, it seeks to lay the groundwork for further exploration and invites constructive critique to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the inner forces shaping human behavior.

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Table of contents

This work investigates the concept of "inner civilization," a model for understanding the internal structuring of individuals based on deeply held ideas and convictions that influence behavior. Inspired by Feliks Koneczny's theory of civilization and enriched by insights from Étienne Gilson, José Ortega y Gasset, Gustave Le Bon, and Bogusław Wolniewicz, we propose a method for analyzing how these internal structures shape human actions. Central to our thesis is the principle that individuals never act contrary to their core ideas, a controversial yet foundational assertion we seek to substantiate.